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Abstract 
 
Louis-Philippe Demers (2014), “Machine performers: Agents in a  
Multiple Ontological State”, Ph.D. University of Plymouth, UK. 
 
Keywords: robotic art, embodiment, performing arts, artificial intelligence, presence 
on the stage, agency. 
In this thesis, the author explores and develops new attributes for machine 
performers and merges the trans-disciplinary fields of the performing arts and artificial 
intelligence. The main aim is to redefine the term “embodiment” for robots on the 
stage and to demonstrate that this term requires broadening in various fields of 
research. This redefining has required a multifaceted theoretical analysis of 
embodiment in the field of artificial intelligence (e.g. the uncanny valley), as well as 
the construction of new robots for the stage by the author. It is hoped that these 
practical experimental examples will generate more research by others in similar 
fields.  
Even though the historical lineage of robotics is engraved with theatrical 
strategies and dramaturgy, further application of constructive principles from the 
performing arts and evidence from psychology and neurology can shift the perception 
of robotic agents both on stage and in other cultural environments. In this light, the 
relation between representation, movement and behaviour of bodies has been further 
explored to establish links between constructed bodies (as in artificial intelligence) 
and perceived bodies (as performers on the theatrical stage). In the course of this 
research, several practical works have been designed and built, and subsequently 
presented to live audiences and research communities. Audience reactions have been 
analysed with surveys and discussions. Interviews have also been conducted with 
choreographers, curators and scientists about the value of machine performers.  
The main conclusions from this study are that fakery and mystification can be 
used as persuasive elements to enhance agency. Morphologies can also be applied that 
tightly couple brain and sensorimotor actions and lead to a stronger stage presence. In 
fact, if this lack of presence is left out of human replicants, it causes an “uncanny” 
lack of agency. Furthermore, the addition of stage presence leads to stronger 
identification from audiences, even for bodies dissimilar to their own. The author 
demonstrates that audience reactions are enhanced by building these effects into 
 © Demers 2014 
iv 
machine body structures: rather than identification through mimicry, this causes them 
to have more unambiguously biological associations. Alongside these traits, 
atmospheres such as those created by a cast of machine performers tend to cause even 
more intensely visceral responses.  
In this thesis, “embodiment” has emerged as a paradigm shift – as well as  
within this shift – and morphological computing has been explored as a method to 
deepen this visceral immersion. Therefore, this dissertation considers and builds 
machine performers as “true” performers for the stage, rather than mere objects with 
an aura. Their singular and customized embodiment can enable the development of 
non-anthropocentric performances that encompass the abstract and conceptual patterns 
in motion and generate – as from human performers – empathy, identification and 
experiential reactions in live audiences. 
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Introduction 
Premise 
Research into the “Uncanny Valley”, anthropomorphism, causality and 
animacy can shift human perception about the relationship between modalities and the 
abilities of machine performers on the stage and in other cultural environments. 
Furthermore by correlating and combining these issues, various concepts of 
embodiment can be compared and extended beyond current definitions found in 
robotics. These concepts range from the behavioural and performative to the holistic in 
nature. Within the framework of this thesis, I will attempt to design and produce 
machine performers that engage the audience’s emotions by means of novel 
combinations of modalities with abilities, so that these performers can offer new 
insights in scientific as well as cultural environments. 
Aims  
The main aim of my research is to extend the concepts of current academic 
theories and investigations about the Uncanny Valley, artificial intelligence, the 
perception of motion, animacy, causality and artificial intelligence for other artists, 
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theatre designers and directors. In order to do so, I attempt to define a number of 
specific theoretical objectives under each topic.  For example in the Uncanny Valley, I 
hope to create a new approach about this controversy that comes from the perspective 
of experimental robotics and theatre. In the field of artificial intelligence, my aim is to 
combine and reapply current AI theories in order to create new models, so that the 
creators themselves can gain deeper creative experiences.  Within this trajectory, I 
hope to raise awareness of the potentials of scientific and artistic correlations with 
regard to subjects within artificial intelligence like embodiment, by making more 
specific comparisons of the processes and the results.  
Another set of aims relates to the concept of anthropomorphism. Here I hope to 
analyse and derive models about the role of mechanomorphism, zoomorphism and 
anthropomorphism in relation to machine performer in order to enhance the creative 
experience of such performers for future designers. This will require a careful analysis 
of the use of causality and animacy and the resultant audience reactions. Furthermore, 
by exploring current perceptual theories about combinations, reapplications, motion 
and causality I hope to shed light on new understandings of machine performers and 
their effect on the audience. 
The final aim is to combine and correlate these theoretical discourses so that 
the premise of the dissertation is supported. However in order to do so, I have 
attempted to define a number of specific practical objectives in my research. These 
are: 
• to gain insights about the development of robotic art agency so that the 
machine performer can become more appealing and engaging to viewers;  
• to apply techniques of embodied artificial intelligence along with these results, 
and to develop machine characters with reference to neurobiological and 
psychological fields;  
• to create more intensely empathetic experiences for audiences by giving my 
machine characters commonalities of embodied experience. 
The results of such practical objectives are presented in this thesis and should be 
considered as an integral part of my research.  
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Methods and Methodology  
This dissertation has been developed using a combination of art and science 
methods and methodologies, because I regard my research as needing both 
components of analysis. On the one hand, I regard the artwork I have developed 
during the course of this PhD as a set of case studies for the performing arts. On the 
other hand, I have examined relevant theoretical contexts through interview 
techniques, literature reviews and an analysis of AI projects.  
Furthermore, I have attempted to create new methods and methodologies, for 
example, by transposing point-light animations from human motion control techniques 
onto machine performers, or by transposing psychological quantitative analysis from 
social robotics onto machine performers such as the Godspeed index. By following 
such new appropriations of scientific robotics onto machine performers I hope to show 
how valuable these new applications might be for generating deeper emotional 
response. 
This thesis also attempts to contextualise the results my artworks, some of 
which are accompanied by a qualitative analysis of my experiments. The projects 
presented are Devolution (2006), The Tiller Girls (2010), Area V5 (2009-10), La Cour 
des Miracles (2007, 2012) and The Blind Robot (2012).  In The Tiller Girls, the 
discussion on embodiment becomes more pertinent, but still, quantitative analyses of 
two experiments on motion perception and animacy have been conducted.  
Discussions of both Area V5 and The Blind Robot are accompanied by a quantitative 
analysis of audience perceptions of the work. In my first project in the PhD program, 
Devolution, I conducted audience discussions and interviews, plus an interview with 
the choreographer, and examined all the reviews from the critics. 
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The following is a table of some of the above methods and methodologies in 
greater detail: 
METHODS (WHAT) METHODOLOGIES (WHY and HOW) 
1) Comparison of case studies: 
scientific and engineering 
projects with artistic and 
theatrical results 
  
To contrast results from scientific and engineering 
domains with regard to artistic and theatrical results. 
Conducted by dialectical argumentation and critical 
analysis.  
2) Interviews with people 
involved with machine 
performers 
Collections of qualitative information about 
performance and case studies plus numerous ad hoc 
interviews after performances, during lectures and 
conferences. 
3) Literature reviews 
 
To survey and identify key concepts inside the lineage 
of robotic agents throughout history with the main 
focus on body representation, movement, context and 
theatrical constituents.  
To survey applicable theatre and performance theories 
and analyse theatre semiotics and the new field of 
embodied semiotics. 
4) Current discourse 
investigations 
– AI discourse, embodied cognition and its 
repercussions in the implementation of behaviour. 
– Psychological theories surrounding the perception of 
movement, animacy, causality, behaviour and emotion. 
Table 1. Methods and Methodologies. 
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My aim is to correlate the above-mentioned findings, thereby constructing an 
alternative representation of machine performers, and to establish the basis of a 
theoretical framework for a new set of robotic characteristics. As mentioned earlier, 
one of these representations requires the transposition of point light displays from 
human motion tracking and the application of this method to machine performers. 
Point light displays often collect a time-based set of data by capturing individual key 
locations of the human body in motion. Instead of human bodies, I have utilized these 
motion capture systems as embedded in the Tiller Girls (see Chapter 4).  In this case 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis I have collected was about the viewers’ 
perceptive and emotional response towards motion (Blake and Shiffrar 2007). I have 
specifically investigated whether audiences can identify with the motion of the Tiller 
Girls. 
I mentioned that I have used the technique of transposing scientific AI results 
(such as the principles found in the synthetic methodology from bottom-up AI) into 
four new artworks (The Tiller Girls, La Cour de Miracles, The Blind Robot and Area 
V5).  The commonality of these works is that they attempt to empower the principles 
found in engineering and re-appropriate them into artworks. An important and 
controversial aspect of these case studies is their implementation of the realm of social 
robotics and the role of touch and gaze in the man-machine relationship.   
Relation between Theory and Practice 
I consider that these five case studies (i.e. the four just mentioned and 
Devolution) constitute at least 50 per cent of my research for the PhD dissertation, 
which is why I refer to them in each chapter. However, because quantification is seen 
as a very difficult form of analysis in the arts, where ambiguity and individual 
audience interpretation are highly valued, I have chosen to blend quantitative and 
qualitative forms of analysis. In the quantitative analysis of Area V5, The Blind Robot 
and the Tiller Girls, I borrow from previous experimental psychology protocols in 
order to draw potential comparisons with academic and engineering results. In 
Devolution I could take my results from the group of critics about impact of robots on 
the spectacle, or from the choreographer’s point of view about the relations between 
size, scale and impact on the audience. In the Tiller Girls, certain members of the 
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audience were interviewed about their levels of identification and the impact of a 
chorus of machine performers. 
In designing the art experiments my main aim has been to trigger various 
visceral reactions about such concepts as movement and balance, or in the case of 
Devolution fear and horror. Because our cultural backgrounds can rarely be 
disconnected  from our visceral reactions, I have also been interested in exploring 
these connections (Zimmer 2003). Therefore, I am also interested in how audiences 
reflect on an embodied level within a controlled environment like that created for V5.  
In this dissertation I hope to embed my own case studies in a new art and science 
context; this requires knowledge of the background of both contexts.  
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Practice  Description 
La
 C
ou
r d
es
 M
ir
ac
le
s 
(1
99
7,
 2
01
2)
 
 
La Cour des Miracles stages robot 
misery and pain.  It comprises a 
series of heretical characters that are 
begging, convulsing, harassing, 
crawling and limping. 
 
It also incorporates a large-scale 
atmospheric environment that 
servers as a habitat for the 
characters. 
Th
e 
Bl
in
d 
Ro
bo
t (
20
12
) 
 
The Blind Robot is a machine that 
has two anthropomorphic arms and 
hands. 
 
It touches visitors to make a mental 
image of what its fingertips have 
seen. 
 
It is a modern version of the Turk’s 
Chess Player. 
Ar
ea
 V
5 
(2
00
9-
20
10
) 
 
Area V5 is a large-scale 
environment. It comprises 60 
mechatronic skulls that can follow 
the visitor. 
 
This work comments on the gaze in 
social robotics and the triggering of 
the Uncanny Valley. 
Th
e 
Ti
lle
r G
ir
ls
 (2
01
0)
 
 
The Tiller Girls is a dance 
performance built upon Zurich’s AI 
lab Stumpy. An ensemble of up to 32 
identical autonomous robots is cast 
as a mechanical version of the early 
20th century dance company of the 
same name. 
 
The piece is improvised and the 
robots’ choreography, sound and 
visuals are performed live. 
D
ev
ol
ut
io
n 
(2
00
6)
 
 
Devolution is a dance performance 
with an ensemble of 10 human 
dancers and 30 machine performers. 
Devolution regroups six different 
families of robot. 
 
Devolution is a large-scale 
performance where robots span the 
performing space alongside human 
dancers. 
Table 2. Summary of Practical Artwork 
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Overview of Research 
I have examined the discourse surrounding embodiment by reading other 
people’s theories about bottom-up AI: Pfeifer and Bongard (2007), Brooks (1999, 
2002), Kaplan (2008); about embodiment: Csordas (1994), Johnson (2008), Gallagher 
(2012), Merleau-Ponty (1962); and about theatre: Fischer-Lichte (2008), Cormac 
Power (2008), Stanton Garner (1994). These theories are imbued with controversies 
about presence, definitions of performing, bottom-up versus top-down AI, embodied 
cognition and the role of mirror neurons. One of the most pertinent of these 
controversies is the Uncanny Valley and the discussion about cognitive dissonance 
(Kang 2009; Tondu and Bardou 2011). I also found research about the perception of 
human dance and mirror neurons in the performing arts (Hagendoorn 2004; Cross, 
Hamilton et al. 2006; Rubidge 2010). However, throughout this dissertation it is on the 
evolution of machine performers that the primary focus lies. 
The field of mirror neuron systems (MNS) is a flourishing one and, among the 
many hypotheses offered by MNS experts , neuroeasthetics and embodied simulation 
can help with the examination of audience perceptions of art and human performers. 
The framework of embodied simulation provides some background on how a 
phenomenological reaction arises in an observer of human movement (Gallese 2005). 
MNS proposes that embodied mechanisms can simulate actions, emotions and 
corporeal sensations. If, inspired by this scheme, I can relate mechanisms involved in 
the perception of human movements to the perception of machine performers’ 
movements, I will be able to offer grounds for understanding the empathic reactions of 
audiences to inanimate objects. 
The controversies surrounding the Uncanny Valley fuel the debate about the 
relevance of constructing humanoids. The humanoid-builder sees this Valley as a 
challenge and seeks instruments to measure the phenomenon (Ishiguro 2006; 
MacDorman and Ishiguro 2006), while the father of the Uncanny Valley himself 
proposed an “escape by design” towards less anthropomorphic machines. The 
Uncanny Valley formulation is highly problematic as it is bound to the quantitatively 
measured level of anthropomorphism in both human and machine, a clear violation of 
the qualitative characteristics of the scale’s anchors (Ramey 2005). In investigating the 
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Uncanny Valley, I therefore look for the observer’s perceptual grounds for rejection 
(or breach of credibility) of machine performers. 
In performance theory, embodiment has become central to the analysis of 
audience perception and the reception of the human performer. For instance, in some 
non-representational theatrical performances, and certainly in dance, embodiment – 
and not the dramatic text – is the focus of the theatrical experience.  This embodiment 
has to be experienced and empathized with by other bodies, those of the audience:  
“The synergy of the actor’s embodiment and the spectator’s willing imagination 
creates possibility, the potential for new understanding and insight charged by the 
necessity of intersubjectivity” (Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 10). My task is to seek 
common ground between the perceived embodiment of human and machine 
performers.	   In doing so, I acknowledge that the phenomenological analysis of the 
machine performer also covers its interaction with the environment: it does not exist or 
act in isolation. 	  
In Chapter One I attempt to reconstruct the machine performer, but in order 
to do so, I need to establish a historical trajectory based on the representation of the 
human body. The aim is to nuance the difference between animate and animated 
bodies, a characteristic used throughout the thesis to qualify machine performers. In 
the course of developing this trajectory, the dramaturgical, the thematic and the 
“performative” aspect of machine performers is examined. I compare current forms of 
representation found in robotics, particularly the social robot and the biologically 
inspired robot. These two forms are illustrated by analyses of two of my practical 
works: La Cour de Miracles and the Blind Robot. Both works develop narratives 
based on the enactment of a situation that reveals the misery of robots and their 
impairment (robot blindness). 
In the course of my research about our identification with machine performers, 
I realized that a potential rejection of the robotic agent is associated with near human 
machines. So Chapter Two examines the Uncanny Valley. In it I address the 
controversies that this “Valley” raises within the robotic community and examine why 
and how “the uncanny” is more a problem in the academic than in the artistic world. 
This chapter attempts to reformulate the Uncanny Valley into a broader perspective: 
one that can be applied to non-anthropomorphic machines. This reformulation focuses 
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on the breach of suspension of disbelief and the animate qualities of machine 
performers. I aim here to highlight the problematic factors of the Uncanny Valley and 
exemplify them by using a quantitative analysis of my own artwork (Area V5). But 
academic researchers may well be interested in my approach as a complement to their 
own. 
So in Chapter Three I have expanded the notions of embodiment found in 
artificial intelligence and compared them with alternative views from fields such as 
phenomenology and anthropology. The constructed bodies of machine performers can 
offer dramaturgy as a way to understand how cultural convention is embodied and 
enacted.  One aim here is to differentiate between the ecological body of the “robot in 
the lab” and an historical enactment of that body. These various levels of 
“embodiment” may enable us to better decode the roles of a functional machine seen 
within the AI context and a performing machine seen on the theatrical stage. In this 
context I present my three practical projects that investigate levels of embodiment and 
artificial intelligence principles. The Tiller Girls takes a robot developed to study 
morphological computing and locomotion and brings it onto the dance floor. Here I 
attempt to analyse how gender can be constructed and based on specific historical 
theatrical contexts so as to create culturally transformed results. In another project, 
The Blind Robot I reference the Turing test as a base for social embodiment, while in 
the characters of La Cour des Miracles I aim to show how to utilize techniques of 
artificial intelligence programming in order to produce bodily manifestations of pain.  
But what does an audience make of all this? 
In Chapter Four, I look at machine performers’ bodies from the outside and 
investigate various aspects of perception and the reception of machine performers.  I 
explore concepts of animacy, causality and attribution found in moving objects. What 
is the impact of anthropomorphism on the perception of an alternative body?  Why 
does such an alternative body need to introduce the audience to the differences 
between biological and mechanical perceptions of movement? It is here that I have 
concentrated on the types of atmospheres that are introduced to affect the perception 
and interpretation of group behaviours. For example what effects does “flocking” have 
on an audience?  Here the stage presence of machine performers is analysed from a 
theatrical perspective, in order to determine if its performance lies between a sense of 
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agency and a simple sense of automation. While Tiller Girls is utilized to primarily 
demonstrate the principles of attribution, it is also utilized to demonstrate a 
correspondence between the biological and mechanical perception of movement. 
Finally, in Devolution a major dance work with both human and machine performers, I 
endeavour to illustrate the various components of perception and reception introduced 
in this chapter 
Framework: Presence and Embodiment 
Embodiment and phenomenology offer me an interdisciplinary framework to 
conduct my analysis of the machine performer. This framework is reflected in the 
structure of the thesis. 1) The epistemology of the mechanical body through time 
serves as a basis to reconstruct the current and potential notions of the embodied 
machine performer. 2) By investigating cognitive dissonances found in machine 
performers (e.g. in the Uncanny Valley), I can look at expectations arising from 
embodiment (e.g. in an android) and the impact of theatricality on its reception. 3) By 
investigating potential ways to realign those dissonances, embodied artificial 
intelligence provides not only new ways of considering embodiment but also 
techniques and principles to achieve alternative morphologies that could have an 
impact on how artists can design machine performers.  4) From both the academic and 
artistic point of view the machine performer needs the co-presence of the audience to 
be fully realized. By looking at various aspects of the perception and reception of 
machine performers, from innate (biological) to constructed (intentional and 
anthropomorphic) motion, the loop can be closed on the definition of embodiment of 
the machine performer.  
Threading through the thesis is the quest to pinpoint, and subsequently realize 
in practice, the qualities of the machine performer. As a starting distinction, there are 
two opposite qualities of machine performers: the animate and the animated body. An 
animate body has a flavour of aliveness while the animated one has a sensation of 
mechanical automatism. Analysed by historian Jessica Riskin, the famous Kempelen 
Chess Player Automaton (see Chapter 1) operated under the identification of two 
separate powers, the hidden “vis directrix” and the visible “vis motrix”. Riskin reports 
historical writing by Windsich: “[he] celebrated Kempelen’s accomplishment, not of 
an identity between intelligence and machine, but of a connection between intelligence 
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on one side of the boundary and machine on the other” (Riskin 2003, p. 621). In other 
words, from the embodiment and the enactments emerged a sensation of body and 
soul congruence, an alignment of the vis motrix and the vis directrix. 
This body and soul (in)congruence has been formulated for the contemporary 
world by many performance and theatre theorists through the concept of presence. The 
plethora of synonyms of presence in theatre are: immediacy, spontaneity, intimacy, 
liveness, energy, “the presence of the actor”, etc. However, even if this sounds like 
common sense, i.e. qualities the machine performer should have, presence is a highly 
contested and vexed term, especially after post-structuralist critiques. Philosopher 
Jacques Derrida denies the reality of presence, in the sense of truth existing in itself, as 
a meta-logical foundation. Derrida points out that “every mental or phenomenal event 
is a product of difference, is defined by its relation to what it is not rather than by its 
essence” (Auslander 1995, p. 53) 
But given the current visibility of presence and its central place in the 
phenomenon of performance, scholars have reified presence based on more nuanced 
discussions. Among these scholar are the main theorists I will be referring to: Fischer-
Lichte (2008), Goodall (2008), Power (2008) and Garner (1994). Theatre theorist 
Cormac Power in the conclusion of his book Presence in Play eloquently refers to the 
artificial performer: 
At a time when concepts of presence are seen as problematic, when notions of 
perception and subjectivity are being (re)addressed in terms of how experience is 
never 'pure' but always encoded within cultural inter-texts, theatre's ability to 
complicate the experience of the present seems especially relevant. Indeed, theatre's 
manipulation of presence can be seen as a crucial asset at a time when technologically 
produced representations are increasingly capable of concealing the artificiality of 
their construction. (Power 2008, p. 198) 
Further on, Power then reaffirms that presence is an unstable experience (or 
multi-stable as expressed by Fischer-Lichte) and he sees presence as a function of 
signification: 
One of the challenges left to us by theories of phenomenology and poststructuralism is 
that of appreciating theatre as a representational form that explores the intricacies of 
presence in particular ways, as we move away from merely privileging theatre as an 
essentially 'present' phenomenon. The spatial and temporal parameters of theatrical 
performance, far from housing a secure and stable 'present' experience, should instead 
be seen as places of almost infinite possibility in which presence is subjected to 
playful manipulation. (Power 2008, p. 205) 
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Power develops his concept of presence over three main modes: making 
present (the fictional mode of presence), having presence (the auratic mode of 
presence) and being present (the literal mode of presence). He derives these presences 
from Garner’s presencing. “Instead of presence, the theatre asks to be approached in 
terms of presencing; theatrical phenomena are multiply embodied, evoked in a wide 
variety of experiential registers, refracted through different (and sometimes divergent) 
phenomenal lenses” (Garner 1994, p. 43) Power claims that “the notion of presence, 
reconfigured through phenomenological investigation into 'presencing', provides a 
more dynamic and less essentialising perspective”(Power 2008, p. 191) . 
By looking at presence as a play of actualities, I can link phenomenology with 
presence, two main issues in this thesis. Presence and presencing refer to the multiple 
facets of the embodiment of the machine performer, the qualities of its co-presence 
with the audience and its fundamental double vision (or intrinsically multiple 
ontological status).  
Presence is also found as a term in virtual reality and human-robot interaction 
(HRI). Virtual reality and HRI both seek a sense of presence in the actuality of events 
– within the artificiality of their apparatus.  Presence in this case is more related to the 
qualities that make the “illusion” credible, giving the user an appearance of being 
present in virtual space. 
Framework: The Machine Performer 
When I bring theatre into the discussion of this thesis, I deal more with the 
theatricality (or dramatization) of the spatio-temporal experience between the audience 
and the machine performer. These encounters include theatre, dance, human-robot 
interactions as well as interactive robotic artworks. This spatio-temporal encounter 
implies the intrinsic characteristic of co-presence between the audience (in the broad 
sense) and the performer (on stage and in other contexts).  
I do not seek to compare machine performers with actors rendering a dramatic 
text on stage, though I might make small incursions into performance theory.  As this 
field is humanocentric, I aim to transpose some of those theories towards application 
to machine performers. I have coined the term ‘machine performers’ to express the 
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aspect of my work as being based not directly on a dramatic text but rather on the 
behaviour of fictional characters, using sound rather than voice. This expression 
deliberately enlarges the notion of acting (theatre) to include dancing and movement, 
performance art, kinetic art and the robotic sense of “performing” a task or a goal. 
Accordingly, I will not fully embark on the analysis of audience reception of 
(or participation in) a specific work, but rather dissect elements of perception and 
reception to bootstrap the process of understanding the act of perceiving the machine 
performer.  
I employ the word machine as opposed to robot to include a broader definition 
of the machine as a performing agent. I define the machine performer as embodied and 
intentional (whether or not this is apparent) and set to perform in a specific spatio-
temporal situation (e.g. a play, a social or cultural context). The term robot has many 
connotations in its visual representations: android, industrial arm, automaton, to name 
only a few. The vagueness of the word machine helps me to present non-
anthropomorphic embodiments as “equal” to anthropomorphic ones and to look at 
machine functions (behaviours) in a broader context (from the mechanical to the 
human). 
Conclusion of the Introduction  
My analysis has left me with many questions, but certain attributes of machine 
performers are still obvious. The machine performer has to be animate in order to be 
accepted by an audience. These audiences seem to be able to relate and identify with 
alternative morphologies for machine performers, and I will attempt to demonstrate 
this claim with my analysis in this thesis.  I will use some of my own experiments to 
prove that a correspondence between a robot and a human body may change and be 
affected by the attribution of intention during animacy experiments (Tiller Girls). Also 
the attribution of character to a machine performer may end up severely modulating 
audience perceptions. Based on both quantitative results (The Blind Robot) and 
qualitative analysis (The Tiller Girls), I hope to offer new approaches to the building 
and designing of machine performers for the stage, to the shifting of atmospheres so as 
to enhance the perception of machine performers, and finally to offer scientists 
different ways of thinking about the “Uncanny Valley” as a valid aesthetic choice for 
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audiences. The following table illustrates my own attempts, inspirations and reactions 
to building such performers:  
Practice 
Name of 
Machine 
Performer 
Reconstructing 
the Machine 
Performer 
The 
Uncertain 
Valley 
Comparing 
Embodiments 
Perception and 
Reception 
     
La Cour des 
Miracles 
Aligned to bio-
mimicry 
 
Historical context 
 
Staging 
Embodiment 
 Implementation of 
subsumption 
architecture for 
behaviours 
 
Morphological 
computing 
Anthropomorphism 
 
Animacy, causality 
and attribution 
 
Atmospheres 
The Blind 
Robot 
Aligned to social 
robotics 
 
Shifting from 
behaviours to 
experiential for 
the audience 
 Quantitative 
analysis of the 
perception of two 
“characters” played 
by the Blind Robot 
 
Reformulation of a 
Turing test 
Experiential 
Area V5  Pastiche of 
Uncanny 
Valley 
archetypes: 
death, fear 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
 Scenography makes 
atmospheres 
The Tiller 
Girls 
  Qualitative 
description of the 
development 
process of the work, 
the comparison 
between AI robots 
and machine 
performers and 
comparison 
between machine 
performers and 
human performers 
Heider-Simmel 
quantitative analysis 
of perceived animacy 
 
Quantitative analysis 
of point light displays 
reaction 
Body schema and 
correspondence 
Devolution    Anthropomorphism 
Atmospheres from 
populations of 
identical bodies 
Body schema and 
correspondence 
Staging the “unreal”: 
swarms and unclear 
attributions to 
machine performers 
Table 3. Practical artwork and relation to chapter topics 
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As far as I know there has been little research about these shifts in human 
perception of machine performers on the stage from both an academic and an artistic 
perspective. It is hoped that other researchers, as well artistic stage designers, will 
continue to explore these behavioural, performative and holistic approaches, so that 
machine performers may have the chance to star more often in cultural environments. 
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1 
Reconstructing the machine 
performer 
1.1. Outline of Chapter 
The history of robotic art is situated in the long evolution of representations, 
models and simulations of the living body by mechanical objects. It is driven by an 
ongoing inquiry into the comprehension of the human environment (nature), 
behaviours and genesis. For although machines are universally regarded as different 
entities from us, they can nevertheless serve as a tool for understanding the human 
within the structure of the world (Demarinis 1990).  
It is significant in this respect that robots and robot-like machines typically 
exploit theatrical means (Sussman 1999; Gorman 2001). According to historian 
Jessica Riskin, the evolving boundary between simulation and representation found in 
automatons since the 18th century is the ongoing essence of what she considers 
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artificial life1 (Riskin 2003). In performance theory, a similar tension is found between 
the performer as representation and as an embodied agent (Fischer-Lichte 2008). By 
re-examining the history of machines and robots from the slanted perspectives of 
human body representation and theatricality, as well as (blurred and multiple) man-
machine relations, my aim is to reconstruct the machine performer within the 
historical landscape leading up to and including the present. 
Via a genealogy of mechanical-artistic renderings I will first establish that 
machine mimesis corresponds in the West to each era’s understanding of the human 
body, society and nature. Secondly, I will trace dramaturgical, thaumaturgical and 
performative ingredients found in the presentation of robots in order to augment the 
viewer’s reception of the machine performer. Thirdly, I will expand on the 
performative aspects of the human representations found in automatons, androids and 
robots over the last three centuries, at a time when the definition of life was (and still 
is) constantly and ambiguously shifting. 
To conclude this history, I will explore how authenticity, verisimilitude, 
mimicry and representation can shift audience perceptions of machine performers. I 
will compare two current forms of representation in robotics – the social robot and the 
biologically inspired robot – to illustrate their influence on the construction of 
machine performers. These two forms both embrace and breach the cybernetic model 
of the robot, and their comparison will establish a rationale and context to further 
explore the Uncanny Valley and artificial intelligence in the next two chapters 
respectively. 
I will illustrate the chapter’s analyses with two practical works: La Cour des 
Miracles (1997-2012) and The Blind Robot (2012). Referring to historical moments 
and artefacts, both works establish a frame of presentation for machine performers. 
Furthermore, both works walk the thin line of simulation vs. representation, as both 
embody improbable situations for animated metal structures, namely pain and 
blindness.  
                                                
1I follow Riskin’s definition of artificial life as any attempt to understand living processes by using 
machinery to simulate them. Fischer-Lichte, E. (2008). The Transformative Power of Performance: A 
New aesthetics, Routledge.. 
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In the process of reconstructing the machine performer, I will look at the 
illusion of life – or more specifically, the illusion of performing that can be found (or 
not) in a mechanical object on stage. In other words this chapter is concerned with the 
characteristics of the machine performer’s agency throughout history. 
The fascination of movement as a sign of life includes in itself a concern about 
the location of life. Media theorist Jacqueline Stacey and anthropologist Lucy 
Suchman address the question whether this location is antecedent, integral or 
consequent to that which moves. In their analysis of the confluence of animation and 
automation they state:  
We might distinguish between bodies and things, the organic and the inorganic, not as 
animate or inanimate but rather as animate or animated. That is, we take the former to 
embody, inherent in their nature, processes of contingent and generative 
transformation, while the latter require something outside themselves, an external 
force, to set them in motion. (Stacey and Suchman 2012, p. 17) 
Throughout the chapter I will return to this animate-animated disjunction as a 
common framework to examine the multiple facets of the history of the mechanical 
reproduction of life. Having established various qualities and characteristics of this 
equation via different historical trajectories based on the presentation, representation 
and misrepresentation of the human body, I will finally develop a trans-disciplinary 
perspective of robotic agency and embodiment for the machine performer. 
Before doing so, however, I will show in the following section that the shift 
from cybernetics (1960s) to phenomenology (1980s and on) that caused the 
appearance of hybrid machine performers also generated a controversial discussion 
about the dualism of mind and body.  
1.2. The Robot: an episteme of the human body 
Robotic art has broad roots and a rich cultural history. This history embraces 
modern science-fiction as much as artificial creatures (either real or imaginary); from 
ancient artificial maidservants to medieval golems to the homunculus of the 
Renaissance and the androids of the Enlightenment. The western history of the human 
machine, more than two millennia old, is driven by the ongoing quest for deeper 
understanding of the true nature and genesis of the inner self in the environment. 
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In Sublime Dreams of the Living Machines, historian Minsoon Kang argues 
that the automaton is a central idea of the Western imagination: “In […] Western 
thought, it has functioned as a kind of conceptual chameleon, embodying greatly 
varying sets of ideas and attitudes from one period to the next” (Kang 2011, p. 5). 
1.2.1. Non-anthropocentric shift 
The media theorist David Tomas writes about modifications of the human-
machine relationship as a “machine-based history of [the] western body” (Tomas 
1995). Tomas often refers to cybernetics discourse, particularly to Norbert Wiener’s 
writing on the history of mirroring the human body with machines. Wiener traced the 
parallel histories of machines and human bodies when he presented a history of 
automata divided into four stages that generated four models of the human body 
(Wiener 1948): firstly, a mythic golemic age that referred to the body as a malleable, 
magical, clay figure; secondly, the age of clocks (17th and 18th centuries), when the 
body was seen as a clockwork mechanism; thirdly, the age of steam (19th century), 
which transferred the body into a Cartesian scenario, a “glorified heat engine” that 
burned combustible fuel instead of glycerine from human muscles; finally the fourth 
and last stage, which Wiener identified as the age of communication and control (the 
age of cybernetics), an age marked by a shift from power engineering to information 
and communications engineering, from an “economy of energy” to one based on “the 
accurate reproduction of signals” that understand the body as an electronic system.  
After Alan Turing’s pioneering work, robotic art and artificial intelligence 
emerged from the assumptions established by cybernetics. The appearance of robotic 
art in mid 1960s cybernetic discourse is connected with an anti-mimetic shift in the 
history of humanlike machines.2 This shift brings a cancellation of borders between 
the fields of art and reality (artefact and nature), between mimesis, representation, and 
life itself. Of the landmark works of this era, The Senster (1969-1970) by Edward 
Ihnatowitcz is an instance of autonomous behaviour in art (Kac 1997). The Senster 
was a behaviour-based (and biologically inspired) articulated body that tracked and 
leaned towards human spectators. As Tomas argues:  
                                                
2 Burnham described it as a history of both figurative sculpture – in accordance with the mechanistic 
automatons of the 17th century – and robotic sculpture. He concludes that: “Suddenly, art history 
naturally assimilates history of life creation as well as an evolution of machine.” Riskin, J. (2003). "The 
defecating duck, or, the ambiguous origins of artificial life." Critical Inquiry 29(4): 599-633. 
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The cybernetic automaton’s mirroring of the human body was not established on the 
basis of conventional mimicry, as in the case of androids and their internal parts, so 
much as on a common understanding of the similarities that existed between the 
control mechanisms and communicational organizations of machine systems and 
living organisms. (Tomas 1995).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Senster by E. Ihnatowitcz (version from 1970) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Richard Ihnatowitcz. 
The anti-mimetic cybernetic shift in robotic art illustrated by the Senster 
brought a new aesthetic dimension that preferred behavioural modelling to 
representational form, and motion to the mimesis of static objects. 
Unfortunately, Tomas’ analysis stops in the era of cybernetics (1960s) and 
does not include recent representations of robots. He does, however, offer a good 
analysis of the lineage of machines as signs of the understanding of the western human 
body. But to consider cybernetics as the current model of a robotics view of the human 
body poses many problems. 
Robotic artist and theorist Simon Penny places cybernetics in opposition to 
digital computation (Penny 2012; Penny 2012). For Penny, cybernetics offers bottom-
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up situated agents that break free from anthropocentrism; it was what he calls “digital 
computation” that was dualistic and aligned with the symbolic computation of 1960s 
artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, despite Penny’s eulogy of cybernetics, this field is 
strongly slanted to symbolic processing and cognition, to intelligence rather than 
embodiment. Even if cybernetics has feedback and is contextually situated, its essence 
is about representation via signal and information. As a system of signals modelling 
the biological, cybernetics does not necessarily entail a phenomenological body. Thus 
computer scientists and roboticists Noel Sharkey and Tom Ziemke clearly define 
mechanistic and phenomenal embodiment models for the robot (Sharkey and Ziemke 
2001), stating boldly that a mechanistic embodiment is a control architecture of 
sensors and effectors and nothing else. 
I would, then, suggest referring back to cybernetics and post-cybernetics for an 
understanding of more recent developments in robotics, as both models utilize 
feedback and situated bodies. I would bring the nuance of having cybernetics more 
aligned with a dualistic Cartesian model of the brain and the body, where the symbolic 
computation of sensor signals happens in the “processor”. I would then look at post-
cybernetics as aligned with post 1980s notions of artificial intelligence (nouvelle AI), 
where signals and information are difficult to situate and model and the border 
between the brain and the body blurs. A more comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
cybernetics in the 20th and 21st centuries will be presented in section 1.4. 
1.2.2. Artificial and natural 
The paradox of the robot can be found in the ambiguous status of artificial 
human-like creatures (androids) and their existence. This paradox is not only present 
in the case of fictitious artificial creatures but also in the case of the ‘real’ mechanical 
puppet or android.   
The evolutionary drive to mastery of the environment has repeatedly issued in 
the dream to create an artificial human being and the need to create helpers for us. On 
the one hand, this is seen as an attempt to imitate a ‘Creator’, to make a creature in our 
own image, or even to discover the secret of life. On the other hand, it may be an 
entirely practical ambition to make the perfect servant. This second motive is often 
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connected with utopian projections of an ideally ordered social system. Aristotle in his 
fundamental work Politics wrote: 
For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the 
will of others, like the statue of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says 
the poet, ‘of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods’; if, in like manner, 
the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, 
chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. (McKeon 2009) 
Roboticist Frederic Kaplan visits the history of Western myths and novels from 
the perspective of the human “creation act” (Kaplan 2004). Kaplan traces the 
development of Western machines by looking into the artificial versus the natural. At 
an early stage the artificial reproduction of nature is seen as a positive act (homage to 
the gods): it is a twofold quest with the creation of the artificial companion 
(Pygmalion) on one hand and the understanding of the secret of life 
(golem/homunculus) on the other. Further on in time, Kaplan opposes the 
Enlightenment, with its separation of the natural from the artificial, to Romanticism, 
which elevates the natural above the artificial. Finally, his analysis brings the reader 
back to the religious dimension of creativity, where artificial reproduction is seen as 
an offence against God. In this case, the human creator becomes a “Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice” – either a mad lover (Future Eve, Sandman) or a mad scientist 
(Frankenstein). 
Kaplan’s purpose is to compare Western and Japanese cultural attitudes to the 
displacement of the human from the central equation by robots and artificial creatures:  
Several cultural elements suggest that in the Western world, machines are very 
important for understanding what we are. We think of ourselves by analogy with the 
way machines work. But at the same time, technological progress challenges our 
specificity. That is why we can at the same time be fascinated and afraid when 
confronted with new machines. In Japan, in contrast, machines do not seem to affect 
human specificity. The difference between the natural and the artificial is not so 
crucial and building machines is a positive activity in the search of the natural laws 
that govern the world. (Kaplan 2004, p. 12) 
Finally Kaplan turns the artificial-natural equation back to the human:  
Peter Sloterdijk has examined closely the mechanism that we use to prevent machines 
from upsetting us. He explains how machines challenge our “narcissistic shields” and 
how we painfully resist in this fight. But in the end, the new metaphors of humans 
introduced by new machines inevitably win, forcing the Western man to redefine 
himself. (p.14) 
Likewise, Riskin investigates how the automaton represented the problem of where 
the machine ends and the animal begins: 
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The attempt to reproduce life in machinery, in tandem with the attempt to find where 
mechanical reproduction would fail, has resulted in an ongoing taxonomic exercise, 
sorting the animate from the inanimate, the organic from the mechanical, the 
intelligent from the rote, with each category crucially defined, as in any taxonomy, by 
what is excluded from it. (Riskin 2003, p. 613) 
In his controversial book Man-Machine (1747), Julien Jean Offray de La 
Mettrie proposed that not only the body but also the mind was of material origins. De 
la Mettrie put forward the metaphor of the human being as a machine (with Descartes, 
the metaphor concerned animals) and not the other way around. La Metttrie’s thesis 
starts from considering the continuity of biological function and bodily structure in 
living things (Franchi and Güzeldere 2005).  
De la Mettrie was one of the first to suggest that there was no clear distinction 
between living and dead matter – an approach that was both modern and contentious. 
However, his rejection of Cartesian dualism was far too reductive, and in this respect 
similar to the equivalent modern cybernetics model. Both models tend to claim that 
the human being is a machine. However, while de la Mettrie saw the human being as a 
mechanical construction on the Western model, cybernetics portrays the human 
machine as a dedicated symbolic processor.  
Kaplan expands Tomas’ lineage by comparing Western and Japanese views of 
the machine. His historical description, centred on the creator of the machine, is more 
psychological than Tomas’ and has expanded inventors’ notions of the Western body. 
However, the current development of machines in Asia has many pitfalls. Japanese 
researchers tend to be strictly positive and not critical enough of their own 
developments, particularly in relation to machine performers. This applies above all to 
the deeper psychological perspective of the machine and its personification. 
Kaplan, via Sloterdijk, extends this psychological perspective when he takes 
up Tomas’ analysis of the western body and combines these with narcissism. However 
I consider defining human identity through machines to be far too narrow an analysis, 
because the perception of a machine always extends beyond its shape and form. In my 
own artwork, I have attempted to move beyond these anthropocentric views of the 
machine and their contextual and psychological presence on the stage. 
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1.2.3. Animate-animated 
As the borders of what one considers animal or machine shift through the 
constant evolution of the understanding of the human body, the perception of a 
mechanical artefact as either animate or animated will also evolve. Revisiting Tomas’ 
chronology of the western body, one can observe that an 18th century automaton 
would have been considered almost a living animate creature. Nowadays, however, it 
would certainly be considered mechanical: simply an animated object. Table 4 
presents my résumé of the animate-animated qualities of the machines discussed in 
this section. 
Animate Animated 
Tomas/Wiener western body. 
Mythic golem, Age of Steam. 
Tomas/Wiener western body. 
Clockwork, cybernetics. 
Post-cybernetics. 
 
Phenomenological embodiment. 
Cybernetic symbolic processor acts as animator of 
sensorimotor body. 
Mechanistic embodiment. 
The Senster. 
A behaviour-based machine appears animate. 
The Senster. 
If audience considers interaction as simple 
feedback, behaviour becomes too literal and 
borders on automation. 
Given “life”, creatures appear autonomous, even 
sometimes rebelling against their creator: 
Golem, homunculus, Pygmalion, Frankenstein, 
Eve. 
Artificial Creatures are initially made, conjured, 
vivified by the creator, acting as the initial 
animator. 
De la Mettrie proposed a union of mind and body, 
both contributing to animation. 
In a dualist mind-body scheme, the mind does the 
animation of the body. 
Natural   
Animals are animate. 
Artificial 
Objects that appear animated labelled artificial. 
Table 4. Animate and animated, natural and artificial 
The anti-mimetic shifts emanating from cybernetics do not fully represent 
trends in robotics in the late 20th century. In what follows, I will, therefore, look more 
closely at the history of discourse about the mind-body relation. In phenomenology, 
for example, the body is always considered to be an integral part of both space and 
context, i.e. of the continuum ranging from the physical to the cultural environment. 
An analysis of the manipulation of this context by tricks of dramaturgy and mise-en-
scène in magical machines, automatons and androids will serve as a measure of the 
ongoing spiral of changes in mind-body discourse.  
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1.3. Magical machines, automatons and androids: the 
theatre of lures 
It is significant that the act of presenting the machine often invokes theatrical 
means: a judicious mise-en-scène found in Cellini’s sculpture, thaumaturgical lures 
employed in the Chess Player, an improbable defecating duck by Vaucanson, androids 
cast as child characters by Jacquet-Droz, and nowadays the role of media in framing 
(hiding, cut in editing), and with it the functional pitfalls of state-of-the-art robots.   
For the purpose of this section, theatrical means, staging or mise-en-scène can 
be seen as set-ups that focus on some things while obscuring others, forms of narrative 
that direct the attention of the audience, or sequenced events framed and connected via 
cause and effect. The decoy or lure is the pivotal point in staging these artefacts. The 
ambiguous status of the artificial ‘human’ or ‘natural’ object, more mystified than 
explained, becomes the dramaturgical element itself.  
1.3.1. Lures of the past 
In The Lure of Antiquity and the Cult of the Machine, Horst Bredekamp opens 
by telling a story about the Italian sculptor Cellini. Bredekamp relates how in order to 
survive a difficult vernissage of an incomplete artwork, Cellini had the idea of 
bringing a spark of life into his sculptures. The trick was to incorporate mechanical 
levers in their bases, so that people hiding behind could subtly set the sculptures in 
motion. As the presentation was at dusk, Cellini could not only hide the obviously 
human intervention but also augment and blur the perception of his figures’ 
movements (Bredekamp 1995).  
Thaumaturgical strategies can be found in Kircher’s “miracle machines”, 
comprised of miniature, artificial universes bearing encrypted messages from a playful 
creator.  In Between the Demonic and the Miraculous, Gorman argues that the 
machines of the Kircherian museum (curiosity cabinets) were more than mere 
mechanical demonstrations, and that it was clear for Kircher (1602-1680) and his 
immediate entourage that these machines were, in some real sense, magical. Kircher 
described his machines as “various, curious and exotic spectacles of admirable effects, 
wonders of recondite inventions, that are rightly called magic, free from all imposture 
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and suspicion of the forbidden Art” (Gorman 2001). Gorman considers that Kircher’s 
machines derived from a culture of special effects, where only an elite social group 
was initiated into the basis of the enigma. Likewise, performance and puppet theorist 
Mark Sussman writes that thaumaturgical strategies often intensified the swindle 
found in public robot performances (Sussman 1999). Sussman begins with the tension 
between the magical and the technological: “Certain pre-technological performances 
[…] can give us some insight into the tense metaphoric operations and 
interconnections of faith and scepticism, or belief and disbelief, in the staging of new 
technologies […]” (p. 82). 
In his analysis of the staging of the Chess Player automaton by Wolfgang von 
Kempelen (1762), Sussman sees the paradox of the machine as an explicit technique 
for generating audience tension:  
The Chess Player highlights the crucial role of the observer's simultaneous belief and 
skepticism in evaluating the object on display, presenting a limit-case in the 
development of a theatre of machines: part puppet show, part scientific demonstration, 
part conjuring trick. (p. 92)  
He suggests that the transmission of human intelligence into an inanimate body 
extends the context of android/automaton staging in general, for it both demystifies 
and re-enchants the performing object itself: 
The automatic thinking machine that concealed, in reality, a human person, can be 
seen as a model for how a spectator might reify, and deify, the hidden power at work 
in a new form of intelligent machinery.  (p. 94) 
 
 
Figure 2. The Chess Player (Sussman 1999) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by RightsLink. 
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Figure 3. The Chess Player (Sussman 1999) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by RightsLink. 
 
From the Renaissance to the late 19th century, automatons entertained 
audiences, and their ambiguous existence was enhanced not only by the way they were 
staged, but also by their appearance and character. Androids/automata are often 
connected with the effort of their designers to show their own (human) competence 
and workmanship. The Swiss fine engineers and clockmakers, father and son Pierre 
and Henri Louis Jacquet-Droz (1721-1790, 1752-1791) constructed The Writer, The 
Draftsman and The Musician (a lady playing the piano). Arguably Jacquet-Droz might 
have programmed his writer-automaton to engrave the sentence "Cogito ergo sum" as 
a play on Descartes’ contemporary theories. Nonetheless, his android was deliberately 
staged as undecidable (neither true nor false) – the status of an artificial being. 
Gaby Wood observes that in the Age of Enlightenment, androids/automata 
were frequently designed in the image of children: “some inventors intended their 
objects to be artificial forms of an eighteenth-century ideal – the child as a blank slate, 
the purest being” (Wood 2002). The android’s childlike appearance functioned as a 
sign of perfection (innocent beings) and a suggestion of the automaton’s ability to 
learn, as well as a trick that could changed the audience’s attitude towards (possible) 
failure of the automatons: “their creators wanted them to look young so that the 
mistakes resulting from their early efforts (as prototypes) would be forgiven” (Wood 
2002). Moreover, Jacquet-Droz’s barefoot writing automaton, with its schoolboy 
appearance, represents the conviction of the period that children would learn more 
freely if unhampered by shoes.  
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The ontological status of these automatons was camouflaged3 and interpreted 
as an ambiguous fluctuation between the mechanical and the organic, the animate and 
inanimate. Its reception was correspondingly chequered. “When Pierre Jacquet-Droz 
exhibited his writing automaton in Spain, he was accused of heresy; both the man and 
the machine were imprisoned for a time by the Spanish Inquisition”(Wood 2002). A 
journalist who experienced a performance of the Musical Lady reports acceptance of 
the android’s living status. It was advertised on posters as a “vestal virgin with a heart 
of steel”, but the journalist’s impression was different: “she is apparently agitated 
with an anxiety and diffidence not always felt in real life” (Wood 2002). The 
android seemed to him more alive than is commonly the case in life itself .  
 
Figure 4. The Musical Lady (Jacquet-Droz) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Creative Commons. 
 
The Canard Digérateur was an automaton in the form of a duck, created by 
Jacques de Vaucanson in 1739. This duck was part of a larger performance comprised 
of a flute and a drum player. The mechanical duck appeared to have the ability to eat 
kernels of grain, and to metabolize and defecate them. But the duck did not actually 
have the ability to do this – the food was collected in an inner container and the pre-
stored faeces were 'produced' from a second, so that no actual digestion took place. 
                                                
3 Wood cites examples of androids that bled ‘real’ blood or were covered with ‘real’ skin. Burnham, J. 
(1968). Beyond Modern Sculpture: the effects of science and technlogy on the sculpture of this century. 
New York, Georg Braziller.. 
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Figure 5. Vaucanson’s Canard Digérateur (Vaucanson 1739) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by RightsLink. 
 
According to Jessica Riskin,  
Vaucanson’s automata were philosophical experiments, attempts to discern which 
aspects of living creatures could be reproduced in machinery, and to what degree, and 
what such reproductions might reveal about their natural subjects. Of course, his 
automata were also commercial ventures intended to entertain and demonstrate 
mechanical ingenuity. But their value as amusements lay principally in their 
dramatization of a philosophical problem that preoccupied audiences of workers, 
philosophers, and kings: the problem of whether human and animal functions were 
essentially mechanical. (Riskin 2003, p. 601) 
Shifting forward in time to the late 20th century, Belgian artist Wim Delvoe’s 
Cloaca is an actual biological reconstruction of a human digestive system. Delvoe’s 
machine replicates functionality (the excrement was tested as human) but not scale, as 
Delvoe requires an entire room to replicate what happens in our bodies. Cloaca is a 
large assembly of bio-reactors, a “Rube-Golberg” machine that can actually generate 
human excrement from the food “ingested”. Delvoe does not hide any of the digestive 
steps, and the presentation of the object is almost didactic, though at the same time it 
maintains an aura of mystification emanating from people’s obscure and sensitive 
understanding of their own bodies and their scepticism about the possibility of any 
faithful disembodied reproduction of bodily functions.  
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Figure 6. William Delveo’s Cloaca 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by the artist. 
In 1898, to the amazement of thousands of people, the Serbian inventor 
Nikolai Tesla (1856-1943) demonstrated a remote controlled submersible boat. Tesla 
was known for his showmanship and upon instructions given by the crowd (a common 
audience interaction for magic tricks), the boat would turn, submerge and so forth. For 
Tesla, the machine embodied the mind of the distant operator. Tesla would describe 
this automaton as having a “borrowed mind”. His writings refer to the development of 
machines with their own mind as a follow-up to this experiment (Rosheim 1994).  
1.3.2. Lures of the present 
The machine is a mythical construct. In the Book of Electronic Arts, Mulder 
and Post continue sociologist Lewis Mumford’s insights found in the Myth of the 
Machine (Mumford 1967):  
A machine is not only a complex tool; it is always also a social device. It consists not 
only of material parts but also of immaterial elements, a mentality, a belief in a 
purpose or an effect, for instance in progress or in the inevitability and irreversibility 
of technological developments. (Mulder, Post et al. 2000, p. 18) 
Jutta Weber further criticizes this “belief in a purpose” when she analyses the 
video documentation of current robotic work, namely social robotics. She points out a 
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discrepancy in the truth discourse of this scientific and engineering field, between the 
authenticity and the presentation of the artefacts:  
Another important factor here is that media such as video or simulation opens up 
opportunities for implementing the fake of sociability into the human-robot interaction 
and thereby to compensate the malfunctioning machines and to veil the simple-
mindedness of still many artefacts. (Weber 2007) 
When Lucy Suchman reports her encounter with MIT’s much mediatised 
robots Cog and Kismet, it becomes clear that the presentation of these agents is staged, 
but this staging surrounds the actual capabilities of the robot with mystery. First, the 
recording of events reframes the perception of the robot’s body while maintaining an 
aura of its current and future agencies:  
Like other conventional documentary productions, these representations are framed 
and narrated in ways that instruct the viewer in what to see. Sitting between the 
documentary film and the genre of the system demonstration or ‘demo’, the videos 
create a record that can be reliably repeated and reviewed. These re-enactments 
thereby imply that the capacities they record have an ongoing existence; that they are 
themselves robust and repeatable, and that like any other living creature Cog and 
Kismet’s agencies are continuing to develop and unfold. (Suchman 2006; Suchman 
2007) 
Second, Suchman’s actual encounters with Kismet did demystify the robot 
Cog. Those encounters were in “off-stage” and “on-stage” situations, the former 
relegating the agent to the level of a prop waiting to be brought onstage, the latter 
creating a “live” unedited interaction with Cog. Backstage, Cog’s body remainder, not 
visible in media portrayals, impresses Suchman; she is struck by the amount of human 
labour and affiliated technologies that are required to give Cog its agency. Onstage, 
Suchman could not elicit any coherent or intelligible behaviour from Kismet: 
The contrast between my own encounter with Kismet and that recorded on the 
demonstration videos makes clear the ways in which Kismet’s affect is an effect not 
simply of the device itself, but of Breazeal’s trained reading of Kismet’s actions and 
her extended history of labors with the machine. In the absence of Breazeal, 
correspondingly, Kismet’s apparent randomness attests to the robot’s reliance on the 
performative capabilities of its very particular ‘human caregiver’. Like all forms of 
agency, in other words, Cog and Kismet’s capacities for action are created out of 
sociomaterial arrangements that instantiate histories of labor and more and less 
reliable, always contingent, future re-enactments. (Suchman 2006, p. 653) 
In his recent book about his journey into Ishiguro’s laboratory, robotic artist 
Zaven Paré qualifies this laboratory as a strange theatre that displaces experimental 
certitudes (Paré and Grimaud 2011). He reports that when Ishiguro’s robot moves, 
something happens with its performance: a minute movement of the fingers combined 
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with an ocular contact becomes a perfect moment of synchronicity that nobody 
expects. “Something happened!” and the lab team gets suddenly agitated around the 
robot while the experimenters were not even ready for it. This event surpasses the 
robot itself and its intrinsic capabilities.  
 
Figure 7. Ishiguro and his doppelgänger 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by IEEE. 
Ishiguro’s geminoids and actroids are unsurpassed in their imitation of human 
skin texture, hair, facial expression etc. But in the heart of the actroid lie mechatronics 
and mechanical principles that are similar to those found three centuries ago. 
Moreover, in an almost fraudulent fashion, a remote operator accomplishes the actual 
animation of the high-level behaviours (speaking per se) of the android. 
1.3.3. Concealing the animated, revealing the animate 
In conclusion, Mumford’s analysis, tied into a criticism of the Industrial 
Revolution and automation, was focused on how technology impacts a society at large 
in its relation to machine performers. Even though Mumford’s criticism was confined 
to industrial settings, it can easily be applied to the perception of machine performers 
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today, because robotics is also filled with unsatisfied promises that have become 
almost mythical. Some examples might be: the superiority of the artificial brain, the 
virtuosity of the robot, and its foreseen ubiquitous role as a servant (Brooks 2002) . 
Unfortunately, many typical presentations of robots are still mystifying and not 
easily explicable. Two robots of two different eras have reached stardom in their 
respective times: The Chess Player and Ishiguro’s Geminoid. In both cases, these 
agents are not capable of performing anything on their own. Their agency is brought to 
life by “borrowed minds” – a la Tesla – residing outside their bodies in the form of a 
remote control operator. These robots hit the imagination of society by what they 
represent, not by what they actually are: sophisticated hoaxes. Ishiguro to some extent 
revives Kircher’s magical insider jokes with his menagerie of actroids and geminoids. 
I can actually ask about the real object of these machines, as Riskin asks of 
Vaucanson’s duck: “What, then, is the meaning of this hybrid animal, partly 
fraudulent and partly genuine, partly mechanical and partly (ostensibly) chemical, 
partly transparent and partly ingeniously opaque?” (p. 609). 
In my own work this kind of mystification has no relevance. Its aim is too 
literal. I think that in order to encourage audience empathy towards machine 
performers, each member of the audience has to understand the embodied robot in 
their own way as it performs live in front of their eyes. 
 I have shown in these examples that staging adds capabilities to the machine 
without actually having to fully implement them. In my own work, the direction of 
audience attention and exploitation of what the eyes see (or don't see) does not aim at 
hiding but at exploring and enhancing the limitations of the machine performers.  
Figure 8 shows two constructions: an automaton from the Treatise on 
Pneumatics written by Hero of Alexandria (circa AD 63) and the Cube, a machine 
performer from Devolution (full description of the work in Chapter 4). Hero created a 
series of devices to dupe the faithful into believing that the doors of the temple were 
opened by divine power. This was a “cause to effect” swindle, as the person who lit 
the fire in the atrium would “magically” open the doors of the temple by means of the 
pneumatic principles illustrated below. The Cube is a large-scale articulated structure 
that morphs from geometrical to more organic shapes. Though the Cube has a fairly 
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limited vocabulary of expression, its analogy to the deus ex machina4 found in Greek 
theatre enhances its role and character, as well as the audience’s perception. In both 
cases, the doors and the cube apparently move independently of visible human action 
(pneumatic systems in both situations). However, Devolution’s audience would not be 
duped by the invisible means that move the Cube’s structure. Twenty-first century 
viewers will undoubtedly try to establish a rationale for the abstract movement of this 
complex articulated structure, in line with their power to resolve the plots of other 
deus ex machina devices. 
  
Figure 8. Heron of Alexandria’s temple door-opener (circa 60AD) and Devolution’s 
Cube (2006) 
Current theorists like Wood posit that the disguise found in automatons like 
those of Jacquet-Droz often reveals the intentional disguise of the makers. In contrast, 
my own intention is to build machines that are reduced to their skeletons and display 
bodily morphologies that are not embellished by aesthetic artefacts. Far from helping 
the embodiment, the level of mimicry present in Jacquet-Droz automatons is just 
cleverly dressed up mechanics. 
In a similar way, media can dress up the results of machine performance and 
fictionalise its reality. I agree with Weber that the framing and editing of the media 
can certainly help to hide the malfunctions of robots. However, in a live presentation, 
the audience always receives an “unedited” version of events. Perhaps by integrating 
these malfunctions, I can integrate these “misbehaviours” of the machine performers 
directly into the dramaturgy. 
                                                
4 A god lowered by stage machinery to resolve a plot or extricate the protagonist from a difficult 
situation. 
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Table 5 summarises the animate-animated equation of this section, where the 
animation act aims on the one hand to reveal the object as animate, and on the other to 
conceal its animation. When the technological and the magical blur5, a “miracle” of 
animism – as opposed to one of performativity – happens. The chess automaton, like 
that found in industrialisation, hides the depersonalisation of automation and 
cybernetic art (Turner 2008).  
 Animate (The animation act aims to reveal the object as animate) 
Animated  (The animation act 
aims at its own concealment) 
Cellini’s sculpture. 
 
Directed focus can hide the 
animator. 
People move the sculptures 
Special Effects of Kircher. 
 
Spectators cannot distinguish 
magic from technology. 
Initiated members understand the 
magical perception of magnetism 
Musical Lady Automatons perform human 
activities and are staged as fragile 
and likeable characters. 
 
Chess Player The vis-motrix and vis-directrix 
were considered as aligned in the 
Chess Player. 
 
Belief induced by thaumaturgical 
means. 
A person hidden inside provided 
both the vis-motrix and vis-
directrix. 
 
Scepticism in this era, as other 
Kempelen machines were 
considered mechanical. 
Vaucanson’s defecating 
duck. 
Non-mechanical nature of the 
behaviour classifies it as animal, 
therefore animate. 
Not only a hoax but also a 
(merely) complex mechanism. 
Cloaca Excrement is real and tested as 
human. 
Presented as a complex apparatus 
comprising opaque processes. 
Heron of Alexandria Spectators only see the effect and 
cannot find the cause. 
Hidden mechanics and 
pneumatics. 
Ishiguro’s Geminoid Spectators are focused on the 
verisimilitude and rejoice when a 
human behaviour happens (by 
accident) 
Intelligence and agency vested in 
a human teleoperator. 
Devolution’s Cube Perceived organic motion makes 
the structure more animate. Its 
behaviour has no apparent cause 
or effect. 
Presented as a mechanical 
structure. 
Table 5. Animate and animated, revealed and concealed 
1.4. Mechanisation of man, humanisation of machines 
Since the 18th century, the automaton has acted as the manifestation of the 
emergence of artificial life, broadly described by Riskin as “an attempt to simulate 
with machinery the physiological processes and cognitive behaviours of living 
creatures” (Riskin 2003, p. 97). 
                                                
5 This refers to a quote from popular scientist and novelist Arthur C. Clarke: “Any sufficiently 
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” 
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In recent times, the automaton has undergone several transformations from the 
dependent automation of the early Industrial Revolution to the semi-automation found 
in the early 20th century and finally, to the full automation of mid 20th century 
computerized automatic machinery. Tomas argues that “By the late 1940’s confusions 
arising from competing images of the human body as a thinking organism were 
effectively exorcized through an anti-mimetic shift in the history of automata” (Tomas 
1995, p. 27). 
I will be using this anti-mimetic shift as the first pivotal point of the recent 
history of automatons. I will show that prior to this point, the automaton was about 
explaining and even employing man as a machine. I will bring examples of theatre 
genres of this era and discuss how they saw man as a machine-performer. Afterwards, 
cybernetics started turning the machine into a man, paving the way for the appearance 
of social robotics. 
When Riskin examines the tension between the animal and the machine – 
which Stacey and Suchman label the ‘animate’ and the ‘animated’ – an ongoing shift 
appears in the boundaries between the two categories. This ongoing ontological 
questioning and repositioning is summarised in the following way by Riskin:  
[…] we believe that the processes of life and consciousness are essentially 
mechanistic and can therefore be simulated, and yet we are equally firmly persuaded 
that the essences of life and consciousness will ultimately be beyond the reach of 
mechanical reproduction. (Riskin 2003, p. 97) 
For instance, such a cycle can be found in the late 20th century, where 
(nouvelle) artificial intelligence moved from the harder mechanistic vision of 
cybernetics towards embodiment, almost abandoning the cybernetic computer models 
required to simulate life. Afterwards, AI had to re-integrate earlier models in order to 
bootstrap the implementation of these earlier, radical embodiment concepts. 
1.4.1. The human machine 
In the course of various artistic movements the early 20th century has given us 
several different views of the “mechanical body”. Čapek wrote his ‘play about Robots’ 
at the beginning of the 20th century, and this owes its inspiration in machine aesthetics 
to the ‘rational’ avant-garde artistic movements of Futurism, Constructivism and the 
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Bauhaus. Even in Surrealism we can find the principle of creativity based on an 
autonomous mechanism (automatism) of the dream. Avant-garde artists’ attitudes 
towards the machine vary widely, from the Futurist and Constructivist adoration of the 
machine to the fear and scepticism connected with human confrontation with non-
human machinist systems that transcend the individual (e.g. Expressionism). 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, the founder of Italian Futurism, wrote in his 
manifesto “Multiplied Man and the Reign of the Machine”: “Engines […] are really 
mysterious […] They have their moods, unexpected bugs. It seems that they have 
personality, soul, will. It is necessary to stroke them and behave with respect to them 
[…].” (Schmidt-Bergmann 1993, p. 108). The quotation reveals the anthropomorphic, 
anthropopathic Futurist understanding of the machine as a system complementary or 
analogical to the human. From this understanding springs the concept of the ‘man-
machine’ as an ideal member of modern society, a fusion arising from harmonisation 
and mutual resonance, the ideal of the modern person as an individual equipped with 
mechanical qualities such as speed, dynamics, or ambiguous moral attitudes.  
A positive relationship to the machine can also be found in Russian 
Constructivism. In contrast to Italian Futurism, Constructivism had a more complex 
understanding of technology and at the same time a collective understanding of the 
human. A significant example of Constructivist aesthetics is Meyerhold’s theatrical 
Biomechanics – a series of exercises for actors that purports to give them the ability to 
control their bodies as instruments or machines. Meyerhold himself said about his 
method:  
According to the given study of the human organism, biomechanics try to raise a man 
that would examine mechanism of his construction, he would perfectly control and 
complete it. Contemporary man lives in an age of mechanization that can’t ignore 
mechanization of his organism’s kinetic system. Thanks to Biomechanics we will 
establish principles of exactly analyzed and performed motions […] Contemporary 
actors have to behave as a modern automobile on a stage. (Rudnickij 1969)  
According to Constructivism, the stage becomes a place where the human machine is 
presented as regulated by the directors who are its designers and engineers.  
When they dreamed of the superman of the future, the Futurists invoked the 
concept of man as an unloving automaton, whereas the Constructivist stage production 
was seen as a mega-machine constituted of human components – in other words, 
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human group performance was understood as a mega-machine production. This 
discourse led directly to the conceptual mechanisation of man and the 
anthropomorphisation of the machine. In both cases we can talk about the mirroring of 
the human in the machine and the machine in the human. 
Part of this relatively early evolutionary line of theatrical experiment inspired 
by machinist aesthetics was a series of theatrical performances on the Bauhaus stage.  
Schlemmer’s theatrical experiments were a search for “elements of movement and 
space” (Goldberg 2011). The inspiration he drew from visual art was reflected in his 
understanding of dancers as objects on the stage. His performances evoked a 
mechanical effect reminiscent of puppet theatre. We can read in Schlemmer’s diary 
(1971): “Might not the dancers be real puppets, moved by strings, or better still, self-
propelled by means of practice mechanism, almost free of human intervention, at most 
directed by remote control?” (Schlemmer and Schlemmer 1990). From 1923, puppets, 
mechanical figures, masks and geometrical costumes became a characteristic feature 
of many theatrical performances of the Bauhaus. Another Bauhaus member, Moholy-
Nagy (1924) went even further in the The Mechanized Eccentric (Die mechanische 
Exzentrik):  
Man, who no longer should be permitted to represent himself as a phenomenon of 
spirit and mind […]. His organism permits him at best only a certain range of action, 
dependent entirely on his natural body mechanism […]. The effect of this body 
mechanism (Körpermechanik) arises essentially from the spectator's astonishment 
[…]. This is a subjective effect. Here the human body is the sole medium of 
configuration (Gestaltung). For the purposes of an objective Gestaltung of movement 
this medium is limited, the more so since it has constant reference to sensible and 
perceptive (i.e. again literary) elements. The inadequacy of human Exzentrik led to the 
demand for a precise and fully controlled organization of form and motion, intended 
to be a synthesis of dynamically contrasting phenomena (space, form, motion, sound, 
and light). This is the Mechanized Eccentric. (Schlemmer, Moholy-Nagy et al. 1996) 
Schlemmer’s dream of an ideal stage representation of man as a puppet, like 
the Futurists’ dreams of a human-machine or Meyerhold´s biomechanics, resonates 
with the developed vision of modern theatre. A New Theatre as an independent and 
fully-fledged artistic medium, represented by Craig’s vision in which actors are 
replaced by super-puppets, entirely controlled by the stage director: “An actor has to 
be removed and at his place, will appear an unloving figure, super-puppet, as we will 
call it until it will get a better name” (Craig 1912). This utopian theatre of objects has 
its roots not only in the aesthetics of symbolist theatre but even more deeply in 
Romanticism.  
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We can find the essence of the Romantic understanding of puppets in Heinrich 
von Kleist´s essay Über das Marionettentheater (1810/11). Paul de Man in his essay 
Aesthetic formalisation: Kleist´s Über das Marionettentheater (De Man 1984) 
confronts Kleist’s text with Schillers’ concept of humankind’s education through 
aesthetics and shows that in the case of Kleist’s essay we are dealing with the 
embodiment of principles of aesthetic formalisation:  
Each puppet has a focal point in movement, a center of gravity, and when this center 
is moved, the limbs follow without additional handling. The limbs are pendulums, 
echoing automatically the movement of the center. Every time the center of gravity is 
guided in a straight line, the limbs describe curves that complement and extend the 
basically simple movement. (De Man 1984) 
It is impossible to interpret and understand robots and robotic art outside the 
context of culture and history, or outside the different connotations and associations 
connected with the word ‘robot’.6 This word appeared for the first time in the play R. 
U. R., Rossum Universal Robots (National Theatre, Prague, 1921) by the Czech writer 
Karel Čapek.7 Figure 9 (left) shows the robot embodiment in the first official stage 
production of the play, whereas the right hand image shows the robot as a 
puppet/apparatus in a later Parisian production of 1924. The variation between the 
mechanized man on the left and the humanoid machine on the right indicates an 
interpretative shift towards the conceptualisation of the robot during the 20th century 
(Horáková and Kelemen 2005; Horáková 2006). 
Karel Čapek’s anecdotal account of the idea that inspired his decision to write 
a ‘play about Robots’ shows his understanding of the robot as an embodiment of the 
contemporary image of man as a creature formed by industrial mass production: 
Robots were a result of my travelling by tram […]. People were stuffed inside as well 
as on stairs, not as sheep but as machines. I started to think about humans not as 
individuals but as machines and on my way home I was thinking about an expression 
that would refer to humans capable of work but not of thinking. This idea is expressed 
by a Czech word robot.8  
                                                
6 The word ‘robot’ is a neologism derived etymologically from the archaic Czech word robota, which 
means drudgery or chores in the Czech language.  
7 R.U.R. is interpreted as a comedy of confusion in which we are not able to distinguish between man 
and Robots.Wood, G. (2002). Edison's Eve. A Magic History of the Quest for Mechanical Life. New 
York, New York, Anchor Books, a division of Random House.  
8 Čapek, K. Evening Standard (June 2, 1924). In Čapek, K. R.U.R. Halík, M. (ed.) Československý 
spisovatel, Praha, 1966.  
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Čapek connected his Robots with the history of artificial creatures, specifically 
with the Prague golem legend, when he said: “R.U.R. is in fact a transformation of the 
Golem legend into a modern form […]. Robots are factory mass-produced Golems”. 
A further understanding of the origins of the robot character can be derived 
from the many other artificial creatures created by Č apek brothers. The short story 
Systém (System) (1908/18) is often mentioned as an earlier version of the R. U. R. plot. 
The story is based on the idea of “culturally reformed” workers trimmed and adjusted 
exclusively for manual work. In the Instructive Story (1908) and L’éventail (1908/16) 
the brothers brought into their fiction the figure of Jacquet-Droz (see previous section) 
as a real character, along with his fictitious mechanical androids (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 9. Robot character from RUR. Left, first night in Prague. Right, later in Paris 
(1921) (Horáková 2011) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by RightsLink. 
 
 
The theme of the mechanical humanoid machine is present in separate work by 
Josef Čapek, the real author of the word robot, as well. One instance appeared as a 
“mechanical alter-ego” constructed by an engineer in his short story Opilec (The 
Drunkard) included in the collection Lelio (1917). However, the mechanical double is 
called simply “mechanism”, not ‘Robot’ in that story. The artistic essay Homo 
Artefactus (1924) by Josef Čapek is both a recapitulation and a satirical commentary 
on the theme of the artificial man that appeared at the beginning of the 20th century as 
a notion of the “new man”.  
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Figure 10. L’éventail - Lady with a fan. She is able to say only “si” or “no”. 
Illustration from J. Čapek´s Homo Artefactus (1924)(Horakova 2006) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by the author. 
 
1.4.2. The mechanical human 
Cybernetics in the mid 1960s managed to create an immense fear of the 
machine, blurring the boundaries between man and organisms, as contemporary 
advances in intelligent computers forced people to reconsider the nature of human 
intelligence. Machines and technology became part of what it meant to be human 
(Hong 2004). However, the kind of mechanisms and servo-mechanisms used by 
earlier clockwork and industrial automation systems were not that different in their 
operational logic. The difference was that cybernetics penetrated the social dimension 
in a wide variety of forms beyond the industrial (Tomas p. 24). 
During this period, the success of cybernetics brought a revolution in human 
thought and perception through a set of analogies, sometimes oversimplified, such as: 
the body as a nervous system with sense-organs, the machine as a communicating 
organism, and societies as networks of machines linked via a common 
communications language. Automatons elevated to the level of cybernetics were now 
sensing their environments, adjusting via feedback mechanisms enabling them to 
regulate future conduct by past performances. These automatons were then considered 
active, self-regulated and goal-oriented; a few steps away from the dystopian science-
fiction scenarios of machines overtaking, and taking over, man. 
Cybernetics brought a fundamental distinction between mimetic and functional 
analogies. For instance, the brain analogy was based on a view of mechanical 
function. Cherry wrote: “It is not the machine which is mechanistically analogous to 
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the brain but rather the operation of the machine plus the instructions we fed into it 
(Cherry 1957,pp. 57-58). And Tomas concludes: “Cybernetics operationalized the 
question of ‘life’ by displacing the concept of organism from biology to engineering, 
thus effectively transforming it into a hardware problem” (Tomas 1995, p. 26).  
As we saw in the previous section, the beginnings of artistic investigation 
using electronic technologies were rooted in just such a cybernetic view of systems: a 
world of signal reproduction where organisms had shifted from biology to 
engineering, transforming them into hardware/software models. As David Tomas 
states, cybernetics is a world of automatic machines under the common denominator 
of “control and communication”. 
This operationalization of the living organism led to the conception of a 
hybrid: the cyborg. In the 1960s, the term ‘cyborg’9 was introduced at a time of 
intense concern over automation. The cyborg was a hybrid system of both artefact and 
organism originally conceived to perform in a highly mechanized environment such as 
a spaceship (Hong 2004). The cyborg could also function as a figure of the rejection of 
anthropocentric views, further blurring and questioning borders between humans and 
machines (Kelemen 2010). In her seminal manifesto, Danna Haraway dealt with these 
irreconcilable positions: “Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of 
dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves” (Haraway 
1991). Simon Penny claims that: 
Cybernetics was the first generation of thinking about the qualities of the biological 
life with respect to computational machines. In contradistinction to Artificial 
Intelligence, cybernetics saw intelligence in terms of environmentally situated agents, 
involved in feedback and homeostatis with their environments. (Penny 2012, p. 93) 
And Penny further argues that: 
As digital computation developed, its rhetoric took an antithetical position to that of 
cybernetics: dualist (hardware/software) where cybernetics was holistic; internalist 
where cybernetics was externalist; and representational where cybernetics was, one 
might say, performative” (Penny 2012, p. 93). 
The artificial intelligence that Penny refers to is what some have called Good 
Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) which is best described, in its spirit, by the Dartmouth 
Artificial Intelligence Project Proposal of 1955, the community convened under the 
assumption that: 
                                                
9 Coined by Mansfield Clynes and Nathan Kline of the American Space Progam. 
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We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial intelligence be carried out 
during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. The 
study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any 
other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine 
can be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to find how to make machines 
use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved 
for humans, and improve themselves. We think that a significant advance can be made 
in one or more of these problems if a carefully selected group of scientists work on it 
together for a summer. (McCarthy, Minsky et al. 2006, p. 13) 
This original idea of AI dominated until the mid-1980s as a challenging 
approach. AI then shifted from symbol processing to behaviour-based and biologically 
inspired topics. Following this, the notion of "embodiment" surfaced in the field, the 
concept being that intelligent behaviour is not only a matter of computation, but 
requires a body, a complete organism that interacts with the real world. As a 
consequence, many researchers have shifted their attention away from the central 
brain (the computer) towards embodiment (robots) (Brooks 2002; Pfeifer et al. 2007). 
Many AI theorists see this as a transfer from a top-down towards a bottom-up 
approach, summarized by Suchman in the following words:  
The less visible and somewhat restrained AI projects of the 1990’s play down the 
personification of machines in favor of biologically-inspired computer science and 
engineering initiatives aimed at recreating artificial life forms, via the technologies of 
neural networks, genetic algorithms, situated robotics, and the like. These new 
developments shift the project of machine intelligence away from what is now 
referred to as "good old fashioned symbolic information processing" AI, toward a 
technical practice based in more foundational metaphors of biosocial evolution and, in 
Sarah Franklin’s phrase, "life itself." (Suchman 2003, p. 1) 
Neurophysiologist Grey Walter, one of the first opponents of this simulation 
and modellisation of GOFAI, wanted a new way to visit the workings of the brain. He 
constructed small mobile robots to show that, beyond cognitive organisation, 
anatomical and bodily characteristics determine behaviour (Walter 1950; Cordeschi 
2002). In contrast, the Sexed robots of artist Paul Granjon are a pastiche of Walter’s 
work and similar autonomous behaviour-based robotic experiments.  Granjon reminds 
us of this mechanical reduction of a living system by automating mating rituals into a 
mundane interplay of sensors and a reduced set of internal bodily states. 
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Figure 11. A Tortoise by Walter (left). Sexed Robots by artist Paul Granjon(right) 
Permission to reproduce Tortoise image has been granted by IEEE. Permission to reproduce Sexed 
Robots images has been granted by the artist. 
1.4.3. Life as it might be? Life and behaviour-based machines 
To qualify an entity as ‘living’ was not a concern for Wiener’s cybernetic view 
of organisms: 
Now that certain analogies of behaviour are being observed between the machine and 
the living organism, the problem as to whether the machine is alive or not is, for our 
purposes, semantic and we are at liberty to answer it one way or another as best suits 
our convenience. (Wiener 1954, p. 32) 
However, the very definition of ‘living’ became a field of interest as an 
outgrowth of the field of artificial intelligence. In 1987, during a workshop on 
Artificial Life, Langton and other participants defined the basis of this scientific field.  
Artificial Life was about the simulation and synthesis of living things. Rather than a 
force, Langton saw life as “a property of the organization of matter” (Langton 1989). 
In the vein of cybernetics, life manifests itself in A-Life in behaviours, in its abstract 
dynamic, which is not necessarily based on a biological medium (Whitelaw 2004). 
The philosophy of A-Life included a new motif, unspoken by, but yet present in, 
cybernetics: studying not only “life-as-we-know-it”, but also “life-as-it-might-be”. A 
subset of A-life, Real Artificial Life, concentrated on robotics as a “metaphor” of 
living systems.  
Riskin’s definition of A-life included a motif of simulation while Langton’s 
sought for the roots of the mechanisms of living in both organic and inert systems. A-
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Life as an art form followed the path opened by this A-Life as a scientific 
investigation:  
There is no single feature that characterizes the unique nature of Artificial Life (A-
Life) creativity in art. Rather, there is a set of characteristics, some of which will 
appear in any given work. For example, A-Life artworks might have behaviors, while 
other artworks do not; they are not static but dynamic and may evolve over time in 
relation to their environments; or they might incorporate both natural and artificial 
elements, calling into question the boundary between the living and the nonliving. 
These are A-Life research concepts that, through A-Life art, find their way into 
people’s imaginations in a way that they otherwise could not and in a form that allows 
them to be directly experienced and readily understood. A-Life art is a synthesis of 
different cultural inputs: the technological buzz of the moment, ideas from research 
that are sometimes highly specialized, and whatever artistic strategies must be called 
upon to mold these diverse forces into an artifact that has both aesthetic power and 
social relevance. (Tenhaaf 2008)	  
1.4.4. Life as we know it? Social machines 
In an anthropocentric view of “A-Life”, AI was seen in the early 21st century 
to be evolving into socially driven artefacts:  
Nonetheless, attributions of human-like machine agency seem alive as ever in both 
professional and popular discourse. The growth of the internet in particular has 
brought with it a renewed interest in the idea of personified computational artifacts 
attributed with a capacity for intelligent, interactive behavior. (Suchman 2003) 
In line with their opposing concepts of intelligence as either Cartesian or embodied, 
roboticists have taken opposite paths in their simulation of life: the artificial human on 
the one hand and biomimicry (the rest of the living) on the other. From an external 
perspective, mimicking biology can be seen as embracing the natural, while conjuring 
the inanimate human body embraces the artificial. Governed by this overriding view 
of life, AI is nowadays split between two schools of thought: “strong” versus “weak” 
AI, “top-down” versus “bottom-up”, or the proponents of symbolic computation 
versus the advocates of embodied intelligence. Artificial versus natural cycles surface 
again in the robotic field, as developed in this chapter in the form of the animated 
versus the animate. 
Social robotics typically involves an assemblage of intercommunicating 
components put together onto a frame (body): vision, hearing, speaking, facial 
expression, bodily expression and locomotion. While “life” seems, in “bottom-up” AI, 
to emerge out of simple components interacting with their environment, social 
robotics goes a step further, imitating “life” as a complex set of human interactions. Its 
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high-level functions, like conveying emotions, are very much modelled on top-down 
AI symbolic processing. Hence the body movements of social robots are seen as 
incidental to supporting “social functions” such as gaze and facial expression. In fact, 
the sensation of life conveyed by social robots is itself the subject of controversy. In 
the first place, the dualist Cartesian approach found in this field insufflates a rejection 
phenomenon called the Uncanny Valley that will be discussed extensively in Chapter 
2. And secondly, since the approach of social robotics remains mechanistic rather than 
truly embodied, it will experience considerable difficulty facing the challenge of 
generating animate offspring.  
  
Figure 12. Kismet (Brazeal) and Palmipède (Boyer) 
Permission to reproduce Kismet image has been granted by IEEE. Permission to reproduce Palmipède 
image has been granted by the artist. 
 
Figure 12 brings two robots formed out of assemblages of different 
components. On the left, Kismet by MIT’s Cynthia Brazeal is a complicated machine 
that engages with people socially. Kismet possesses specialized mechanical systems to 
convey its emotions and predispositions. On the right, Palmipède by artist Gerard 
Boyer is a simple mechanical construct made of a car’s gearbox driving two diver’s 
flippers. The resulting gait of this machine is unpredictable, yet resembles a clumsy 
bipedal animal. Palmipède can only walk while Kismet is gifted with a wider range of 
capacities. Nonetheless, Palmipède feels very animate, an empathic scenario of a per 
se credible animal trapped by its limitation, while Kismet’s assembly of friendly 
gestures feels overacted, a collage not yet integrated into holistic bodily experience.     
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1.4.5. Animate-animated shifting borders 
In conclusion, this past century has moved from the mechanically inspired 
robot to yet another dualistic tension. On one side stands the biologically inspired 
machine that mimics existing organisms, on the other the humanly inspired social 
composition that attempts to faithfully replicate the human in all its facets. 
In the early part of the century, a time both fascinated and terrified by the 
latent dangers of industrialisation, Futurism breached the lineage of strictly human 
replication. Even though less anthropocentric, I see a great deal of transference 
between humans and machines in Futurism, and the human is still central in Futurist 
thinking. 
In its claims, the Bauhaus Theatre attempted to evacuate the human from the 
theatre equation, therefore freeing the performance from text and transforming it into 
pure movement and form. However, even within this scheme the human remained 
present (as the borrowed mind of Tesla’s submarines), perhaps waiting for the 
upcoming autonomy of the machine or for greater mechanical virtuosity. On the 
Bauhaus stage, audiences saw abstract images of human bodies reduced to geometrical 
shapes that referred to an urge to depict the essence of the human not in its individual 
uniqueness, but in its general sense and universal validity. In the case of the Bauhaus, 
I consider these machine-like or puppet-like bodies as (generalising) mirrors of the 
human, or a deconstruction of that construct into a visual language of geometric form. 
Complete autonomy of the machine was certainly approached by the Č apek 
brothers. The word ‘robot’ was coined by this duo, but it has been re-appropriated in 
various forms and contexts to fulfil the aura of the myth of the mechanical double. 
Close to Cartesian thinking, the link and boundary line between the human and the 
machine is, for the Čapek brothers, the soul. 
The “soul” of the machine became a social concern during the 1960s. With 
advances (and promises) by artificial intelligence and new models representing the 
biological combined with the electronic, this era faced a diffuse sense of fear of the 
machine. Cybernetics generated many utopian and dystopian views of machines that 
were becoming increasingly autonomous. Fuelled by science-fiction and the climate of 
the time (nuclear proliferation, the Cold War), a machine with a sense of inner 
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motivation and self-regulation (man outside the loop) generated widespread distrust of 
the mechanical. 
In my own work, the sense of being animate in a robot is not to be confused 
with a sense of autonomy. In Chapters 3 and 4 I will discuss at length the minute 
variations in autonomy, agency and lifelikeness involved in locating the vis-motrix 
and the vis-directrix of my machine performers. 
Finally, Dana Haraway’s posthumanist “Cyborg manifesto” summarized late 
20th century developments in the cycle of the animal versus machine definition:  
The second leaky distinction is between animal-human (organism) and machine. Pre-
cybernetic machines could be haunted; there was always the spectre of the ghost in the 
machine. This dualism structured the dialogue between materialism and idealism that 
was settled by a dialectical progeny, called spirit or history, according to taste. But 
basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, and autonomous. They could 
not achieve man's dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author to himself, but 
only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream. To think they were otherwise 
was paranoid. Now we are not so sure. Late twentieth-century machines have made 
thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, 
self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to 
apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we 
ourselves frighteningly inert.(Haraway 1991, p. 120) 
 Animate  Animated 
Artificial intelligence Biomimicry (part of nouvelle 
AI) copies behaviours found in 
nature. 
GOFAI is a Cartesian view of 
the body. The brain is the 
symbolic processor and controls 
all the body (effectors). 
Man as Machine Non-anthropocentric view of the 
role of the human body on the 
stage. Seeking the animate of 
the human body in its essence. 
 
Kleist, Futurists, Moholy-Nagy. 
Still anthropocentric view of the 
glorified human, either as a 
silent abstract figure or as a 
utopian product. 
 
Schlemmer, Meyerhold. 
Machine as Man Čapek’s robots are machines 
with souls. R.U.R. 
 
L’Eventail has a limited 
functionality for the stage. In 
fact it is intended to feel 
animated. 
A-Life Palmipède’s movements are not 
modelled, they simply happen. 
Hence the behaviours have the 
complexity of the living. 
Though Walter’s Tortoise was 
probably first seen as animate, 
the internal mechanisms lack 
integration into the 
environment. 
Social Robots  Sexed Robots are conceptualized 
as animated and ridicule the 
mechanization of the biological. 
 
Though Kismet can socially 
engage at many levels with the 
human, it feels manipulated. 
Table 6. Animate vs. animated in the 20th century. 
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1.5. Contributing work:  La Cour des Miracles 
1.5.1. Description 
In the 17th century “La Cour des Miracles” was a nickname for the slum 
districts of Paris. The name derived from the sudden “miraculous” disappearance of 
the pseudo-disabled found in various manifestations of beggary once the night had 
fallen. Actually most of these people were not disabled at all. These districts were 
dark, scary places where beggars, thieves, the crippled and the sick lived, discarded 
from society and hidden from the eyes of the bourgeoisie.  
By creating a universe artificially loaded with affliction, the aim of a robotic 
Cour des Miracles is to induce an empathic response from the viewer towards 
characters that are merely articulated – though in some sense also articulate – metallic 
structures. The force of the simulacrum is heightened by perverting the perception of 
these ‘animats’10, which are neither animal nor human, stimulating an inevitable reflex 
of anthropomorphism and – in line with Aristotle’s Poetics – the cathartic projection 
of the sensations of pity and fear. 
Using the principle of evocation rather than representation, the installation 
space simulates a hypothetical habitat made for robotic characters. Viewers must 
traverse a long, narrow, “sordid” space located in an industrial-looking site. The 
machines are distributed along this confined corridor, crawling on the floor or hiding 
in dark corners. The close proximity of the machines challenges the viewer's comfort 
and impressions of physical safety. In her analysis of La Cour Tenhaaf thus concludes 
with the comment: “The robots show an unquestionable power in their abrasive 
clamour for attention, even with their very limited repertoire of movements and 
behaviours” (Tenhaaf 2008). 
  
                                                
10 ‘Animats’ are artificial animals, a subset of Artificial Life Studies. The word was coined by S.W. 
Wilson in 1985. 
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Six individual "characters" were originally created to perform under the 
dramaturgical theme of “robot misery”: 
• The Harassing Machine calls upon the passing viewer by shaking its 
articulated arms towards them. At the extremity of these members, small 
tentacles (agitated by compressed air) tease the intruders with importunate 
touches.  
• The Limping Machine walks painfully towards the viewer, stumbling 
awkwardly because of a differently aligned or distorted member of its body.  
• The Convulsive Machine is a thin metallic structure shaking with frequent but 
yet irregular spasms, especially when viewers approach.  
• The Begging Machine rocks its trunk back and forth on its base and raises its 
mechanical arm towards the viewers walking by. In order to emphasize the 
solicitation, the beggar has a suction device fixed at the end of its articulated 
arm.  
• The Heretic/Rebel Machine is locked up in a cage. When viewers come close 
by, it rushes violently towards them, grabs the metal grid and furiously shakes 
its cage.  
• The Crawling Machine creeps laboriously on the floor. Slow and vulnerable, it 
tries to run desperately away from approaching viewers. 
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Figure 13. La Cour des Miracles at V2 (Demers-Vorn 1996). The Limping. The 
Untamed. The Convulsive. The Begging  
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by V2. 
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1.5.2. Presentations 
La Cour was initially conceived as a set of six characters premiered at the 
International Symposium on Electronic Arts (ISEA) 1997. The following year, it was 
presented in a larger and more elaborate mise-en-scène (30 robots) at the Museum of 
Contemporary Arts of Montreal. Subsequently, La Cour was exhibited internationally 
and received first prize at VIDA 2.0, a high profile international contest focused on 
Artificial Life. 
As part of their facility’s grand opening in May 2012, Fundacion Telefonica 
decided to curate “Art and Artificial Life”, a retrospective show involving most of the 
first-prize winners of past VIDA contests. La Cour des Miracles had to be 
reconstructed and refurbished for this retrospective, as it had been dismantled in early 
2000. 
With my collaborator Bill Vorn, we had to re-implement a subset of the full 
cast of characters, and consequently revisit their embodiments and actualize their 
programming. Back in 1997, La Cour already included a number of AI concepts and 
techniques such as subsumption programming architecture to implement behaviours 
(Brooks). At that time our approach to embodiment was intuitive, and it is only 
through this thesis research that I started to formalize the process. The AI-embodied 
behaviours of La Cour des Miracles were then actualised, redeveloped and examined 
within the context of this thesis. In Chapter 3 I will show how the bottom-up 
approaches of recent AI can be used to reinforce embodiment. 
1.5.3. Embodiment and staging in La Cour 
Given that these limited machines are augmented by their mise-en-scène, an 
examination of the context created by La Cour des Miracles and of the morphologies 
of its machine bodies will serve as a useful springboard for an analysis of the 
repercussions of embodiment in machine performers.  The following principles will 
become apparent: 
• As an artistic strategy, presenting the disability of the machine helps to 
emphasize notions of embodiment. 
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• La Cour reflects on an historical situation by combining different modes of 
staging (medieval, freak show, zoo) as opposed to a neutral museum 
exhibition (white box, silence, contemplation). 
• By deconstructing stereotyped situations (e.g. Asimo showing his abilities to 
serve coffee) of scientific presentations, La Cour engenders an artistic 
scenario through its mise-en-scene. 
1) Disability and embodiment 
When audiences are faced with afflicted mechanical organisms not performing 
repetitive duties and predictable tasks but displaying rather tortuous and painful 
behaviours, these machines begin to evince a certain level of credibility. The divide 
between the disabled animats and the utopian conception of the “perfect machine”, or 
the tool performing at a virtuoso level, challenges audience preconceptions. 
These preconceptions are rooted in a clash between realism and the metaphor 
of the invented objects. In the context of La Cour, viewers have to imagine the normal 
behaviours (or normal bodies) of the machine performers as staged. In her analysis of 
(e)motional machines, Neumark describes La Cour in terms of its evading the 
instrumental logic of social robots: 
Though interesting for its recognition of emotion, the creativity of affective 
computing is itself blocked by its instrumental logic. It is this logic that produces the 
famous emotive talking computer, Kismet, as blandly ‘cute’ and what is called 
‘expressive synthesized speech’ as dully functional. Even in much media art, the 
attempt to simulate and “model how objects and humans act, react, move, grow, 
evolve, think and feel,” has been driven by the logic of realism. […] However, there 
are artists who are exploring the edge of AI with works which are not about the 
instrumentality of either cuteness or realism, but which express startling and 
frightening and bizarre and other irreducibly intense, if strange, emotions. (Neumark 
2001) 
Likewise, in her essay on Artificial Life and the VIDA Competition, Tenhaaf 
summarises the disabled machine as a form of protest against the instrumental purpose 
of machines: 
Because works that are autonomous artificial agents become metonyms for 
technology itself (the part stands for the whole), their dysfunctionality or defiance of 
instrumental purpose truly stands in protest against the instrumental values we have 
realized in technology. (Tenhaaf 2008), p.14) 
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As performance theorist Stanton Garner has argued, the representation and 
perception of pain from the performing body – as in La Cour’s disabled, pain-racked 
bodies – fuses the fictional and the actual, providing rich ground for the 
phenomenologist of theatre:  
Thus the performing body occupies a paradoxical role as both the activating agent of 
such dualities as presentation/representation, sign/referent, reality/illusion and that 
which most dramatically threatens to collapse them. This is one reason why the 
staging of pain – prevalent throughout the history of drama and of particularly intense 
interest in the contemporary theater – is of such potential usefulness to the theater 
phenomenologist: in its evocation of corporeal duress, the suffering body brings to the 
point of crisis the body's representational volatility, and it casts in relief the 
experiential exchanges of character, actor, and spectator. The "performance" of pain 
invades, and is in turn invaded by, the perceptual actuality of pain in a way that 
foregrounds the uncanny circuitry and ambiguity of dramatic representation itself. 
(Garner 1994,pp. 44-45) 
In “Bodies in commotion: disability & performance”, Auslander & Sandhal 
remark:  
similarly, to think of disability not as a physical condition but as a way of interacting 
with a world that is frequently inhospitable is to think of disability in performative 
terms – as something one does rather than something one is. (Sandahl and Auslander 
2005, p. 10) 
One might argue analogously that the effect of focusing the interpretation of the 
machine performer in La Cour on its phenomenological body rather than on its mind 
(control of the muscles, reactions) is that the perceived behaviours manifested by the 
robotic agents are not ascribed to the machines’ programs but rendered immediately 
live.  
This is the pivotal point of these machines. The implementation of various 
afflicted behaviours is not via top-down processes. On the contrary, they are a set of 
muscular vibrations that, in collaboration with the machine morphology and according 
to audience proximity, make the robot tremble, collapse and so forth.  For example, 
the convulsive machine’s spasm qualities (spontaneity, tension, surges) are not 
programmed but “computed” by its body structure. The limbs of the machines are 
preloaded with tension, implementing a chaotic system, and a minute change in one 
limb can shift the whole machine to a different position. Likewise, the limping 
machine emanates a sense of helplessness, as the viewer directly witnesses the effect 
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of the machine’s weight falling on the floor. A viewer’s folk physics11 and folk 
psychology12 will conclude that the machine does not have sufficient power to resume 
its nominal position. These bodily manifestations shift the perception of the 
movements of the robots from a sensation of imposed programmed functional 
behaviours (something one is) to a quasi-disappearance of the program (something one 
does). 
La Cour certainly employs lures (as much as the real characters of La Cour 
did) but rejects the thaumaturgical strategies (Turkish Chess Player, Kircher) and 
falsification (Weber) of the past. The embodied weak situation of the robot is 
presented directly, appearing live in the front of the viewers. La Cour does not 
camouflage the limitations of the machines but rather directly exposes and exploits 
these limitations to generate empathy in the viewer. In this sense, the credibility of the 
robot is augmented. 
2) Staging 
In scientific discourse about machines, the environment is usually described as 
the space sensed and acted upon by the agent.  Hence an object bolted to the floor or 
restrained by a chain would simply be described as constrained (variables). 
Artistically, however, an object bolted to the floor is perceived as suffering for some 
heinous reason. In La Cour des Miracles, the robots are helpless or condemned (bolted 
to the floor, in cages, failing to accomplish simple tasks) and this mise-en-scène helps 
the audience to accept the lures and empathise with the situation.  
The cultural codes (stereotypes) of presenting and collecting oddities or rarities 
are numerous: e.g. the zoo, the museum, the freak show, and the circus. Any of these 
mises-en-scène can supply a frame for perceiving movements and behaviours. In 
Bodies in Commotion Auslander and Sandhal have this to say about staging disability:  
Manipulating and transforming stereotypes are important tactics, since the available 
scripts of disability – both in daily life and in representation – are frustatingly limited 
and deeply entrenched in the cultural imagination (Sandahl and Auslander 2005, p. 3). 
                                                
11 Human perception of basic physical phenomena. 
12 Innate capacity to explain and predict the behavior and mental state of other people 
Horáková, J. (2005). "RUR‚ A Comedy about Robots." DISK, a selection from the 
journal for the study of dramatic arts 1: 86-103.. 
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Considering La Cour as a freak show (presenting its biological rarities) highlights a 
tension between science and art, for it is usually acceptable to display oddities and 
human monstrosities only for the purposes of science. Loaded with negative cultural 
connotations, the freak show is popular only in the underground layers of society. 
In her essay Theatre, Fear and Space, architect Maya Öztürk approaches the 
site of the stage as a physical component of theatrical praxis: “It seeks to acknowledge 
that a subtle dimension of space, the ‘bodily’ and unmediated, can trigger an 
experiential mode, infused with feelings, and bearing on the ontological” (Öztürk 
2010, p. 296). Writing about the exposure of the body to space, she claims that space 
can magnify the perceptions and goes on to observe that:  
Validating the absorbing qualities of the immediate, these are viscerally felt, as much 
a potential for response to sensibility as a pathway to awareness, especially while, 
acknowledged by the body, they condense in a fairly stable cluster of discrete 
occurrences and processes that constitute a form of experience. (Öztürk 2010, p. 312) 
In La Cour, space does not actually pose a threat. However, the dark and hazy 
lair invented for the machine characters resonates with the physically situated body of 
the audience. Far removed from either the scientific laboratory presentation or the 
neutral ‘white box’ setting of the museum, the environment immerses the audience 
immediately, and the perceived behaviours of the characters of La Cour are mediated 
and modulated by the interface between audience and machine. Audience participation 
thus becomes an act of experience instead of an act of admiration (passive 
observation). 
3) Deconstructing presentation 
By putting the robot in a weak situation, La Cour proposes its afflictions in 
order to explore different qualities of the machine (e.g. its potential for empathy). It 
stands, therefore, in contrast to the well-functioning and predictably behaving robots 
that have mimicked the body down through the ages. From the rise of the Industrial 
Revolution to AI in the 1960s conventional presentations have defined the robot 
imaginary as either utopian or dystopian, and in both cases robots had qualities that 
surpassed those of the human being. 
The way engineers and scientists present their robots to the general public has 
been analysed by Weber, who views these presentations critically as framed and 
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edited, their real purpose being to show the machine’s capabilities, either real or 
pretended (Weber 2007). The staging of these presentations offers stereotypical 
situations such as Asimo serving coffee and Paro being stroked by an enlightened 
elderly person. Science-fiction characters are also stereotypical of the omnipotently 
clever (the computer HAL in Kubrick’s Space Odyssey) or the indestructible and 
mighty (the androids of the Terminator film series). 
In the context of La Cour, I wish to elicit another side of the machine: its 
affective response. In her essay referred to above on “Artificial Life and Robots”, 
Tenhaaf pinpoints the difference between scientific and artistic stances: 
Robots tend to foreground autonomous behaviours such as mobility and sensitivity to 
their environment and to mimic the sensory responses of humans or animals. 
However, A-Life robotic artworks are invariably different from robots found in 
research, even if they investigate many of the same questions about agency and 
artificial embodiment. Unlike research robots that are studied to gain quantifiable 
data, robotic artworks call attention to relationships between robots and humans, 
whether those humans are the creators of a work or members of the public. It is not 
simply a question of objective or subjective points of view; it is a question of the 
robotic artist wanting to elicit narrative elements and affective responses that 
complicate a viewer’s response to the work. In the lab, those narratives may be 
present but are set aside. (Tenhaaf 2008) 
Deliberately putting machines in a weak position in relation to the audience 
focuses attention on that relationship rather than on the functions of the machines. As 
Whitelaw discerns with respect to La Cour, the experience is not situated in the robot 
itself but in the interface of audience and robot, in the atmosphere created by the mise-
en-scène: “La Cour des Miracles are other works that elicit empathy and flesh out a 
communicative exchange that is not controlled by either humans or artificial entities 
but lies in a space between the beings involved” (Whitelaw 2004, p. 214).  
1.6. Contributing work:  The Blind Robot 
1.6.1. Description 
With the Blind Robot, I aim to further understand the degrees of engagement, 
intellectual, emotional and physical, that are generated when a social robot touches a 
person intimately. In essence the Blind Robot is a piece of minimalistic mechanical 
engineering. The rationale is to start from a familiar cultural artefact, the robot arm, 
and transform it from a high-precision tool into a fragile, imprecise and emotionally 
loaded agent.  
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The Blind Robot comprises a typical robotic arm equipped with an articulated 
hand. In this installation, visitors are invited to sit in the front of the machine and 
engage in non-verbal dialogue with it. The robot delicately explores the body – mostly 
the face and upper body – of the visitor in a manner that recalls that of a blind person 
seeking to recognize another person or object. On a nearby monitor or projection 
screen the machine then produces a visual rendering of what its fingertips have “seen”.  
  
 
Figure 14. The Blind Robot. Concepts and mechanical incarnation (Demers 2012) 
The hypothesis I set out to verify in this artwork is that the social role of the 
robot, simulating that of a blind person, will augment the merely physical act of 
touching via the potential of the created emotional connection between the human 
visitor and the robot. Only limited research has been devoted in social robotics to the 
sense of touch, and in particular to invasive touch to our vulnerable body parts: head, 
neck and torso (Chen, King et al. 2011). If the role of a social robot – in this instance 
modelled on the healthcare provider – is to be fully integrated into human society, 
these robots will have to go beyond non-invasive touch (handshake, patting) and 
address the complexities of human proxemics.  
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The Blind Robot then becomes an artistic and critical investigation of the 
scientific developments of social robotics with the following aims: 
• To verify if the mise-en-scène of a social robot influences, shifts or augments 
the perception of the participant. 
• To explore the impact of empathy from a suggested character on invasive 
touch and investigate if these circumstances  modulate the perceived 
competency of the agent. 
• To verify how faithful, precise or delicate the touch has to be in order to be 
accepted. 
• To verify if the robot has to be verisimilar to a human for such intimate 
contact. 
• To generate conditions where the Blind Robot’s touch would be accepted as a 
“feel-good” (Burwell 1999), potentially altering cultural preconditions and 
resistances. 
1.6.2. Developing the Blind Robot 
The development of the robot lasted over a period of twelve months with a 
team of two people. One staff member developed the arm architecture and the hand 
mechanism while the other was responsible for software control and mathematical 
models for forward and inverse kinematics of the arm. I supervised the whole 
development, staged the work and finalized the entire programming. 
The proportions of the arms and hands were measured on my own body. The 
actual geometry – a straightforward six degrees of freedom manipulator – of the 
constructed limb is depicted in Figure 15. The original plan considered cosmetic 
draping of the skeleton in an attempt to recreate a similar aesthetic as that found in an 
18th century device. At this stage, I did not have the occasion to try these designs and 
to measure their impact on the audience. However, I had to be careful with the payload 
of the arm; this needed to remain as lightweight as possible, and eventually ruled out 
enrobing the arms. 
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Figure 15. Geometry of the arm (Demers 2012) 
The object of the design of the hand was to mechanically master a limited 
range of acceptable touches and sensations to be given to a viewer’s body and face. I 
did not seek to reproduce a human hand’s full flexibility or aesthetics. Inventorying 
the state-of-the-art robotic hands in current use, I quickly realised that gaining access 
to a high-end solution would be both costly and time-consuming. With my team, we 
designed the hand based on articulated mechanisms found in finger prostheses and 
decided to opt for lightweight plastic materials. The shell of the hand (its skin) was 
chosen to provide an agreeable sensation of touch while dissimulating its internal 
mechanism. As the main source of body interaction between the Blind Robot and the 
participant’s skin are its fingertips, the robot needed to skilfully sense these contacts. 
We concentrated our design on the fingertips’ acute sensing capabilities and the 
required miniaturisation of the pressure sensors (see Figure 16). Very complex 
attributes that are difficult to faithfully reproduce, such as skin temperature and 
texture, were not addressed by this project. The aesthetics were intentionally 
mechanistic, as was the range of touch and movement, yet performed with a necessary 
amount of care and sensibility to maintain affinity in the contact. 
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Figure 16. CAD model of the hand, fingertip sensor and CNC parts (Demers 2012) 
Ultimately and intentionally, the Blind Robot was constructed with relatively 
low-end robotic components. However, this choice led to an accumulation of feedback 
errors that made fully automated computer control of the arm a nearly impossible task. 
Moreover, an algorithm that will find and recognize the body parts of a person simply 
by means of touching is a great challenge. I could design methods that would make the 
arms scan the space and progressively discover the shape of the body in front of it, but 
this also needed precise feedback systems. Facing this challenging task, I decided to 
opt for a tele-operation scheme, where most of the movements of the Blind Robot were 
under human supervision (see Figure 17). The finger motions are on an automated 
feedback loop to minimize the actions required by the operator, while the control 
information for the arms is intuitively captured by remotely manipulating a facsimile 
of the arms. Nonetheless, I am planning to develop an automated version of the Blind 
Robot that will require external and accurate sensors to measure the positions of the 
various articulations of the arms and hands. 
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Figure 17. Tele-operation. The robot arms extend the operator’s gestures (Demers 
2012) 
This technical decision introduced another facet to the project; it created a 
scenario similar to Kempelen’s Chess Player. In this way, the Blind Robot not only 
investigates the impact of the empathic character of the agent but investigates the 
perception of its borrowed competence. In Chapter 3, where I compare embodiments, I 
will cover a quantitative experiment, a sort of Turing test that I performed with the 
Blind Robot. For the purposes of the present section, I will analyse the Blind Robot 
along the same vein as La Cour des Miracles, based on observations gathered during 
the public presentation of the work. 
1.6.3. Presentations and data gathering 
The Blind Robot premiered at Kibla (Maribor, Slovenia) as part of the 
European Capital of Culture programme in 2012. Kibla programmed the exhibition 
with the British association Robots & Avatars which had originally commissioned the 
Blind Robot. In the course of the exhibition I gathered video footage of visitors 
(n=12), informal discussions during the opening event, and ad-hoc comments during 
testing phases of the robot. 
During the exhibition, the operator of the robot was hidden behind a one-way 
mirror window while gallery goers could watch people experiencing the Blind Robot. 
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Figure 18. Visitors and Blind Robot (Demers 2012) 
1.6.4. Embodiment and staging in the Blind Robot 
Many media artists put physicality and tactility at the centre of their research 
and practice. Early tangible works like Fleishmann’s Liquid Views (1994), 
Schiphorst’s Bodymaps: artefacts of touch (1995) and Dubois’ Les Errances de l’Echo 
(2004) establish touch as the modality of interaction. In social robotics, touch is at a 
very early stage. So far, touch has been mainly limited to non-vulnerable body parts 
and non-invasive gestures such as handshakes or hugs. Furthermore, social robots as 
toy companions focus more on the sensing side than on the affective side of touching 
(Velonaki, Rye et al. 2010). 
Heslin describes five types of touch according to their functions: 
functional/professional, social/polite, friendship/warmth, love/intimacy and sexual 
arousal (Heslin 1974). His research demonstrates that the interpretation of a specific 
touch is affected by factors such as: the modality of the touch (pat, squeeze, stroke, 
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poke, etc.), its location, duration, intensity and frequency. Gender and degree of 
interpersonal involvement between the two people concerned are also factors. The 
location of touch can be divided into “non-vulnerable” and “vulnerable” body parts. 
For instance, hands, arms and shoulders are considered non-vulnerable, while head, 
neck and torso are seen as vulnerable. To sum up, a touch that invades our privacy has 
the potential of being perceived as less positive (Burwell 1999). Modulating intensity 
and duration will associate anger, love, gratitude or sympathy. Sympathy may be 
associated with a long duration but moderate touch, anger with a strong touch of 
moderate duration, and gratitude with a handshake. 
The Blind Robot creates a specific context for the participant: touching a face 
is a very intrusive and intimate action and the Blind Robot walks the thin line between 
being a cold stranger and an empathic agent. To analyse its acceptance, I will show the 
following:  
• As an artistic strategy, presenting a competent machine that targets very 
minute and precise human activities (touching) helps to reinforce notions of 
embodiment. 
• The Blind Robot reflects on an historical situation by recreating the staging of 
the Chess Player. 
• By amplifying the stereotyped situations (social robots as friendly agents) 
found in scientific presentations, the Blind Robot engenders an artistic 
scenario through its mise-en-scène. 
1) Competence and embodiment. 
The Blind Robot is a direct reference to the works of Merleau-Ponty and his 
example of a blind’s man cane becoming an extension of the body. The blind man 
senses the world through the cane; he is not directly conscious of the cane as such but 
rather of what it touches.  The cane becomes incorporated in the body scheme of the 
blind person and acts as an extended sense organ. As Merleau-Ponty claims: “To get 
used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to 
incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. Habit expresses our power of dilating 
our being in the world […]” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 143). 
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When Feenberg analyses Merleau-Ponty’s blind man’s cane, he concludes that 
the cane does more than sense the world; it also reveals the blind man as blind: 
His body is extended not only in the active dimension on which Ihde and Merleau-
Ponty focus but also in the passive dimension of its own objectivity. Those around 
him recognize his blindness and are generally helpful. The blind man knows this is 
happening and has a non-specific awareness of the helpfulness of those who perceive 
him as blind because of his cane. (Feenberg 2003, p. 105) 
It is this very aspect that the Blind Robot seeks to exploit: to create an empathic 
situation and a positive predisposition for engagement. It is not concerned with the 
aspect of use (technicality of touch itself) but rather with the consequences for bodily 
objectivity and the subject’s awareness of those consequences. It aims to exploit this 
passive dimension and to explore its repercussions in the acceptance of the robot’s 
very invasive touch. The Blind Robot is endowed with an arm and hand to sense its 
environment: the embodied “cane” of the computer dialoguing with the viewer. The 
robot’s gestures and the environment reveal it as blind. 
In Agency and Embodiment, French literature professor Noland (Noland 2009) 
discusses agency through “tatonnement”13 in opposition to haphazard discovery. 
“Tatonnement” has a double meaning in French: it refers to the groping movements of 
the hands but also indicates an intellectual process of testing out possible solutions. 
“Tatonnenement” could also imply the use of a prosthesis (a blind man’s cane for 
instance). “Tatonner” conveys a sense of exploration, whether physical or cognitive. 
These “tatonnements” are hints that the Blind Robot will be gentle rather than 
invasive, but they are also indications of a heightened potential for sensuous arousal in 
the visitor. In a reversal of roles, I have observed that the object becomes the subject 
in this gestural interchange. I would then extend the following statement of Noland: 
“Inchoate groping transforms the body into a receptor or, better yet, encourages a 
heightened attention to the sensory information that is always potentially available to a 
body that is skin and nerve and not plastic or metal” (p. 105). In our case, the receptors 
are both subject and object. Visitors become focused on this non-human touch while 
witnessing the Blind Robot’s groping heuristics unfolding on their body: the subject 
becomes the heightened site of reception. 
                                                
13 Noland bases her analysis on Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of “tatonnement” in gesture and speech. 
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When Noland links Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind – “a hand feels its way, it 
gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes” – with “tatonnements”, she looks at the 
semiotic and instrumental orders of the gesture and how they are mutable and 
plurifunctional:   
The locution suggests further that the body performing inscriptive gestures is more 
than instrumental or expressive, spectacular or sentient; the body engaged in the 
gestures of writing is exploratory as well. Caressing the space of inscription is one 
way for the body to orient itself in, parse, and divide up space by means of self-
displacing “tatonnements”. (p. 209) 
Gestures of groping (for a blind person) or writing are techniques of the body, 
constructed syntactic sequences executed with the intention to discover/fabricate an 
object, leave a mark, or accomplish a task. Being touched by the Blind Robot is, 
therefore, more than just the instrumental action of groping; it is the whole situation of 
a shared habitus, technical intentionality and social inscription. 
2) Staging. 
In the Blind Robot, I did not employ saturation of the senses as in La Cour des 
Miracles. The lighting revealed everything; the sound was only to clothe the space 
with a texture and also to provide an acoustic feedback when the robot touched the 
person. 
The Blind Robot is a direct allusion to Kempelen’s Turkish Chess Player. The 
set-up is similar, with a mechanical upper torso representing the human body. The 
Chess Player engaged in a sophisticated mental activity while the Blind Robot engages 
in an intricate physical activity. Both situations call for a high-level of competence 
from the agent that in turn, raises scepticism about true nature of the situation. 
The visitor is invited to sit in front of the robot, a position similar to that of a 
game of chess. The swindle is that – as in the Chess Player – the robot is under human 
control and the perceived behaviours of the Blind Robot emanate more from a make-
belief in the scenario than from the actual capabilities of the machine (Sussman 1999). 
The human operator is not visible, and Blind Robot’s hands appear to be able to find 
body parts and touch them automatically. 
However, the Blind Robot’s structure and constituents are directly exposed and 
there is no attempt to conceal the nature of the object. The movements are deliberately 
Contributing work:  The Blind Robot © Demers 2014 
 
68 
presented as issuing from the mechanical realm; what is concealed is only the 
competence of the robot to touch the visitor. As I was able to observe during the 
opening event, nobody seemed to care about the veracity of the animation of the 
object, whether it was a complex AI system, a marvel of bio-mimicry, or simply a 
brutally imposed hoax. The staging of the experience and of the atmosphere seemed to 
be at the forefront of the audience’s concerns.  
3) Amplification 
The Blind Robot negates the a priori perception of mechanical touch. After the 
initial contact (discovery), participants engaged playfully and trustingly with being 
touched by the robot. Visitors accepted the Blind Robot’s exploration, recognized as 
gentle and less invasive. Sometimes the visitors led the robot in the movement (joining 
hands) and sometimes she or he waited to discover the “new” sensation of being 
explored by a robot (mostly on the face). 
The surprising reactions of visitors to the touch and groping of the Blind Robot 
also indicate that veracity and verisimilitude to human touch are not central to the 
experience. The quality of the touch is actually amplified by the staging of the 
situation, the uniqueness of the experience and the acceptance of the touch as being 
singular to the blindness of the robot. The technicalities of the mechanism did not 
seem to impact the audience. Even when some of the finger movements were not 
operational, visitors were still very much in tune with the experience of being touched 
by a non-living agent.  
I received a few questions about the underlying mechanisms involved in 
animating the robot arms and hands. Actually, only a few people, technically versed, 
asked me how the robot was able to perform such complex gestures. I admitted that 
this was a hoax and their deception was more about the functionality of the system 
than about the experience they had: revealing the trick did not seem to cancel or 
drastically alter the experience for these viewers. Overall, the concealment of the tele-
operator did not seem to impact the audience’s judgment of the Blind Robot. 
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If I compare this scenario to Ishiguro’s Geminoid presentations, there is quite a 
shift in audience reaction14. Geminoid and Blind Robot share anatomically correct 
representations of the human body and both are remotely operated. With Geminoid, 
the audience is captivated with finding visual and tactile cues (hair or skin textures, 
water in the eyes) and deciphering and registering any minute moves. Blind Robot is, 
in contrast, raw; its anthropomorphic arms serve the purpose of groping, their 
verisimilitude is found in the groping action, the fictional situation of the blindness of 
the agent and not the skin texture becomes the fascination point for the audience. 
The focus of the experience is the hands of the Blind Robot, more specifically 
the vicinity of the points of contact of the two bodies. The dance of the hands in space 
onto your body is a singular experience, neither human nor mechanical. The hands are 
the residual body of the agent touching the visitor; engaging with the sensuality of the 
experience, visitors try to integrate these new sensations.  
Belief in this case does not focus on the endowment of the robot with 
intelligence but instead on its ability to touch and explore your body with delicate 
precision and care. The actual suspension of disbelief is that the Blind Robot will 
touch you softly and engage in bodily dialogue with you.  Participants do not seem to 
compare or measure the realism of the motion of the arms/hands with the human. They 
accept the artefact at face value as a mechanical construct. They amplify this animated 
robot in order to focus on the animate experience of having their own body touched. 
  
                                                
14 I attended Ishiguro’s demonstration at Ars Electronica 2009. Further details about this experience are 
presented in section 2.3. 
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1.7. Conclusion 
In Mulder’s examination of Lewis Mumford’s critique of the idea of the body 
as a machine (Mumford 1934), he accurately isolates the attitude of modern natural 
science: 
Like the monk the exact scientist sees the world as spiritless, as purely matter, factual 
and therefore measurable. The scientist, like the monk, positions himself outside the 
world, where he overlooks and looks down on life. The scientist also thinks that 
intuition and other animal cognitive tools are irrelevant to his task as only the mental 
faculties of man are capable of fully understanding the laws that nature and the mind 
obey. Mumford: “Machines – and machines alone – completely met the requirements 
of the new scientific method and point of view: they fulfilled the definition of 
“reality” far more perfectly than living organisms.” For man to be able to live with a 
scientific worldview he must turn himself into a machine.  (Mulder, Post et al. 2000, 
p. 12) 
In Mulder’s view, we are still permeated by a scientific view of the body that is 
predominantly derived from a mechanist perspective. While engineers are concerned 
with realism and characteristics that make a robot “perform” in the humanly built 
environment at large, the present research is concerned with the specific issue of how 
to make a robot “perform” for the stage framed by a context or a mise-en-scène. The 
machine performers that I develop do not attempt to duplicate human performers; my 
works are rather experiments in audience reception. My explorations into alternative 
body morphologies for machine performers provide new insights and guidelines on 
their design rather than solving intricacies of their inner body (or the human body). 
These insights aim to help machine performers navigate the thin line of the animate-
animated equation. 
Nowadays, Mumford’s observation resonates without equivocation: the 
robotics (and particularly social robotics) community claims that through the 
construction of machines that mimic the social human we will be able to understand 
and model the (ideal) human. This presupposes that there will be equivalences (at all 
levels) between the organic human and its sensorimotor counterpart. These 
equivalences raise direct reminiscences of the cybernetic view of living organisms 
(biology). Today, I think, these mechanistic and cybernetic models are far too limiting, 
because they do not account for a history of adaptation and transformation based on 
learning and memory found in the human body.  
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Kaplan observes that the robot body is at the same time similar and different 
from the human body (Kaplan and Oudeyer 2008). He is more modest in his approach 
to investigating complex constructions such as androids. What he suggests instead is 
to explore “invented” bodies, thus implicitly considering the body as an experimental 
variable. In accordance with this assumption, my work looks into similarities, 
complementarities and differences between the machine performer and the human 
body (audience). For alternative morphologies to enhance machine performers, I 
consider that they need to encompass the 1960s cybernetic anthropocentric shift, as 
well as implementing a tighter coupling between their bodies and their animations.  
Explorations into alternative body morphologies can, in turn, provide new 
insights for embodied robotics. The stage is a “controlled” environment and I consider 
it as my laboratory for experiments on the embodiment of machine performers. By 
extension, I do not limit myself to the stage as a proscenium but to any space where a 
mise-en-scène can take place. In this sense, an installation is to be equally considered 
as a stage from the perspective of its mise-en-scène of the agents. 
The perception of a robot’s behaviour goes far beyond the reality of its 
sensorimotor behaviours and embarks into the areas of fakery and mystification. 
Robot history brings us numerous scenarios where the situation obscures, conceals or 
augments the actual capacities of the agent. In La Cour des Miracles, viewers 
experience the machine performers as entities experiencing bodily pain, not solely as 
robots mechanically reproducing signs of pain. By encompassing many layers of 
embodiment, from the physiological to the social, La Cour des Miracles enhances 
viewers’ own bodily reception and encourages them to see these machine characters 
not as tools to show pain but as bodies that actually experience pain. The empathy is 
with the perceived behaviours of the robot, not with what their bodies look like. The 
behaviours are implemented by sets of movements, hints and assemblages that are 
culturally coded (beggar rocking, rebel/heretic shaking the cage), socially coded 
(harassing) and bodily coded (the motoric sensation of spasms).  
In the Blind Robot, the novel phenomenon of being touched by a robot enables 
the audience to engage in a sensual experience, as opposed to one of solving the 
intellectual, ontological issues of the quasi-living. This scenario demonstrates some of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological statements:  “attention to life is the awareness we 
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experience of ‘nascent movements’ in our bodies” (Merleau-Ponty 1962,pp. 90-91). 
My research into embodiment expects my audiences to be active witnesses of these 
experiments. As an A-Life art exploration, studying the embodiment of machine 
performers also contributes to the scientific field. As argued by Tenhaaf: 
The A-Life research community has become interested in A-Life artists over the past 
few decades precisely because of their deployment of research concepts in public 
space. Their artworks call attention to the role of the “participant subject” and invite 
the recognition that one of those subjects is the researcher her- or himself—albeit an 
expert one rather than a novice. A-Life artworks can explicitly explore the boundary 
between the researcher and the subjects of the experiment: “This researcher will have 
to allow for—perhaps even explore— other emotions than those of the ideal distanced 
witness”. This kind of shift in thinking, and the exchange of interests and working 
methods in general, continues to be one of the most fruitful areas of art and science 
crossover.15  
The dichotomy in the impact of embodiment in robots is symbolized by the old 
and new AI approaches. I see this as powerfully mirrored in the current disciplines of 
androids and bio-mimicry. Exploring alternate morphologies is a path to “reconcile” 
these avenues:  
No doubt we must get beyond the anthropological in order to reckon with the 
Merkmale of our irrevocably displaced humanity and to see that machines which 
centuries ago began to move away from the human they used to simulate are now 
coming to seek the soul they had forgotten.  […] The imaginative rationality 
(Lakoff/Johnson) in the arts offers a unique way of structuring and integrating 
conceptual frameworks thereby producing an “autonomous kind of thought”, which 
allows the emergence and recognition of new Merkwelten. (Norman 2012) 
In this chapter, I have exposed the ongoing dialectic between man and machine 
and between the natural and the artificial. It is not surprising that nowadays we are 
witnessing a plethora of attempts to unify these opposites. So far I have spoken of 
embodiment without introducing phenomenology. I would like to conclude this 
chapter by presenting phenomenology as a methodology and framework for analysing, 
designing and staging machine performers. For, as demonstrated by the shifting 
barrier of the animal and the machine, the different epistemes issued by different 
models of the body do change our perception of the mimesis of machine performers. 
In philosophy, phenomenology explores aspects of being in the world, dealing 
with the liminal divide between the body and its surroundings, between subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity. Merlau-Ponty points out that our bodies are not in space but of 
                                                
15 Part of the press release of Art and Artificial Life, The retrospective of 10 years of VIDA 
International Awards, 2012. 
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space, constantly integrating objects into our bodily space or being projected out of 
our bodily space (Merleau-Ponty 1962). Phenomenological discourse has reached 
many fields, including theatre as an alternative analysis to semiotics. The theatre is 
uniquely able to illuminate the stage’s experiential duality, and Garner (Garner 1994) 
considers that the stage is simultaneously objectified (a detachment) and subjectified 
(the co-presence of actors).  
The next chapter will investigate the dissonance of a misalignment between the 
movements and appearance of the robotic body, a potential phenomenon of rejection 
impacting machine performers. The Uncanny Valley is a thesis that relates the level of 
anthropomorphism of a robot and the affinity it engenders in its relationship with the 
human. In Chapter 3, I will then present various layers of embodiment found in 
phenomenology to contrast them with the notions of embodiment found in nouvelle 
AI.  This chapter will look at the machine performer’s body from within, while 
Chapter 4 presents the view from the outside, the human phenomenological perception 
of machine performers. 
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2  
The Uncertain Valley 
2.1. Outline of chapter 
This chapter aims to capture some key ideas in the current discussion of the 
Uncanny Valley, a phenomenon and a body of theory concerned with the 
unexpectedly negative reaction of humans to near-human robots. As demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, the topic of devices that mimic the human form is far from 
recent. Hence the Uncanny Valley takes its place within the historical lineage of 
robots, a tradition that plays a considerable role in the current understanding of the 
human body and is a social reflection of our era. In an age of omnipresent replication 
(nanotechnology, increased realism from technology), genetics (biology and cloning) 
and posthumans (one of the world’s fastest runners has prostheses instead of legs), 
androids and geminoids (aka second life) resonate with current concerns. From the 
engineering and scientific standpoint, the Uncanny Valley is an icon of the current 
state of human representation, embodiment and artificial intelligence. 
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The reasons why the Uncanny Valley is heavily featured in this dissertation are 
numerous. The discussion has created a controversy not only in science but also in the 
arts. Automatons and animatronic figures have been around for a long time in the 
entertainment industry.  In order to situate my approach to machine performers, and in 
opposition to current modes of casting androids/actroids, this chapter will look into the 
impact of their verisimilitude in the performing arts and everyday life.  Does the 
supposed Uncanny Valley – the asymptotical burden in the acceptance of humanoid 
robots – also hold for machine performers on stage? By investigating artistic 
counterparts to the Uncanny Valley, I will show that the hypothesis can be 
reformulated in embodiment terms, applicable to the stage, the arts and social robots.  
I will first look at the original definition of the Uncanny Valley thesis and 
point out some key elements – such as escape by design – left aside by the current 
literature. As the formulation of the thesis calls upon parameters such as 
anthropomorphism and affinity, the still open question of measuring these will be 
addressed. Following this, I will undertake a comparative analysis to highlight various 
angles of research into the Uncanny Valley. Two polarized schools of thought have 
emerged in the field of social robotics: researchers into humanoid robots are trying to 
bridge the gap between reality and fiction, while researchers into non-humanoid robots 
are optimizing design within the niches of specific robotic applications. 
I will then further investigate why and how the Uncanny Valley seems to be a 
greater problem in science than in the artistic world. First, I will demonstrate the 
acceptance and empowerment of the Uncanny in the artistic world and how it might 
constitute an aesthetic value of its own (Kozin 2006). Secondly, I will compare 
alternative formulations of the Uncanny Valley hypothesis and similar perceptual 
ambivalences and adapt these to the case of machine performers.  These formulations 
are the concepts of multistability from theatre performance theorist Erika Fischer-
Lichte (Fischer-Lichte 2004; Fischer-Lichte 2008), of ambivalent power from art 
historian Minsoon Kang (Kang 2009; Kang 2011), of two to ten seconds of confusion 
from robotic artist Zaven Paré (Paré and Grimaud 2011), of empathy and imaginative 
perception from philosopher Catrin Misselhorn (Misselhorn 2009; Misselhorn 2010), 
and of Heider’s balance theory from psychologist Bardou and roboticist Tondu 
(Tondu and Bardou 2011). Thirdly, by bringing the robot into the arts realm and away 
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from the laboratory, I will show how these shifts in perception affect the Uncanny 
Valley. Via case studies and one of my own practical works (Area V5) I will 
demonstrate that the acceptance of potentially uncanny agents can be mediated. 
In adapting the Uncanny Valley to quasi-living machine performers 
(sometimes non-anthropomorphic) I aim to bridge the notions of embodiment found in 
performance theory and robotics. In recent analyses of theatre (Power 2008), for 
instance, presence is a key element qualifying the intangible perception of acting 
bodies on the stage, and this, after all, is what the Uncanny Valley expresses for a very 
specific narrative. The Uncanny Valley calls upon shifting and evolving perceptions 
on the part of the viewer. Given the differences and similarities between scientific and 
artistic issues, I claim that art, particularly the machine performer, is able to re-situate 
and re-appropriate the perceptual and conceptual issues of the Uncanny Valley. I am, 
in fact, looking at what constitutes a breach in the suspension of disbelief in the case 
of the machine performer, and investigating whether phenomena surrounding the 
Uncanny Valley can participate in this breach. 
2.2. Mori’s Definition 
2.2.1. The Thesis 
The Uncanny Valley thesis was first presented in 1970 by Japanese roboticist 
Dr. Masahiro Mori (Mori 1970). In the wake of continuous interest from roboticists 
and engineers, Mori recently republished an updated and “authorized” version of his 
1970s publications (Mori, Macdorman et al. 2012). Though the essence of the thesis is 
mostly conveyed by plotted graphs depicting human responses (affinity) towards the 
verisimilitude of a robot, Mori’s published texts do not include any “formula” per se. 
The closest he provides to an algebraic formulation explaining the curve of the graphs 
(see Figure 19) is qualitative and metaphoric rather than quantitative. Mori 
contextualizes his Uncanny Valley graph in contrast to monotonically increasing 
functions, or as reformulated by psychologist Frank Pollick: 
An example of a function that does not increase continuously is climbing a 
mountain—the relation between the distance (x) traveled by a hiker toward the 
summit and the hiker’s altitude (y)—owing to the intervening hills and valleys. I have 
noticed that, in climbing toward the goal of making robots appear like a human, our 
affinity for them increases until we come to a valley (see Figure), which I call the 
uncanny valley. (Mori, Macdorman et al. 2012, p. 98). 
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In an earlier publication Pollick puts the issue of the Valley very succinctly: 
Assume we could make a robot more and more similar to a human in form, would the 
affinity to this robot steadily increase as realism increased or would there be dips in 
the relationship between affinity and realism? (Pollick 2010) 
Mori’s thesis proposes that there will be a strong negative dip in the form of 
the Valley. First there will be an increase in perceived affinity, but as the robot 
approaches a nearly human state, acceptance will dramatically decrease. Mori plotted 
his assertion as a function f(x) – a two dimensional graph – showing strong aversion 
when the robot is near-human and growing back towards affinity when the robot is 
virtually human. 
Mori coined this precipitous drop in Japanese as “bukimi no tani”.  The term 
Uncanny Valley surfaced only later as a translation and was popularized in the 
literature on the subject. “Bukimi” has several translations into English: “eerie”, 
“strange” and “uncanny”. It is speculated that “uncanny” was chosen because of its 
resonance with Freud’s 1919 essay “Das Unheimliche”, later translated into English as 
“The Uncanny” (Freud 1960). Reichardt (1978) was probably among the first to 
popularize the term “Uncanny Valley” in her seminal book Robots: Fact, Fiction and 
Prediction, which contextualized the concept, as the title suggests, within the vast 
array of human imitations of the body by robots. 
The Uncanny Valley has recently evoked growing interest in the milieu of 
robotics, especially in the fields of social robotics and artificial intelligence. Even 
though the term was coined more than four decades ago, it has recently emerged at the 
centre of discussions about physical humanoids and virtual human characters16, and it 
continues to generate a fair amount of debate and even dissent within the robotics 
community. 
This section of my research, however, is based on an investigation of prior 
attempts to formalize human mechanisms regarding the acceptance or rejection of 
robots as credible agents. For, although not yet precisely formulated, the Uncanny 
Valley thesis collates a body of evidence concerned with levels of quality in 
anthropomorphism and movement, and the associated discussion has produced 
                                                
16 Its focus on human replication inevitably limits its morphological scope with respect to the broader 
category of machine performers. 
© Demers 2014 Mori’s Definition 
 
 79 
formulations and methods of comparing robots within these perspectives. Thus the 
Uncanny Valley has been used to describe robot design process (Dautenhahn 2002), to 
justify a robot design (DiSalvo, Gemperle et al. 2002), and to formulate hypotheses 
when conducting psychological experiments into human reactions to robots (Gee, 
Browne et al. 2005). 
2.2.2. The graph and its interpretation 
The Uncanny Valley is usually visualized in the form of an iconic graph 
plotting Mori’s thesis. Figure 19 illustrates its most common depiction. The vertical 
axis plots perceived affinity towards the agent from negative to positive. The 
horizontal axis charts the level of anthropomorphism – i.e. of similarity to the human. 
 
Figure 19. The Uncanny Valley graph 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by IEEE. 
In order to travel the graph and its axes, most literature on the subject places 
robot instances at relevant points (Fong, Nourbakhsh et al. 2003), indicating – 
generally on the basis of empirical assessments and folk psychology (Dennett 1987) – 
that the anthropomorphism scale can go from industrial robot to toys and ultimately to 
a carbon copy of the human. Alternatively, utilizing abstract icons, a character can 
progress from a pure geometrical shape through an iconic form such as a smiley face 
to a cartoon figure.  
Mori takes account of the joint impact of movement and appearance in his 
thesis and states that it shapes the graph by amplifying the peaks and valleys. He 
suggests that anthropomorphism emanating from movement has a stronger impact 
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than that based on appearance. This observation is further corroborated by 
psychological studies of the perception of movement and animacy. In Chapter 4, I will 
examine the surprising results of Heider and Simmel’s experiments, where abstract 
geometrical shapes are vested with human behaviours solely by their movements 
(Heider and Simmel 1944). However, such experiments are difficult to represent on 
Mori’s graphs, as they evade his method of plotting the situation. Movement (not 
shape) is the anthropomorphic evaluation here, and the introduction of simple shapes 
would cause a strong misalignment between appearance and movement plots. 
  Figure 20. Movement versus appearance graphs 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by IEEE. 
  Figure 20 shows two overlaid graphs. The dotted line shows the 
response curve for a moving robotic agent. In the original paper Mori states that with 
industrial robots the impact of movement is relatively low, because we see it as a 
functional machine. He draws a clear line between opposite characteristics – either 
agentic or automatic (the animate vs. the animated, the intentional vs. the functional) – 
in the perception of behaviours in self-propelled machines. In this thesis I will argue 
from various perspectives that this agency stance is pivotal in the credibility and 
acceptance of machine performers. 
Mori’s hypothesis reflects the “form vs. function” design paradigm, inasmuch 
as specific kinds of agency pull “form vs. function” in one direction or the other 
(Dautenhahn 2002). Thus industrial robots are task-oriented and their shape is derived 
from their function. On the other hand, a robotic toy needs to pay attention to its shape 
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in order to trigger affection. The humanoid quest pulls both form and function towards 
the human spectrum. 
Rather than strictly addressing humanoids, Mori’s original publication targets 
issues in the design of what would later be called social robots. Actually, Mori focuses 
more on visual cues and movements of robots involved in human-robot interaction 
than on their mimicry of humans. He suggests escaping the technological challenge of 
the Uncanny Valley by design – a strategy later referred to as “escape by design”: 
We hope to design and build robots and prosthetic hands that will not fall into the 
uncanny valley. Thus, because of the risk inherent in trying to increase their degree of 
human likeness to scale the second peak, I recommend that designers instead take the 
first peak as their goal, which results in a moderate degree of human likeness and a 
considerable sense of affinity. In fact, I predict that it is possible to create a safe level 
of affinity by deliberately pursuing a nonhuman design. I ask designers to ponder this. 
[…] As another example, consider this model of a human hand created by a 
woodcarver who sculpts statues of Buddhas […]. The fingers bend freely at the joints. 
The hand lacks fingerprints, and it retains the natural color of the wood, but its 
roundness and beautiful curves do not elicit any eerie sensation. Perhaps this wooden 
hand could also serve as a reference for design. (Mori, Macdorman et al. 2012, p. 100) 
In a recent interview, Mori even questions the risk of attempting to cross the 
valley. From his perspective it is not even interesting to develop a robot that looks 
human (Kageki 2012). It is not surprising, therefore, that he uses the Bunraku puppet 
as an important example and puts it on the other side of the valley along with human 
figures. Mori sees the puppet as less realistic than a realistic prosthetic hand, as the 
puppet’s appearance is not like that of a human being. However, at a certain distance 
the audience forgets the puppet’s specific features, and its impact (appearance of eyes, 
hand movements etc.) more closely approximates the human. To the extent that an 
audience becomes absorbed in this art form, Mori concludes, it might feel a high level 
of affinity for the puppet.  
The strategies of escape by design – and certainly the impact of art and staging 
– are not often mentioned in the scientific and engineering literature of the Uncanny 
Valley. Looking back at the history of robots, the Uncanny Valley feels like the 
ultimate test of verisimilitude, only accessible to a few initiated experimenters. While 
we are constantly breaking ground in psychology, biology, neurobiology and artificial 
intelligence, opening new horizons in the understanding of our bodies, we revert to 
primordial reflexes of belief in the ever-liminal man-machine relation. Here robotics 
has found its own quest: while physics looks for the all-unifying theory, robotics 
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wants to find the secret of life in the form of a perfect model – which presumes a 
perfect understanding – of the human.  
2.3. Scientific, Cultural and Artistic Stances 
While Mori's thesis presents an asymptotic burden for roboticists to build 
humanoid machines, it contributes to the process and production of art by 
transforming the ambivalent state of the uncanny into an aesthetic experience with the 
potential to engage audiences. In this section I will contrast some artistic and scientific 
stances on the uncanny, reporting relevant contentions within the scientific world, 
presenting artistic strategies and comparing works from the two different cultures.  
2.3.1. Robotic and Social Stances 
Within the robotic community the Uncanny Valley thesis remains 
controversial. While there is some evidence for the phenomenon, critics have sound 
reasons to question its formulation. An inquiry into the intention behind humanoid 
research may shed light on dissident views of Mori’s thesis. 
1) Psychology of the phenomenon 
Scrutinizing the formal aspects of the Uncanny Valley as a psychologist, 
Ramey infers that some people experience the effect while others do not. But in this 
case, if the uncanny does not exist, one must account for it in terms of a mistaken 
experience (Ramey 2005, p. 9). 
Pollick puts forward a series of psychological plausibilities (Pollick 2010). He 
claims that, given the flow of correct perceptual information elicited by the humanoid 
in motion, small errors should be drowned out. If these small errors still surface, there 
must be a peculiar sensitivity to incorrect data on the part of the perceiving subject. He 
relates this to the human binary categorization process (Ramey 2005), as well as to 
cognitive dissonance emanating from the inability to categorize. He then looks into an 
existing case where motion exacerbates an uncanny situation. His assertion is based on 
the wealth of sensory cues and the process of reconciling them. Form and motion, for 
example, may contain different cues, and in their initial process follow separate visual 
pathways that are later integrated (Giese and Poggio 2003). Finally, Pollick introduces 
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the social dimension, suggesting that the Uncanny Valley might not be an issue either 
of logic or of the confusion of perceptual cues, but rather of how the social brain 
evaluates these cognitive scenarios. 
The human nervous system is innately and finely attuned to read the visual 
language of the human face (Levenson et al. 1990, Bruce et al. 2002), and this could 
elicit a stronger sense of affinity as the level of anthropomorphism increases. 
However, evidence from Heider & Simmel clearly shows that the opposite end of the 
anthropomorphic spectrum (abstract geometric figures) can equally trigger strong 
intentions and behaviours.  
Many researchers speculate about the root of the uncanny feeling elicited by 
the robotic double. The literature often invokes the binary categorization of the human 
within the structure of reality/unreality and the perceptual uncertainty of the mind 
stuck at the bottom of the Uncanny Valley. Roboticists often cite Freud and formulate 
psychological reasons to explain their findings instead of leaving us with a simpler 
explanation based on dissonance or uncertainty. They cite emotions associated with 
the liminal divide of mortality evoked by the salient features of these robots 
(MacDorman 2005), look at corpses and proximal versus distal sources of danger 
(Mori, Macdorman et al. 2012), and consider the threat to the reality scheme inherent 
in dead things acting as if they were not dead (Kang 2009). And, of course, they cite 
Freud and Jenstch, bringing in Hoffman’s Sandman along with anxieties of castration, 
childhood trauma and so forth. 
In The Freudian Robot, humanities scholar Lydia Liu revisits Jentsch and 
Freud’s arguments about the uncanny and their divergent interpretations of the 
intellectual uncertainty and anxiety this provokes when confronted with the 
animate/inanimate (Liu 2011). Jentsch – in his analysis of Hoffman’s “Sandman” – 
not Freud, was the first to link the uncanny to automata, but Freud found the 
uncertainty too obvious and irrelevant for other striking instances of uncanniness. As 
the identity of Olympia is gradually revealed in Hoffman’s story, Freud introduces an 
alternative explanation by displacing the automaton problem to the ocular anxiety of 
Nathanael (who had fallen madly in love with Olympia). He develops a parallel 
narrative based on a psychoanalytic standpoint, stressing that these anxieties render 
the intellectual uncertainty explanation irrelevant. Liu points out that most people are 
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content to mimic Freud’s manner of introducing the argument through etymology: the 
uncanny is the canny (i.e. known, familiar – from Anglo-Scots “ken” and German 
“kennen” = “to know, to recognize”) in a concealed form (Liu 2011). 
2) Problems of basic formulation 
How can we precisely characterize the dimensions of realism 
(anthropomorphism) and affinity? The formulation of the hypothesis implies that the 
phenomenon exists within the stimulus space. However, the axis definitions entail a 
number of underlying problems. The continuous spectrum suggests that the 
characteristics of each axis can be quantitatively measured and assessed. But these are 
essentially qualitative and subjective evaluations, they are far from continuous, and 
there may be a number of singularities across the valence range.  
Ramey goes into some detail on the legitimacy of any scale uniting robots and 
humans. His main argument is “that the quantitative nature of the spectrum violates 
the qualitative characteristics of the anchors” (Ramey 2005, p. 8). A scale such as 
“humanness” or “robotness”, he argues, will inevitably dichotomize humans and 
robots. The measure is really qualitative and its conversion into a quantitative metric is 
purely artificial. As a robot is a category (qualitative variable), Ramey explains that 
making a robot more human-like is different from making it less robot-like. Of the two 
actions, the first unites two categorically different qualities, treating them as if they 
were quantitative variables on a continuous scale. In this view, therefore, the idealized 
valley graph is a function of the underlying illogicality of the metric. 
Even with proper categorization of the metrics of the Uncanny Valley, it would 
be necessary to have a good “measurement” of anthropomorphism in terms of the 
stimuli presented (morphology, action, behaviour). Anthropomorphism refers to the 
attribution of a human form, human characteristics, or human behaviour to non-human 
entities such as robots, computers and animals. The bulk of the literature on the 
Uncanny Valley cites anthropometric (human reference) or iconic (e.g. cartoon-based, 
non-physical) qualities, but the spectrum from the inert to the human replica is 
manifestly more complex and includes many other variables.   
For instance, the anthropomorphic spectrum cannot be solely based on both 
form and function. DiSalvo adduces four categories of anthropomorphism (DiSalvo, 
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Gemperle et al. 2005), depending on what aspect of the human form is being imitated: 
structural (shape), gestural (movement), character-based (predisposition) and 
awareness-based. Furthermore, anthropomorphism can depart from the form/function 
paradigm: Epley defines it, for instance, as a process of inference about unobservable 
characteristics of a nonhuman agent, rather than as a descriptive report of a nonhuman 
agent’s observable or imagined behaviour (Epley, Waytz et al. 2007). 
For example, if I consider the five levels of embodiment cited by Johnson (see 
section 3.2), I will already start with five anthropomorphic scales that are not 
necessarily aligned in the spectrum. A machine can appear very anthropomorphic at 
the physiological level but express very little at the social level. Conversely, as an 
embodied machine, the character HAL from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 Space Odyssey 
appears almost abstract (like a camera lens), but its verbal capabilities and 
communication skills are identical to those of a human. We may conclude that 
anthropomorphism needs to be better formulated to truly test Mori’s hypothesis. 
Clearly, a single axis cannot capture all the variations and subtleties of the 
perception of anthropomorphism. Since the anthropomorphism spectrum has multiple 
readings, it can generate many niches and many singularities on the horizontal axis 
(Pollick 2010). For instance, Dautenhahn points out that preconceptions, expectations 
or anthropomorphic projections can bias the user’s attitude even before interaction has 
occurred (Dautenhahn 2002). 
The lack of proper formulation of the axis also leads to a potential bias in the 
testing of the hypothesis. Since the anthropomorphic axis is bipolar, most of the 
surveys used to gather information about the Uncanny Valley are also bipolar, forcing 
respondents to take a stance in a binary divide. For this reason standard surveys like 
the Godspeed17 index (Bartneck, Kulić et al. 2009) oppose the use of disjunctions such 
as fake/natural, machinelike/humanlike, unconscious/conscious, artificial/lifelike, and 
rigid/elegant (referring to movement) to qualify anthropomorphism. 
According to Ramey, the uncanny is more than a vague feeling; it is a 
cognitive and affective phenomenon:  
                                                
17 “Godspeed” because it is intended to help creators of robots on their developmental journey. 
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One interprets humans or robots cognitively and affectively as meaningful [sic] 
different kinds, or qualities. An Uncanny Valley arises as a general phenomenon when 
linking these different categories by certain quantitative metrics that call into question 
the original qualities, [sic] most obviously affecting us when one of those categories is 
ourselves and our humanity. (p. 13) 
What, then, are the fundamental behavioural mechanisms that determine the 
confrontation of morphology and perceived human affinity? It might be asked if the 
uncanny can appear for any given form found on the anthropomorphic scale. Equally, 
movements could be modulated for a given morphology to test the conditions where 
the uncanny manifests itself. Chapter 4 will investigate the mechanisms and 
repercussions of anthropomorphism in the perception and reception of machine 
performers by audiences.  
3) The divide 
The Uncanny Valley has generated extensive discussion within the field of 
humanoid research. As human-like robots become more technically possible, 
roboticists argue that Mori had no basis for the right-hand (post-valley) section of the 
graph. In fact, by challenging the capability of technology to achieve the perfect 
carbon copy, the Uncanny Valley undermines their entire thesis about the significance 
of the carbon copy of the human as social agent. As already indicated, the following 
points have been raised: the lack of formal evidence to derive the affinity curve, the 
lack of cultural studies within the derivation of the problem, the lack of formal 
understanding of the spectrum of each axis, and finally the lack of 
biological/psychological evidence to support the sense of the uncanny. Since most of 
the experiments about the Uncanny Valley have been designed around the graph, their 
results will inevitably either demonstrate “escape by design”, or supply measurements 
that fall into the valley, or show that some instances of humanoids elicit a positive 
affinity response in humans.  
Many of these problems may well remain unsolved, but a revealing pattern 
emerges from the review of literature on the topic, namely that the discussion about 
the Uncanny Valley polarizes two major groups, which I would call the pro-humanoid 
and the niche-oriented factions. This polarization is not strictly about confirming or 
refuting the Uncanny Valley, but more about how researchers utilize the hypothesis to 
justify their procedures. For instance some pro-humanoids claim that the Uncanny 
Valley is non-existent, that it merely represents an ill-formulated problem. Despite this 
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widespread questioning of the scientific foundations of the Uncanny Valley, most pro-
humanoids have at least surfed Mori’s thesis, and look on bridging the gap – or 
climbing out of the valley – as their ultimate goal. Their quest would then achieve a 
double goal: they would justify their humanoids as the ultimate human-machine agent, 
and at the same time accumulate unprecedented evidence to refute or confirm Mori’s 
thesis. The niche-oriented follow Mori’s statements more closely; preferring to stay on 
the left side of the hill and travelling the graph by investigating specific niches for 
man-machine interactions. 
This development has rather left Mori out in the cold. In his thesis he calls for 
nuance and exploration in the design of robots, but the now omnipresent graph and 
icon of the valley have been re-appropriated by the creators of humanoids to fuel their 
research. As morphology and movement are intimately linked to perceived 
anthropomorphism (see cumulative curves), the graph does not convey all of Mori’s 
writing on the thesis but only one of his conclusions.  Issues such as “escape by 
design”, or the impact of movement and knowledge about the essence of the agent 
(mechanical vs. human) are no longer at the forefront of the main Uncanny Valley 
discussion. 
David Hanson, who developed a realistic robotic copy of his girlfriend's head, 
has said that the idea of the Uncanny Valley is "really pseudoscientific, but people 
treat it like it is science” (Ferber 2003), arguing that robot designers should not be 
conceptually limited by a theory without scientific proof. Sara Kiesler, a human-robot 
interaction researcher at Carnegie Mellon University, has questioned Uncanny 
Valley's scientific status, stating, "We have evidence that it's true, and evidence that 
it's not." (Ferber, 2003) Christoph Bartneck has pointed out that the cultural 
background of the users might have a considerable influence on how androids are 
perceived, including their perception of the Uncanny Valley (Bartneck 2008). 
The niche-oriented claim that there are sufficient similarities in human-robot 
interaction to investigate the plausibility of using the Uncanny Valley as a main focus 
for all aspects of current research, whilst gaining another perspective on how to 
maximize the success of robot design (Dautenhahn 2002). Dautenhahn himself has 
warned about the quest for realism: 
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Life-like agents that closely mimic human appearance or behaviour can unnecessarily 
restrict and narrow the apparent and actual functionality of an agent by evoking 
expectations that the agent cannot fulfil. (Dautenhahn 2002) 
Cynthia Breazael has argued that realistic animatronics technology is not quite 
human enough to be convincing and just human enough to push people’s expectations 
of the intelligence of the machine beyond what can be met by today’s technology. This 
hesitation is a point of some debate in the AI community, with most roboticists 
believing cartoon identities are OK, but humanlike ones are not. The iconic Kismet 
(Breazeal, Brooks et al. 2003) certainly adopted this path to implement pleasing head 
features.  
Another pertinent observation of the niche-oriented faction is that when the 
agent is clearly non-human, especially in science-fiction, 
We are happy to fill in the gaps and project features and qualities into these abstract 
humanoid representations, however, when those gaps are filled in for us by 
simulations that try to be more realistically humanoid but don’t quite get it right, our 
responses are far less positive. (Cleland 2011) 
In her analysis, Cleland joins the “escape by design” of Mori when she cites examples 
of accepted behaviours in clearly non-human agents in movies and fiction. 
Some pro-humanoids base their arguments on cultural acceptance, arguing that 
prolonged exposure to robot agents generates greater affinity. Their thesis derives 
from observations of cultures where there is a vast acceptance of robots. For instance, 
MacDorman and Sone argue that Japanese culture provides the proper environment for 
the acceptance of the humanoid without much impact of the Uncanny Valley (Sone 
2008; MacDorman, Vasudevan et al. 2009). However, despite media hype about 
Japan’s robot craze, response similarities in surveys suggest factors other than attitude 
better explain robot adoption. These include differences in history and religion, 
personal and human identity, economic structure, professional specialization, and 
government policy. 
Bartneck (Bartneck 2007) introduced a framing theory to further analyse the 
Uncanny Valley, but its results seem to point in a different direction. The framing 
theory calls upon a set of a priori knowledge aspects conditioning the observation of 
an agent as either robotic or human. But empirical research indicates that framing has 
no significant impact on the measurements and that the plotted measurements do not 
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produce a significant valley but rather point to a cliff immediately before the valley. 
Bartneck’s conclusion is that it is unwise to build highly human-like androids, since 
positive reactions are more frequently observed with machine-like robots. 
As a lone voice within the scientific community, Hanson claims that 
acceptance is based on aesthetics, regardless of the level of realism: 
Although the uncanny exists, the inherent, unavoidable dip (or valley) may be an 
illusion. Extremely abstract robots can be uncanny if the aesthetic is off, as can 
cosmetically atypical humans. Thus, the uncanny occupies a continuum ranging from 
the abstract to the real, although norms of acceptability may narrow as one approaches 
human likeness.  However, if the aesthetic is right, any level of realism or abstraction 
can be appealing. If so, then avoiding or creating an uncanny effect just depends on 
the quality of the aesthetic design, regardless of the level of realism. (Hanson 2006) 
Looking more specifically at the Uncanny Valley and at some experiments 
from the robotics field, Liu criticizes the modality of the interaction: “…we are told 
that human participants prefer to interact with ‘positive’ robots and avoid negative-
looking robots or negatively behaving robots, whatever their negativity is supposed to 
mean at social and psychic levels”. Liu returns to Freud and states that the uncanny in 
AI engineering has still not been adequately investigated: 
Whereas Freud would have been intrigued by their experiments, the design of such 
experiments seems to reveal more about how the scientists themselves view the 
functions of the human brain with respect to intentions, goals or desires of others – 
human or robot – in an already socialized game setting than how they can enlighten us 
about the uncanny in human-robots interactions. (Liu 2011, p. 228)  
Actually, since the emergence of geminoids and actroids, humanoids such as 
Asimo are now considered too mechanical and set on the left side of the hill, whereas 
more fleshily realistic silicon humanoids are headed more to the right side of the 
graph. I see these humanoids as the contemporary version of the Jacquet-Droz 
automatons, where the creators demonstrated their know-how (Wood 2002). Neither 
the virtuosity of the machine nor the quality of replication is central to the uncanniness 
of these modern stunts. The unfamiliar actually depends more on the obscure quests of 
their makers and their voluntary staging of machines as unusual occurrences such as a 
girlfriend’s head, a twin, or a copy of a popular star (see Figure 21). About the Chess 
Player, Reichardt wrote in her seminal book Robots: Fact, Fiction and Prediction: 
In robot lore, truth as a concept may not seem the most relevant or vital criterion, but 
fraud in automatons is worse than human deception because its association with 
science makes it impervious to corruption.  (Reichardt 1978, p. 25) 
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Figure 21. Uncanny occurrences: a decapitated head, geminoid and actroid 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by IEEE. 
2.3.2. Artistic and Cultural Stances 
Shifting the approach of the Uncanny Valley from a technological to a social 
and aesthetic perspective can shed new light on the issues involved. As Ramey asserts, 
“the uncanny is not unavoidable and can in principle be appraised quite differently and 
flexibly given a different knowledge ground on which to build meaning” (p. 12). Art 
and aesthetics provide this ground, for, rather than considering ambivalence and 
ambiguity as negative characteristics, art values multiple and unstable meanings. Art 
also re-formulates, re-appropriates and challenges assumptions and preconceptions. 
Hence de-familiarization is one of its many processes and the uncanny is an integral 
part of a modern aesthetic sensibility. Scientific and technological AI discourse tends 
to view the uncanny as the product of pseudo-natural perception without reference to 
its cultural codification. Art sets different accents. Without covering all aspects of the 
uncanny in this vast field, I will in the following pages point to some representative 
issues in art and aesthetics that might well broaden the scientific approach to the 
Uncanny Valley. Among these are the cultural backgrounds of robot perception. 
1) Suspension of disbelief 
When roboticist Brian Duffy analyses the suspension of disbelief in social 
robotics, he admits that “Scientists and engineers to date have tended to imitate or fake 
the real rather than create fiction. To date this has generally led to more technological 
feats rather than socially capable robots.” (Duffy and Zawieska 2012, p. 484) 
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Furthermore, side-tracked by the quest for “hard” models of an Uncanny Valley 
theory, scientists have not fully explored perceptual areas that are topical in the arts 
such as alienation vs. identification, de-familiarization vs. familiarization, and 
ostranenie vs. repetition (in the sense of reproducibility). 
This act of suspension of disbelief will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
but meanwhile I will briefly introduce how strategies of fiction can alter the dip of the 
Uncanny Valley. The willing act of poetic faith as described by Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge18 allows non-realistic elements to be enjoyed in literary works. Ramey 
refers to Freud when he writes that one does not feel a sense of the uncanny in fiction 
and art (relative to the same experience in reality) because “we adapt our judgment to 
the conditions of the writer’s fictional reality and treat souls, spirits and ghosts as if 
they were fully entitled to exist, just as we are in our material reality” (Ramey 2005, p. 
8). Going beyond fiction itself, Jentsch  (according to Liu) had already suggested that 
literary strategies such as leaving the reader in a state of uncertainty were reliable 
ways to evoke the uncanny (Liu 2011, p. 212). 
 
2) Credibility of the facsimile. 
When Gaby Woods analyses The Piano Player, she describes an exposure to 
automata that contains several levels of cultural codification: “Their creators wanted 
them to look young so that the mistakes resulting from their early efforts would be 
forgiven […]”; and “[a] vestal virgin with a heart of steel […] [she] is apparently 
agitated with an anxiety and diffidence not always felt in real life” (Wood 2002). And 
when Mitchell argues that images come alive in two basic forms that vacillate between 
figurative and literal senses of vitality or animation, he also refers to culturally 
codified bodies: 
They come alive because the viewers believe they are alive (weeping madonnas) or 
because a clever artist has engineered them to appear alive (puppeteer or 
ventriloquist). The notions of images as life-forms always equivocates between 
questions of belief and knowledge, fantasy and technology, the golem and the clone. 
The middle space, which Freud called the Uncanny, is perhaps the best name for the 
location of images as media in their own right. (Mitchell 2010), p. 295; Liu 2011, p. 
218) 
                                                
18 Coleridge coined the expression “suspension of disbelief” in Biographia Literaria (1817). 
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Even given a perfect replica of a human in some distant future, the rejection of 
these robots might not be based on the Uncanny Valley but on the cultural background 
of the audience. Plotting the Uncanny Valley in the future to the gap that divides 
simile from metaphor will become the gap between like and is. The replicant in Philip 
K Dick’s novel Do Electric Sheep Dream – as transported to the film Blade Runner 
(1982) – depicts this situation. The Uncanny Valley idea resembles Freud's writing 
about the narcissism of minor differences, where feuds between communities of 
adjoining territories ridicule each other. This territory is also depicted by Steve 
Dixon’s notion of “metallic camp” (Dixon 2004, p. 273) when he discusses 
performance examples in the creative arts. Dixon argues that “robotic movement 
mimics and exaggerates but never achieves the human, just as camp movement 
mimics and exaggerates, but never achieves womanhood” (p. 274), and that camp is 
an essential factor in anthropomorphic and zoomorphic robot performance. The place 
where the credibility gap or the Uncanny Valley occurs is not, for him, the point 
furthest from the truth, but the point closest to it. As observed by kinetic artist Kirbey, 
when a kinetic artwork is almost credible, it lacks credibility (Rickey 1963). 
Following Derrida's strategic valorisation of the suppressed supplementary term of any 
binary, my own works investigate the dichotomy of human/non-human in the grey 
area that lies between the two dimensions.  
3) The uncanny as an aesthetic experience 
Fischer-Lichte describes the state of destabilization in performance audiences 
and the in-between space it creates – where the valley should shy away – as a 
stimulating situation to develop an aesthetic of this unstable conjuncture: 
So, by blending the real and the fictional and thereby transferring the spectator into a 
state of liminality, these performances allowed for a particular aesthetic experience 
which ran counter to our traditional understanding of what aesthetic experience is 
about, and in this way stimulated a new discussion of its very concept, so central for 
all forms of art in the Western world since 1800. (Fischer-Lichte 2008), p. 95) 
The term “uncanny” functions both scientifically and aesthetically. Pollick 
suggests, from his psychological standpoint, that “we can look at falling into the 
Uncanny Valley not from the usual perspective of ever more realistic artefacts, but 
instead from the viewpoint of how normal human activity might be modulated to fall 
into the same Uncanny Valley” (Pollick 2007). For instance, the artist Kozin describes 
his uncanny encounters with deformed bodies as breaking pre-formed conceptions:  
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These other experiences prevented me from both simply stating the fact of 
abnormality but also connecting the abnormal body to the lived body of mine in an act 
of empathetic congruence. It did manage, however, to awaken the sense of wonder, 
the very awe that arises from encountering something, someone so odd that no 
available pre-formed measure is capable of giving the encounter any sensible 
explanation. (Kozin 2006)  
Mori’s publication calls for more metaphorical design for humanoid artefacts, 
but most writing and research about the Uncanny Valley does not seek for alternative 
modes of representation across the spectrum of either anthropomorphism or 
movement.  
 
4) Staging the Uncanny 
As Fischer-Lichte observes, performance happens when reality and fiction 
collide (Fischer-Lichte 2008), a similar contention to the one raised by the Uncanny 
Valley. The staging of the robot in science can be seen as a very specific theatrical 
genre with its own cultural rules. The Uncanny Valley is not, therefore, just a tool to 
judge the appearance of the robot: it can also generate a staging of the uncanny itself.  
The context in which one experiences uncanny objects also frames one’s 
perceptions. What happens when the ontological questioning is reinforced by the 
space where the bodily encounter with the work of art occurs? Performing spaces can 
be considered both as a dynamic constituent – in the sense of a cultural extension – of 
the experiential body (Öztürk 2010) and also, broadly speaking, as zones of cultural 
interaction (public squares, theatres, card-tables, stadiums) where reality is in some 
way suspended (Cleland 2011). Öztürk analyses the functions of space and how it 
infuses feelings bearing on the ontological questioning of reality. She considers the 
corporeality (akin to the spatiality of the situated body) of a body hesitant over 
ambiguous impulses borne and/or magnified by space. Cleland uses the analogy of the 
magic circle19 when she looks at performances and cultural spaces (galleries, 
museums). She points out many zones of fantasy where the suspension of disbelief, 
and temporary worlds within the ordinary world, create environments akin to the 
uncanny. In such zones, the eerie could happen without triggering feelings of the 
uncanny. Equally, the zones provide safe environments to explore the uncanny without 
real threat. 
                                                
19 Used in game and play analysis 
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Anthony Vilder coined the phrase “the architectural uncanny” with respect to 
the interaction of mind and space: in other words the aesthetic dimension of mental 
projection impacting a spatial configuration.  Vilder argued that neither a building nor 
special effects can be guaranteed to provoke an uncanny feeling: 
[…] the uncanny is not a property of the space itself nor can it be provoked by any 
particular spatial conformation; it is, in its aesthetic dimension, a representation of a 
mental state of projection that precisely elides the boundaries of the real and the 
unreal in order to provoke a disturbing ambiguity, a slippage between waking and 
dreaming. (Vidler 1994, p. 11) 
 
5) Social concerns 
Trends in human-robot interaction, further intensified under the microscope of 
the Uncanny Valley, raise many concerns seen from the perspective of the humanities 
and cultural studies (Weber 2005; Suchman 2007; Weber 2007). The strongly gender-
stereotyped design of social robots as women, infants or pets calls for a critique of 
patterns, norms and roles. It encodes the theoretical concepts that shape technological 
construction, and it also supports naïve and non-demanding attitudes towards 
machines (e.g. mother and child, owner and pet, client and receptionist or waiter). 
These stereotypical patterns of social interaction lead to a standardisation of the 
relationship between social machines and people. Standardisation also exists in the 
emotions implicit in robot behaviour. These are usually limited in number to six. 
2.3.3. Case study: Geminoid H1-1 and HUBO’s legs 
I would like to compare two of my personal encounters with the creatures of 
android makers. Both robots have a latent potential to fall into the Uncanny Valley. 
The first is the geminoid of Prof. Ishiguro (Ishiguro 2006; Nishio, Ishiguro et al. 2007) 
and the ATR laboratory in Osaka, the result of an ongoing effort to make verisimilar 
machines that culminated in visual carbon copies of people. Geminoid H1-1 has 
become the icon of recent androids and also of the Uncanny Valley. The doppelganger 
of its maker, it has attracted worldwide media attention and penetrated the collective 
imagination. The second robot is HUBO by Prof. Oh (Oh, Hanson et al. 2006) from 
the KAIST robotic laboratory in Korea. HUBO is anatomically similar to a human, 
while keeping a certain mechanical flair; it has a plastic shell as opposed to a silicon 
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skin, and the educated eye can imagine all the mechatronics involved in its bipedal 
locomotion. HUBO has had many variants and Hanson, for instance, made a copy of 
Albert Einstein’s head to complete its body. HUBO is more a descendant of the 
equally iconic Asimo by Honda, while Ishiguro’s geminoid attempts to recreate 
fleshily human features (hair, eyes and skin). HUBO is an autonomous bipedal 
machine, whereas the geminoid is teleoperated and incapable of locomotion – 
Ishiguro’s doppelganger always sits on a chair. 
When I first experienced Ishiguro’s geminoid at Ars Electronica 2009, my 
uncanny sensation had nothing to do with the robot in action. What I found striking 
was the freak-show it created: the excitement of the crowd trying to find out 
differences between the original and the copy and the ongoing pokes to the android’s 
skin to complement the visual perception with a tactile one. My own curiosity was 
targeted at another level; it was concentrated on the bodily expression of the geminoid 
when it was simply turned off (see Figure 22). The body appeared to be in rigor 
mortis, while the living version was busy working on cables and preparing the 
demonstration. This uncanny sensation was much closer to the feeling experienced in 
a wax museum than that described by Mori. I never felt any agency in this amalgam of 
silicon and motors, as I never considered the geminoid to have convincing human 
movements or behaviour. Actually, the movements feel more like a twitch than 
anything else (Paré and Grimaud 2011) and the geminoid cannot engage in any 
complex bodily action. Finally, Ars Electronica has brought the laboratory set-up into 
the art museum, endowing this demonstration with performative attributes. Audiences 
read this action as an artwork, the staging of the confrontation of a man with his 
double. In the actual situation of the exhibition, Ishiguro was lecturing us, as in any 
scientific presentation or demonstration, about the geminoid, and complementing his 
thesis with a typical question and answer session. 
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Figure 22. Geminoid H1-1 (Ars 99) and KAIST biped tests 
Permission to reproduce the right image has been granted by IEEE. 
I had a more viscerally uncanny sensation when I visited the laboratory of 
Prof. Oh and his progeny. Like many other robotics labs, it concentrates on developing 
bipedal humanoids, often relying heavily on (rigid) mechatronics. In the corner of the 
lab there was a long catwalk and at the end of it, half of an android body (only the 
legs). The professor started this machine and it ran towards me. The image of out-of-
control decapitated animals (or even humans) overwhelmed me. Between this image 
of horror and my perception that this robot had no head, I was unsure if it would stop 
in time. This massive piece of metal suddenly came to a halt right in the front of me, 
as if to provoke me. My body reacted by quickly jumping backwards, which was 
acclaimed by a huge grin from the professor: I imagine his test was (for him) 
conclusive. 
In both cases (Geminoid and HUBO), my uncanny experience is not rooted in 
the intrinsic affinity I have towards the agent but in the affinity towards the agent 
within its context, staging and environment. These factors, which are known before I 
enter the situation, taint any original and neutral scenario such as walking unprepared 
into a situation that is perceived as uncanny only when it arises. In both cases, 
audiences (including myself) are fully aware that these androids are mechanical and 
not human. Therefore this diminishes any categorical man-machine uncertainty 
associated with the Uncanny Valley. The most mechanical object, not the most 
human-like, triggered my own uncanny experience. At this stage, Ishiguro’s geminoid 
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can barely perform any movement, and to evaluate its anthropomorphism inevitably 
brings up the arguments of Ramey about the ill-formed scale of measurement. The 
form is human, some visual features are strikingly verisimilar, but the body in action is 
far removed from approaching human capacities. Actually, the geminoid is remote 
controlled, with the voice and facial movements manipulated from a control booth at a 
separate location. What makes it uncannily human is its improbable duo act with 
Ishiguro as a ventriloquist20. 
In “Human+” at the Science Gallery Dublin, there was a series of large print 
pictures of androids (Armstrong Rachel , Spillane Charles et al. 2011). The series 
depicted either situations where the machines were performing human activities (e.g. 
cooking) or situations where the original human and the robotic copy were staged next 
to each other. I observed that the audience turned this uncanny vision into a play of 
finding the “errors”, looking at both static images for visual cues to distinguish the 
mechanical from the human. Even the scientific publication, IEEE Spectrum, directly 
invited the reader to play this game by glancing from left to right (Guizzo 2010). 
 
Figure 23. Ishiguro's Geminoid H1-1 printed fold 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by IEEE. 
 
                                                
20 Popular culture has transformed the old forms of entertainment such as clowning and ventriloquism 
into eerie and creepy experiences. 
Shifting the thesis for machine performers © Demers 2014 
 
98 
When we look at how Ishiguro stages his appearance(s), it always follows the 
same mise-en-scene: the Ishiguros are set side-by-side to evoke a comparison between 
the flesh and the nuts and bolts versions. This staging exacerbates our reflex to 
categorize the human and the machine, just as the graph of the Uncanny Valley 
implicitly forces us to position an object on the right or left of the divide. Once again, 
science drives the audience into a quest for realism in a situation that should call for 
broader behaviour: there is more at stake here than merely distinguishing the animate 
from the animated. 
Ishiguro is currently staging an android in a theatre play (Ogawa, Taura et al. 
2012), to which I will return in Chapter 4. When an audience is presented with an 
android actor, it has to overcome the reflex of constantly looking for visual and 
expressive cues that distinguish the machine from a hypothetical human performer. 
The following section brings different models of this unstable scenario, along with 
observations about the saturation potential arising from the reflex described above, 
and how theatre empowers a multi-stable environment.  
2.4. Shifting the thesis for machine performers 
The current formulation of the Uncanny Valley has two underlying motifs: its 
negative connotations (fear, death, horror) and its concern with human-looking 
objects. The transference of the valley to machine performers does not, as Jentsch 
proposes, derive from the obscurity of animated objects: “as long as the doubt as to the 
nature of the perceived movement lasts, and with it the obscurity of its cause, a feeling 
of terror persists in the person concerned” (Jentsch 1997). Under an embodiment 
perspective, the nature of these movements should look as far as possible integral to 
and initiated from the body, rather than obscure. Nevertheless, if the attention of the 
audience is focused on the otherness of the machine performer’s animation, it is bound 
to consider the performance inadequate. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
it will fall into the Uncanny Valley. In a manner analogous to Brecht’s “alienation”, it 
may perceive that very inadequacy as a source of enjoyment. In other words, I need to 
reformulate the Uncanny Valley not as a problem but as an aesthetic experience in its 
own right, and the affinity scale as a qualitative description of the acceptance of a 
machine performer on its own terms as a true performer, i.e. a credible agent in its 
present embodiment on stage.  
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Many aspects of the rejection or acceptance of robots are hardly covered by 
research on the Uncanny Valley. For instance, the length of exposure to the machines 
could play an important role, whereas most lab experiments last only a few minutes. 
Practically, the experiments (unlike many of our social interactions) can hardly span 
more than an hour. In a performance context, the length of exposure would be 
typically longer than in a lab experiment. Here, I am not looking to scale or compare 
durations, but to consider the time factor in the formulation of affinity. It is more than 
probable that audience reactions change throughout the exposure to machine 
performers during a stage enactment. 
As my own work is either mechanomorphic or zoomorphic (rarely strongly 
anthropomorphic), I would seek for a definition that does not include 
anthropomorphism as a correlate of the agent’s affinity. Actually, if I am looking at 
using the body as an experimental variable (Chapter 1 on Kaplan), anthropomorphism 
has to be fully revaluated in its contribution to the thesis to enable the inclusion of 
arbitrary shapes. After all, anthropomorphism is a shifting qualitative attribute 
dependent on exposure, cultural codes and context, to name only a few variables. 
What is lacking is a deeper study of the phenomenon of perceptual dissonance. 
For instance, how can perceptual dissonance lead to an unbearable position in science 
and at the same time be such a source of inspiration in the arts? The scientific world 
wants to be on one side or the other of the valley, feeling this state of limbo too 
unstable for its belief system. Perhaps they find there is not enough “truth” at the 
bottom of the valley. In opposition to the concern with the Uncanny Valley, my own 
works posit the essence of the machine performer in its double vision, the core of its 
identity being neither just a mechanical self-moving artefact nor a facsimile of the 
human. 
In this section, I will present four models that focus on the Uncanny Valley in 
robotic terms and a fifth that involves theatre performance. I will demonstrate that the 
undecidability in the classification of robots is exacerbated by perceptual and/or 
conceptual loops. I will point out how various analyses from different perspectives 
lead to very similar conclusions. Finally, I will look into an adaptation of these models 
to address an alternative to the Uncanny Valley thesis targeted on machine performers.  
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2.4.1. Paré’s confusion cycles 
Robotic Artist Zaven Paré recently published a book about his experience at 
Ishiguro’s laboratory (Paré and Grimaud 2011). Written more as a journal than an 
academic essay, Paré’s book becomes an ethnographic study on how these scientific 
experiments are conducted. His personal experience reveals the undocumented side of 
Ishiguro’s methodology in investigating his creatures. In a similar way some years 
earlier Suchman and Weber reported on their own experiences with social robots 
(Suchman 2003; Weber 2007).  
Paré observes that the surreal interaction with Ishiguro’s geminoid is cyclic. 
Sometimes the engagement starts and then quickly falls off, sometimes it entails a 
cumulative process, and sometimes it becomes a saturating experience that has to stop 
if it is not to end in delirium. Paré speculates that the engagement operates on a typical 
loop scheme (see Figure 24): when a state of “ontological” confusion arises, it leads to 
a cycle with the following steps: dissociation, multiplication of presence 
(representation of the geminoid), and saturation. This saturation then leads back to the 
starting point, the unsolvable question of ontological status (p. 98). Paré further points 
out that the key element of the geminoid’s experimental set-up is that each of its 
components has the propensity to generate signs, mise-en-scene variations and 
interpreted behaviours (p. 102). 
 
Figure 24. Paré's confusion cycle 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by the artist. 
Paré wonders if audiences can sustain a lengthy surreal dialogue and how long 
one can live in a scenario with a robot. He observes that all these robotic experiments 
fall into the dilemma of a relationship that is either constructed (artificial) or imposed 
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(levelled down by the less powerful agent). These are questions raised by Paré when 
he coins the description of the engagement with the geminoid as the problem of 
extending the “2 to 10 seconds of confusion”21, the initial spark of confusion or 
enchantment. Once the surprise effect has vanished, even if emotional and physical 
restraints are installed, the confusion comes back, untamed, incoherent and uninvited, 
unwillingly imposed upon the experimenters themselves (p. 161-162). 
2.4.2. Kang’s controlled parameters 
Historian Misoon Kang’s essay questions our emotional, imaginative, and 
intellectual reactions to the illusion that robots are alive or lifelike. Kang’s essay 
develops around an anecdotal encounter with a street performer, combined with the 
ritualistic complicity of the audience, featuring a man pretending to be a machine that 
pretends to be a man. Kang builds around the two faces of this encounter, the stillness 
and the sudden movements of the figure, shifting the viewer from a contemplative to 
an eerie state. He explores the lack of explanation as to “how the automaton can 
switch from being a frightening, uncanny thing in one context, to an amusing and 
captivating object in another” (Kang 2009). 
There is no doubt for Kang that the uncanny is a major component of our 
reaction to the robot, but he questions what makes it an interesting subject and how it 
can arouse such a wide range of emotions. He builds his model of analysis on a 
consideration of the immediate, almost visceral impact of the automaton. For Kang, 
the explanation of the automaton’s power must start at the level of perception, 
cognition and emotional reaction. What begins as fascination or amusement has the 
potentiality to turn into the sublime, and from there into terror or horror. Kang 
establishes the following corollaries, subsumed in tabular form in Table 7: 
  
                                                
21 This expression was also used by Ishiguro in his presentation at ICRA 2012. 
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I. The less powerful (often but not always because it is small) and more apparently 
mechanical a robot is, the more amusing it is. 
II. The more powerful (often but not always because it is bigger) a machine, the less 
amusing it is and the more sublime. 
III. The technological sublime turns into terror the moment the powerful machine 
appears to have gone out of human control. 
IV. The more lifelike a robot, the greater the sense of the uncanny sublime. 
V. The uncanny sublime loses its pleasurable aspect and turns into horror when a 
human being turns out to be a robot or vice versa in an unexpected way. 
 
 
Table 7. Emotional responses towards machinery (Kang 2011) 
Permission to reproduce this table has been granted by the author. 
2.4.3. Misselhorn’s imaginative perception 
Philosopher Catrin Misselhorn investigates a model of empathy involving a 
kind of imaginative perception and claims that this perception fails in the case of very 
humanlike objects (Misselhorn 2009). Misselhorn constructs her arguments on the 
basis of three questions that the Uncanny Valley has to answer: why do we feel 
empathy towards non-human entities (with some human characteristics), why do we 
stop feeling empathy when they become very humanlike, and why does empathy then 
give way to eeriness. Misselhorn’s angle of analysis suggests that it is the perception 
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of an inanimate object that produces empathy in the beholder, not its pretence at being 
human. 
Misselhorn builds her empathy model on Sobel and Wilson’s conceptual 
exclusion of empathy for inanimate objects. She then complements this model of 
empathy with “T-ing” where T stands for some behaviour or expression that is reliably 
correlated with an emotion E (e.g. crying, laughing). Finally she links the inanimate to 
the human via the equation that seeing the T-ing of an inanimate object we imagine 
ourselves to be perceiving a human T-ing. To resume, here are the three incremental 
formulation of her empathy model: 
(1) S empathizes with O’s experience of emotion E if and only if O feels E, S believes 
that O feels E, and this causes S to feel E for O. (Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 234 f.) 
(2) S empathizes with O’s experience of emotion E if S perceives O’s T-ing and this 
perception causes S to feel E for O. (Maibom 2007, p. 168) (Maibom 2007) 
(3) S empathizes with an inanimate object’s imagined experience of emotion E if S 
imaginatively perceives the inanimate object’s T-ing and this imaginative perception 
causes S to feel E for the inanimate object. 
Misselhorn then introduces the imaginative perception paradigm set forth in 
formulation (3): imagining the perceptual experience of an object F to be the 
perceptual experience of an object G involves salient similarities between F and G and 
also triggers the concept of G. Misselhorn speculates that “as a rule of thumb, the 
more features there are, and the more typical and salient they are, the stronger will the 
concept of a (or the) G be triggered, and the more vivid will the imagining and 
phenomenal feel be” (Misselhorn 2009, p. 354). She qualifies the act/process of 
perception (and the imagined object) as a “blended” phenomenological situation; one 
sees an F and not a G but this influences its phenomenological ‘feel’, because 
perceiving F feels to some extent like perceiving G. To resume, she postulates: 
The human-like features M of an inanimate object trigger the concept of a human N, 
for that reason, seeing the T-ing of an inanimate object feels (to some extent) like 
seeing a human T-ing. (Misselhorn 2009, p. 354) 
Finally, Misselhorn attacks the problem of the breach of empathy in the 
Uncanny Valley. While the triggering of the concept of humanness is very strong, 
applying the concept fails, since the perception of the object is not accepted as an 
instance of the concept. Due to the similarity in the features, the concept is repeatedly 
re-triggered and hangs, as it were, on the verge of being elicited. The process of 
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empathy is interrupted, suspended between activation and deactivation of the concept 
of the human:  
This leads to a kind of very fast oscillation between four situations, which resembles a 
gestalt switch: the mere triggering of the concept, the reaching of the threshold of 
concept application, the failure of concept application resulting in a complete turning 
off of the concept, and the renewed triggering in keeping on to perceive the object. (p. 
357) 
Misselhorn adds that the failure in concept application could amount to a sense 
of conceptual confusion and that the Uncanny Valley implies other elements 
emanating from the failure, a specific quality of eeriness born from a particular kind of 
confusion between the dead and the alive. 
2.4.4. Tondu and Bardou’s balance theory 
Roboticist Bertrand Tondu and psychologist Nicole Bardou revisit Heider’s 
balance theory (Heider 1946; Cartwright and Harary 1956) and Festinger’s cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) to provide a social psychology framework of 
analysis, and to distance this approach from the recurrent Freudian “innate fear of 
death” analysis of the Valley. 
These authors refer to Leon Festinger, who developed a theory of cognitive 
dissonance as the feeling of uncomfortable tension that comes from holding two 
conflicting thoughts at the same time (Festinger 1957). To this the authors add 
Heider’s balance theory, which formalizes social exchanges between people. This 
theory is based on a tendency to achieve a balanced state deprived of tension in all 
exchanges. Heider plots relationships between entities as either positive or negative. In 
the case of a dyad, a balanced state is achieved when relations are either positive or 
negative in all respects. This dyad situation compares to Festinger’s dissonance theory. 
Triads, for Heider, can create a social structure between all the elements involved, 
where a state of balance can also be determined. He postulates that balanced states 
exist if all relations are positive or if two are negative and one positive. Tondu and 
Bardou then posit such social structure as made of three elements: a human, a robot 
and the task performed by the robot. They claim that the Uncanny Valley effect is 
limited in this situation as it generates a “weak” cognitive dissonance demonstrated by 
the coverage of possibilities of balanced states (Tondu and Bardou 2011, p. 344). 
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Figure 25. Social interactions in dyadic (up) and triadic (down) configurations (Ibid., 
p. 344) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Actapress. 
 
In attempting to broaden the application of balance theory to their Uncanny 
Valley analysis, they bring the case study of another entity into the relationships: a 
human bystander. The upshot is an explosion of possible permutations (64) in which a 
balance degree factor is calculated. It is then noted that not all combinations generate 
the same level of balance, and they conclude that a lower balance level would generate 
a deeper valley. They further claim that by modulating the task to be performed by the 
robot, the depth of the dip can also be modulated. Their contribution to the debate is to 
show theoretically that in the Uncanny Valley there is a task dependence factor in the 
affinity generated towards the robot. 
2.4.5. Fischer-Lichte multistability 
Performance theorist Erika Fischer-Lichte examines aesthetic experiences that 
arise from transgressions between the dichotomous pair of the fictional and the real 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008). More specifically, she analyses tensions between the 
phenomenal body and the semiotic body. These tensions appear when the perception 
of the actor’s body shifts and oscillates from the phenomenal (or real) to the dramatic 
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(or fictional). Fischer-Lichte introduces perceptual multistability as a constant 
transition between two orders of perception, the order of presence and the order of 
representation: 
Perceiving the ‘real’, phenomenal body of the actor, his bodily being-in-the-world, 
lays the foundation for a particular order of perception, to perceive the actor’s body as 
sign for a fictional character, for a very different order of perception. Each of the two 
orders generates meaning according to its own principles, which become dominant the 
moment one order is stabilized. (Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 87) 
This perceptual multistability is responsible for the fact that neither of the two 
orders becomes permanently stabilized. There is a dynamic in each shift: it can 
become goal-oriented or chaotic. Each turn results in the perception of new elements, 
incorporated in a new order of perception. Fischer-Lichte evaluates this as a device not 
to eradicate the dramatic figure but to disturb our perception. The frequency of the 
multistability depends on the situation and performance. If the frequency is too high, 
the difference between the orders loses its relevance and attention focuses on the 
rupture itself rather than on the subject. This rate of disruption makes the spectator 
aware that she cannot control the transition. She might try to adjust her perception 
anew, but she will soon notice that the shift occurs anyway and is outside her control. 
She will then experience her perception as emergent but nevertheless consciously 
performed. 
According to Fischer-Lichte, the self is a prominent factor in the way 
audiences perceive presence. Audiences can create associative chains of meaning that 
are not necessarily directly related to what is perceived and hardly comprehend 
associations between presence and theatrical elements: 
 Based on self-referentiality, the order of presence allows meanings to emerge over 
which the perceiving subjects have no control. (Ibid., p. 150) 
Being suspended between the two orders, the perceiver finds himself in a 
condition of liminality. Destabilization lies here not only in the orders of 
representation and presence but also more importantly in the self: 
Aesthetic experience, in all these cases, is to be regarded as a liminal experience, as an 
experience of being ‘betwixt and between’, as Victor Turner put it, an experience of 
crisis. It is, above all, the collapse of the ‘real’ versus ‘fictional’ opposition which 
induces the crisis (Ibid., p. 95) 
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2.4.6.  Hybrid reformulation   
Scholars and practitioners from various backgrounds have issued the five 
models set forth in this discussion: an artist robot-maker, an art historian, a 
philosopher, a psychologist teamed with a roboticist and a performance theorist. Their 
analyses share the observation of an unstable oscillation of perception and of a liminal 
space engendered by this instability. Their findings correlate in part or in whole on a 
phenomenological scale.  
Paré cites detailed observations about a communicative experience with 
Ishiguro’s geminoid. He reveals that the device becomes credible only peripherally, by 
accidentally triggering details of its embodiment in minute movements. The human 
comes back into the communication loop with playful dissonances between the voice 
(operator), the context (topic) and body (a twitch). Paré then witnesses the collision of 
the orders of presence and representation expounded by Fischer-Lichte. Likewise his 
saturation point resembles the moment when the frequency of multistability becomes 
too high and makes it the point of focus for the participant.  
Kang is intrigued by the way the robot can be playful then become frightening. 
He bases his analysis of the Uncanny Valley on the rupture point between the sublime 
and the terror/horror emanating from the robots. I think most robots – at least real if 
not necessarily fictional ones – remain in the controlled parameter section. When I 
experienced the humanoids of the previous section, I knew these robots were well 
within controlled parameters. If I extrapolate from Kang and analyse my encounters, I 
would not stay in (or come close to) the area of horror or terror, I would come back to 
lower levels in Kang’s order, where the robot and the situation are more playful (aka 
Paré). Or worse, I would simply become bored and the robots would not sustain my 
attention anymore. 
While Paré looks at this perceptual loop as an experimental bug, trying to 
locate its origin, Kang looks into the final (gestalt switch) reaction to this 
incongruence and Misselhorn elicits the triggering of the gestalt switch, Fischer-Lichte 
reads this unstable and multistable situation in the light of the aesthetics it brings to the 
audience. Nonetheless, Paré’s analysis about a scheme of interaction emerging with 
the doppelganger chimes in with Fischer-Lichte’s multistability.  
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In this discussion, the body is an instance of an anthropomorphic object: T-ing 
the human by some means, a human lookalike, etc. What happens when the body 
becomes too remote from any definition of the human, and empathy requires 
considerable imagination? What would the phenomenological mechanisms of 
perception be between this object and the human? To develop a thesis about stage 
acceptance of machine performers, I need to encompass anthropocentric morphologies 
and behaviours. At the same time, the human audience is the preceptor and the 
receptor of the machine performers. Hence I need to find some common ground 
between performers and audience.  
If I consider audience perception of a machine performer on a scale of feeling 
that runs from qualifying it as animate to qualifying it as animated, I could utilize this 
bipolar scale to gauge a successful machine performer. Moreover, such a scale does 
not infringe the categorical boundaries of its anchors (see Ramey section 2.3). If the 
machine performer is considered animate, this must mean more than that its 
movements are simply congruent with the morphology of a machine. It implies that 
other layers of embodiment, with their specific readings of this mechanical body, are 
congruent with its perceived behaviour. In social robotics the machine is seen as 
ubiquitous, but it does not guarantee this congruence. So far as the credibility of 
puppets is concerned, Duffy observes: 
Artists can create puppets that resemble human beings as closely as possible (an 
imitative approach) or they can schematically or more abstractly represent animate 
beings (a conceptual approach) [31]. The choice of which is taken often depends on 
the themes and stories being told – a concept often ignored in social robotics. (Duffy 
and Zawieska 2012, p. 485) 
When the nominal functions of a machine are shifted and adapted to meet a 
narrative role, its apparent intentionality becomes grounded in its behaviours and the 
machine shifts from the animated to the animate. The animate object facilitates 
empathy and identification from the audience, while the animated one reminds a 
viewer of the object’s mechanical essence. It is not an embodiment but a strict 
simulation. An animate machine performer would then have a strong sense of presence 
while an animated machine performer would possess a weak presence, close to that of 
a casual object. An animate machine should also embody flaws and limitations to 
alleviate the resurgence of conceptual uncertainty without considering them as a 
malfunction: 
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There is no explanation, however, of why at a certain level of resemblance to life, 
flaws should suddenly become sources of discomfort, when they were unproblematic 
in less lifelike machines. Perhaps the cause of the uncanny is not in the flaws, but the 
conceptual uncertainty that they cause in the perceiving mind. (Kang 2009) 
Multiple oscillations between human and machine, animate and animated, 
subject and object in the performer are fundamental elements of the multiple 
ontological (or semiotic) states found in the machine performer. If I try to remain 
faithful to Fischer-Lichte, I need to revisit her perceptual multistability theory, as she 
states that objects cannot enjoy or evoke presence: 
Objects are frequently perceived as present, especially in theatre performances and 
performance events. The radical concept of presence requires the idea of an embodied 
mind at its centre and therefore has to be limited to human beings. (Fischer-Lichte 
2008, p. 100) 
The reformulation of the Uncanny Valley into a qualitative assertion of the 
sensed affinity (credibility) of the machine performer will continue in the next two 
chapters, where I will look at why and how this object can be considered as equal in 
rank to human performers. 
2.5. Contributing work: Area V5 
The project Area V5 was initiated within the context of a large museum exhibit 
about the human mind. The Museum of Civilization of Quebec City commissioned me 
to create an artwork related to current trends in artificial intelligence and the future of 
“thinking”.  
In this context, I aimed at establishing reflection in the audience about social 
robots and their still very limited interactions with humans, and at exploring the 
potential of the uncanny in its embodiment in the mechanical agent. For some time I 
have also been interested in the invasive (plus uncanny) sensation of the gazes from a 
whole crowd of machines. Area V5 followed previous work where I created an array 
of machines deployed in an arena22, putting exhibition visitors on stage in front of a 
synthetic audience in the role of performers and objects of attention. 
  
                                                
22 L’Assemblée (2001) deploys 48 robots in a theatrical arena. All the robots are directed and interact 
towards the central focal point of the structure where the audience is situated. 
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2.5.1. Description of work 
Area V5 is an artistic comment on social robots, particularly on the hypothesis 
of the role of the gaze in social robotics (Breazeal 2004). I approached the museum 
theme by re-contextualizing the claims made by recent artificial intelligence work 
about the prominent role of eye movements in establishing meaningful dialogue 
between humans and machines. 
In this work I explore confluences between the gaze as a non-verbal dialogue 
facilitating communication between humans and machines and the gaze in the theatre 
from audience and performers that opens competing perceptual configurations. 
Writing about spectatorship and the visual field, theatre theorist Stanton Garner 
discusses the impact of that competition: 
The performer/character's gaze, like the body's living presence that it asserts, exceeds 
the containing parameters of representational space and confronts the audience's gaze 
with an intersubjectivity that represents a potential or actual "catastrophe" in terms of 
spectatorial detachment. From the phenomenological point of view, the living body 
capable of returning the spectator's gaze presents a methodological dilemma for any 
theoretical model – like semiotics – that offers to describe performance in "objective" 
terms. Alone among the elements that constitute the stage's semiotic field, the body is 
a sign that looks back.. (Garner 1994, p. 49)  
The installation-experiment Area V5 invites the viewer-participant to 
experience the enigmatic gazes of a massive array of disembodied eyes, a complex act 
of ambiguous surveillance from silently impotent machines. The mutuality of the gaze, 
set in train as a strictly positive “mechanism” to enhance man-machine relations, 
immediately becomes a field of phenomenal interrogation: are eye movements simple 
reflexes, a common attempt to communicate, a judgment about what unfolds in front 
of them or a mirror of the machine performer’s “soul”?  
The title of the work refers to the visual area V5, a region of the extrastriate 
visual cortex that is thought to play a major role in the perception of motion, the 
integration of local motion signals into global percepts and the guidance of specific 
eye movements. 
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Figure 26. Area V5 - Skulls displayed as specimens (Demers 2009-10) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by the Musée de la Civilisation. 
2.5.2. Area V5 claims and hypothesis 
To fully understand the process behind this work, the artefact’s design and the 
scenography of the work, this section presents the premises, claims and underlying 
investigations determining the development of Area V5. The overall question behind 
the experiment was whether by voluntarily staging an uncanny situation it would 
percolate through to the visitor. 
Clearly the context of the encounter and the audience’s expectations are crucial 
in determining whether an encounter will be experienced as uncanny or not. As this 
work was intended to become an experiment contributing to the Uncanny Valley 
section of my thesis, I identified the following related issues from the scientific 
literature: 
1) As most Uncanny Valley experiments modulate morphology and not 
behaviour, Pollick proposed the following as a worthwhile alternative: 
“Certainly, one testable claim about Mori’s presentation of the Uncanny Valley 
would be to find an uncanny form and to see if motion can be used to modulate 
the experience.”(Pollick 2007) Area V5 was designed to generate just such an 
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uncanny form and determine whether an installation context could actually 
modulate audience reactions. 
2) Area V5 also sought to corroborate Hanson’s statement about modulating the 
Uncanny Valley effects by means of aesthetics and staging:  
despite the fact that the back of the robot’s head was missing so that audiences could 
see the uncanny robotic interior behind its artificial human-like features […] people 
who interacted with the robot appeared entertained, not disturbed or afraid. The robot 
held peoples’ attention in conversation for many minutes and even hours.  […] 71% 
said the robot was “not eerie,” and 89% “enjoyed” interacting with the robot. (Hanson 
2006).  
3) Hanson’s observations show that audiences can quickly get over initial feelings 
of uncanniness if they become sufficiently intrigued and engaged by the 
interactive encounter. It is also possible that the lack of any felt uncanniness in 
response to Hanson’ robot was due to the audience’s clear awareness of the 
robotic nature of the head from the start of the encounter.  
4) As Uncanny Valley literature mostly refers to the fear of death as the hidden 
motive behind the human reactions towards androids (Tondu and Bardou 2011, 
p. 337), Area V5 could literally use death to contribute to the uncanny setting. 
Some proponents of the Uncanny Valley argue that mortality salience 
contributes to the rejection of the agents (MacDorman 2005). Area V5 could 
stage this as an important layer of the artwork. 
5) Area V5 aims to investigate the different levels of the Uncanny as developed 
by Kang.  In these terms, Area V5 operates under controller parameters, and 
audience responses should lie within what Kang called the “uncanny sublime”. 
The voluntary staging of the uncanny could be implemented with various 
strategies, e.g. literally including elements of death, presenting human morphologies 
in an uncomfortable way (e.g. surgical or clinical), or creating a space where the 
visitor is not at ease. The following lists observations and design decisions made in the 
course of Area V5: 
1) The scenography of the whole exhibit was organized in a chronological 
fashion, from the Dark Ages to the present, showing human skulls (e.g. Lucy 
and Descartes) in almost all sections of this historical track. 
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2) The scenography of Area V5 went through several revisions. The initial 
concept was much more visitor-centred, creating a focal point on the audience. 
Finally, Area V5 was organized as a medical artefact display, a long row of 
specimens one would find, for instance, in a natural history museum (see 
Figure 27). 
3) In the continuity of many of my robotic artworks I am exploring mass 
replication of the object to study the impact of an anonymous choric member, 
as opposed to singular and unique entities. Social robotics has mainly dealt so 
far with singular characters. 
4) The linear arrangement of the skulls is analogous to the “skull racks” or 
Tzompantli found in Mexican culture. These racks were displays of the ritually 
executed – either war captives or game losers.  
5) The skull shape is an exact replica of the human skull, except that is 
reproduced 50% larger than the original size. The top part of the skull has been 
truncated with surgical precision and evokes many 3D renderings of medical 
imagery such as the iconic “visible human project” or MRI scans. 
6) The clear skulls are reminiscent of the iconic “visible man” anatomic model 
(1960s-70s) where the skin becomes a transparent plastic layer revealing the 
inner constituents of the human body. 
7) The sliced skulls are also a pastiche of the mechanistic Cartesian view of the 
body: the audience can freely see the internal mechanisms that generate eye 
movements, and the body of the agents is reduced to the skull, the repository of 
the brain and hence of the Cartesian intelligence. 
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Figure 27. Area V5 (Demers 2009-10)- initial proposal (above) and final linear layout 
(below) 
2.5.3. Technical details 
Area V5 is a large-scale interactive installation comprising sixty mechatronic 
human-like skulls retrofitted with moving eyes. The eyes are capable of following the 
movements of the audience, and track faces among the participants. Area V5 is three 
metres high and ten metres long. The sixty skulls are laid out in three rows of twenty 
skulls each. 
My initial idea was to construct a biomorphic object as close as possible to the 
human skeletomuscular system using artificial muscles23, on the assumption that a 
stronger sensation of the uncanny would emanate from what resembled a display of 
                                                
23 McKibben actuators are inflatable chambers that expand and contract in a similar fashion to an 
organic muscle. 
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organic matter brought alive than from an array of obviously mechanical displays. 
Each eye has six muscles that control its movements. When the muscles exert different 
tensions, a torque is exerted on the eye globe that causes it to turn and position itself. 
This is an almost pure rotation about a single point in the centre of the eye.  
Unfortunately, as I wanted to study the experiential impact of the space formed 
by a robot crowd, the economic feasibility of the eyes’ implementation became 
important. So I had to depart from verisimilitude in the look of the eyes towards 
simpler pan and tilt gimbals that could mimic a wide range of possible eye movements 
(see Figure 28). The gimbals actually did implement a rotation around the centre of the 
eye, though electro-mechanical movement is not as fluid as that derived from an 
artificial muscle. 
  
 
Figure 28. Eye's skeletomuscular system and pan-&-tilt gimbals (Demers 2009-10) 
Permission to reproduce the left image has been granted by the Creative Commons. 
Mass-producing sixty copies is a large undertaking. First, even if the skull’s 
proportions are slightly blown up, the need for miniature mechanisms is a major 
challenge. I had to rely on computer models and CNC manufacturing to make and 
assemble small mechanical linkages. Second, the carbon copy of the skulls was 
achieved by purchasing a 3D model of a digitally scanned human head. Afterwards, 
this computer model was altered (cutting a section, removing the jaw) and treated to 
feed into a 3D rapid prototyping device. This precision sculpted piece of plastic was 
then used as a positive mould to cast all the skulls. Both of these steps meant a radical 
change from my usual design and production process for machine performers. Up to 
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then I had used crude bolted, welded and powerful structures, hand made out of metal 
and pneumatic muscles. Area V5 made me shift to small, fragile motors and plastic 
parts designed on the computer then assembled with glue, like the robotic toys and 
pets found in the commercial world. 
Evoking the eye movements of humans relies on four basic motion 
characteristics: saccade, pursuit, vestibulo-ocular reflex and vergence.  Saccades are 
rapid ballistic eye movements jumping around the visual field locating interesting 
parts of the scene. Pursuit is the tracking movement that smoothly follows a moving 
target. The vestibulo-ocular reflex maintains eye fixation on a target while the head 
and torso are moving. Vergence is the ability of the eyes to converge towards or away 
from each other in order to focus on an object. Vergence obtains or maintains 
binocular vision. Seen from the outside, a person can spatially determine with 
accuracy where the eyes are looking. However, the vestibulo-ocular reflex involves 
costly extra degrees of freedom (the whole skull would have to move), so this motion 
could not be part of Area V5’s repertoire. 
Building non-verbal dialogue between audience and skull(s) relies on the 
dynamic aspects of eye movement, such as staring versus glancing or engaging with 
eye contact. In order to “see and detect” the audience, cameras are installed in each 
skull in the middle row. As the exact position of every skull in the array is known, eye 
movements can be calculated and programmed for neighbouring skulls (above and 
below) even if the camera is on a remote skull. The locus of attention can be detected 
from each visual input in the form of the fastest or largest optical flow activity in the 
camera’s image. This enables faces to be recognized as such along the approximate 
line of their eyes.  
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Figure 29. Area V5 - skull close-up and multiple gazes (Demers 2009-10) 
Interpreting the motion detection data that control the eye movement 
characteristics mimics a dialogue. For instance, sometimes the mechanical eyes 
saccade from one salient point of motion to another, sometimes they stare into the void 
awaiting an audience and sometimes they follow someone’s face until their attention is 
captured by another person’s waving hand. Equipped with a vast array of skulls, one 
set of eyes could be following a person’s hand while the next one stares them in the 
eye. Such multiple focuses have not been previously studied in social robotics, as most 
of the experiments deal with a one-on-one situation (or sometimes a many-to-one 
robot situation).  
2.5.4. Comparative works 
In this section, I will compare three similar artworks utilizing gaze as a central 
concept, and discuss two social robots, Kismet and Keepon – two icons of the role of 
shared attention through eye movement in social robotics. 
1) Kismet (Breazeal, 2000)  
Roboticist Cynthia Breazeal developed Kismet at the MIT’s AI lab (Breazeal, 
Brooks et al. 2003, p. 167; Breazeal 2004). Kismet aims to engage people in a face-to-
face interaction with the help of social cues from auditory and visual channels. Kismet 
delivers back its own social cues with gaze and facial expressions. These human-
machine social cues are all based on human social cues. On top of replicating human 
movements (for instance saccades), Kismet possesses mechanisms of shared attention 
built upon eye movements, such as the deictic gaze of recognition, or maintenance of 
eye contact. Kismet vests intentionality in the participant by establishing the implicit 
postulate that the shared locus of attention reveals what the participant currently 
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considers behaviourally relevant. In turn, the participant will (in many cases) vest 
intentionality in this mechanical agent under the same conditions. 
 
Figure 30. Kismet (Breazeal 2003) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Elsevier. 
2) Keepon (Kozima, 2009) 
Keepon is a small robot designed for minimal non-verbal communication with 
children. Keepon does not move its eyes towards a target but moves its whole body 
instead. In what Kozima labels as attentive action, it can gaze at an object and generate 
shared attention with the person. Keepon also has emotive action where it can squish 
and rock its body to give the impression of expressing an internal state, mostly 
pleasure and excitement. 
 
Figure 31. Keepon (Kozima, Michalowski et al. 2009) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by RightsLink (Springer). 
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3) Opto-Isolator (Levin & Baltus, 2007). 
According to Golan Levin and Greg Baltus, the authors of Opto-Isolator, the 
sculpture inverts the condition of spectatorship: "What if artworks could know how we 
were looking at them? And, given this knowledge, how might they respond to us?" 
(Levin and Baltus 2007). The piece presents a solitary mechatronic blinking eye that 
responds to the gaze of the visitor with what they describe as “eye contact behaviours 
that are at once familiar and unnerving”.  Opto-Isolator has elaborate eye contact 
feedbacks such as mimicking visitor’s blinks and looking away after a sustained stare. 
 
Figure 32. Opto-Isolator (Levin and Baltus, 2007) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the artitsts. 
4) Desire of Codes (Seiko Mikami, 2010) 
The installation Desire of Codes consists of three different parts responding to 
the movements of the audience: a large wall of sensors, a set of moving cameras, and a 
video display compounding images in the manner of insect vision. Again this work 
draws on the reversal of roles of object and subject and from the commissioners of this 
piece:  
Audience who experience this artwork stands face to face with his or her own 
observed and encoded existence, the resulting data/codes, and ultimately, the 
repercussions of “the body as data” and “the desire of codes.” […] By turning the 
audiences bodies into both the objects of observation and artistic expression, this work 
aims to redefine our position in a time when all kinds of environments – including 
those of everyday life – are increasingly being information oriented society. (Mikami 
2010) [sic] 
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Referring heavily to sensory perception, the “wriggling wall” comprises 90 
units that behave like some kind of insect’s antennas. The stated purpose of this 
massive device is to turn an entire inorganic apparatus into a living being reacting to 
the motion detected in the exhibition space. The difference between Desire of Codes 
and other works reported here is that the audience is presented with what the device 
captures by recombining the data fragments into a projection surface representing an 
insect eye.  
 
Figure 33. Desire of Codes (Mikami 2010) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the artist. 
5) Zeugen (Morgan Rauscher, 2009/10) 
In his description of his work Rauscher also raises the question of 
spectatorship:  
I question who owns the ‘visual’ experience in this gallery space. What is the 
spectacle and 'who' is the spectator? Do we passively witness or are we also witnesses 
of ourselves by the act of witnessing? A struggle is revealed causing tension between 
the witnessing and the witnessed. […] I find the sensation of ‘vision’ to be moving in 
both directions simultaneously between the viewer and the viewed. (Rauscher 2009) 
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Zeugen, a German word meaning “to witness” or “witnesses”, is also a large 
array of staring eyes, but for this piece full faces are cast and embedded in a wall. The 
system also relies on face tracking; however Zeugen, in contrast to Area V5 and Opto-
Isolator, utilizes an ambient soundtrack.  
Rauscher claims that: “Viewers of the work experience a powerful visceral 
event and are motivated to interact and play with the work.”  In his thesis, Rauscher 
mentions that the mechanisms were originally hidden from the visitor, but he observed 
that people looked “behind the wall” to find them. Rauscher then made versions that 
would reveal the construction (Rauscher 2010). 
 
 
Figure 34. Zeugen (Rauscher 2009-10) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the artist. 
All the artworks featured here share a reversal of situation in which the 
audience is sensed and observed. I have brought the two social robots Kismet and 
Keepon into the comparison to contrast their aims with those of the four artworks. The 
social robots evidently attempt a friendlier appearance than the objects made by the 
artists. The non-verbal dialogue of Keepon feels animate, whereas the facial and head 
expressions of Kismet feel animated and constructed. Keepon’s body gestures are 
aligned with its morphology and this makes it credible in its reduced set of 
expressions. In general, social robots playact – almost overacting – at being 
zoomorphic agents. As Kang remarks about the amusement that arises from robots: 
Our attention is arrested by the device because it tries to cross the boundaries of 
animate/inanimate, natural/artificial, living/dead, but it does such a bad job of it that it 
ends up reaffirming our normal schema of reality. And so we laugh in relief at its 
failure and domesticate the object in terms of childhood playfulness, finding it 
amusing and cute. (Kang 2009, p. 53) 
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The gazing robots of the artworks, constrained to a smaller range of behaviours 
than the two social robots, play on the fine line between being entertaining and being 
disconcerting. In all cases, the robots are presented as mechanical, sparking a sense of 
playfulness from the dialogue with the gazing eye(s). But their unbroken gaze creates 
a sense of indefinable and discomfiting judgment. In these situations, the uncanny 
does not emanate from the flaw of not achieving a verisimilar sense of life but from 
the achievement of presenting and mimicking a behaviour (gaze) that is, in turn, 
modulated by the aesthetics of the object and the scenography of the space. 
In line with Kang, where he introduces the notion of the sublime into his 
Uncanny Valley analysis – “we feel awe rather than amusement in front of the great, 
powerful machine […], the same way as at the sight of a grand view of nature”(Kang 
2009, p. 54) – my claim is that regardless of the quality of the dialogue inherent in the 
mutual gaze of audience and robot, its space and scale can enhance the sensation of 
either the uncanny or the technological sublime. 
 Applying this to the works under consideration here, I would see Area V5, 
which distinguishes itself from the other artworks by its voluntary staging of a large 
number of dead specimens, as targeting the uncanny sublime. In comparison, Zeugen 
enacts a sense of enumeration found in large pixel displays rather than a dramatic 
organization, and in that respect tends towards the technological sublime. The awe 
engendered by the large-scale organic Desire of Codes, with its elaborate tentacle 
array, emerges from a mass of mechanical entities and also has its roots in the 
technological sublime. Table 8 provides a summary comparison of the works 
presented in this section. 
In the following section, I will analyse the results of a survey conducted about 
audience emotional reactions from experiencing Area V5. I will further argue for the 
role of scenography to trigger the uncanny. I will also differentiate the entertaining 
from the disconcerting and from the uncanny sensations inside Area V5’s audience 
experiences. 
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 V5 Opto Zeugen Desire Codes Social Bots 
Gaze. Many too 
many. 
Dialogue is 
one on one. 
Bystander 
can 
witness. 
Many too 
many. 
Many too many. Dialogue is one on one. 
Bystander can witness. 
Keepon demonstrates that 
a reduced set of 
movements can still lead 
to a large array of 
behaviours. 
Immersion 
scenography 
Yes. Uncanny 
is also a 
scenographic 
goal.  
No 
object 
In-between. 
Many units 
put together 
in one 
display. 
Yes. 
Scenography 
brings 
fascination with 
wriggling wall. 
Laboratory as mise-en-
scene. 
Not meant to have an 
impact. 
 
Uncanny 
setting 
 
Clinical 
display of 
skulls. 
 
Cyclops as 
unreal 
chimerical 
object. 
 
Display 
recalls more 
pixels than 
human faces. 
 
Massive array 
of sensors. 
 
Aim at not being uncanny, 
as both objects are 
designed to be friendly. 
Kang’s model. 
All works stay 
within 
controlled 
parameters. 
Amusement -
sublime. 
Amusement 
-uncanny.  
Amusement 
-uncanny 
sublime. 
Amusement -
uncanny 
sublime. 
Kismet (grotesque) 
Keepon (pleasure) 
Animate / 
Animated 
Survey shows 
more animated 
than animate. 
Animate Animated Animate 
(wriggling 
wall). 
Animated for 
their 
components. 
Kismet – Animated due to 
its cartoonish features. 
Keepon – Animate due to 
its effective body 
language. 
 
Table 8. Summary comparison of gaze and space aspects 
2.5.5. Data collection and survey analysis 
Area V5 was first presented at the Museum of Civilization in Quebec City in 
the context of a major exhibition on Human Copyright from November 2009 to 
September 2010.  The following year, Area V5 was also included in the HUMAN+ 
exhibition at the Science Gallery (Dublin) from March to June 2011 (Armstrong 
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Rachel , Spillane Charles et al. 2011). During the exhibition at the Science Gallery, 
gallery staff distributed surveys over a period of two weeks and I collected around 
fifty completed questionnaires. The staff ware instructed to first let the visitor 
experience the work freely and then voluntarily complete the forms. No time limit was 
assigned to the experience. Staff were also instructed that other visitors should not 
influence respondents. 
Aimed at establishing the audience’s associative emotional response to Area 
V5, the survey dispensed with bipolar scales of affinity like those found in the 
Godspeed questionnaire (Bartneck, Kulić et al. 2009). Instead, respondents were asked 
to rate the impact of several characteristics that could contribute to such oppositions. 
For instance, questions such as “Please rate your impression of the robot on these 
scales” usually offer scales with poles that implicitly oppose man and machine such 
as, machinelike vs. humanlike, unconscious vs. conscious, or mechanical vs. organic. 
The AreaV5 survey broke down such antinomies by asking respondents to rate the 
poles separately: “Did the robots feel mechanical?”, “Did the robots feel organic?”, 
“Did the robots feel conscious?” Furthermore, there were no questions that addressed 
the Uncanny Valley directly or that utilized words typically found in scientific surveys 
in this field. For instance, the words ‘uncanny’ and ‘anthropomorphism’ did not 
appear in the survey.  
The survey was succinct – only three pages long – and gathered information 
about respondents’ knowledge and experience of robots, their reactions and 
impressions to Area V5, and additional demographic data. The data relating to 
audience reaction was measured on a ten point Likert scale (e.g. from no impression to 
strong impression). 
1) Audience reactions 
The first question, “How did you feel when you first encountered the work?” 
was to evaluate if audience impressions tended more to the amusement/entertainment 
or unfamiliar/uncomfortable side. The question asked the audience to rate six 
emotional states as reported by the box plot of Figure 35. 
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Figure 35. Box Plot – Area V5 audience reactions 
 
The measured intensity is significantly different across the range of emotion 
surveyed X2 (5) = 82.09, p<0.5 (Friedman’s Anova). Wilcoxon’s tests were used to 
perform follow-up analysis of this result and verify if people felt significantly more 
entertained and curious than frightened, unfamiliar with the set-up or uncomfortable. 
A Bonferroni correction had to be applied in order to compare the match-ups between 
frightened, unfamiliar and uncomfortable with a control (either entertained, fascinated 
or curious), i.e. a level of significance of 0.016 instead of 0.05 (divided by 3). 
 Frightened Uncomfortable Unfamiliar 
Entertained N=55, T = 181.5,  
Z=4.621,  p= 0. 
N=56, T=353.,  
Z=3.059, p=0.0022 
 
N=55,T=415., 
Z=1.774, p=0.076 
Fascinated N=55, T=242.5,  
Z=3.94154, 
p=0.00008 
 
N=55, T-408.0, 
Z=2.22,p=0.0267 
N=55, T=552.5, 
Z=0.597, p=0.551 
Curious N=55, T=78.5,  
Z=5.55977, p=-0. 
N=56, T=201.5,  
Z=4.4396,p=0.00001 
N=55,T=262., 
Z=3.487, p=0.00049 
Table 9.  Follow-up analysis – comparison of affinity 
 
Viewers evidently felt significantly more curious than frightened by, or 
uncomfortable or unfamiliar with the installation set-up (all p<0.016, see Table 9). 
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They also felt significantly more fascinated than frightened (p=0.00008) but not more 
so than unfamiliar. They felt almost more fascinated than uncomfortable but just failed 
to establish this as significant due to the correction. Finally, they felt significantly 
more entertained than frightened or uncomfortable (p=0. and p=0.0022 respectively). 
However, the analysis indicated that their sense of being entertained was not 
significantly greater than their sense of unfamiliarity when confronted by such an 
array of robotic skulls. The second question – “How do you feel about the reactions 
the skulls have toward you, do they feel…” – was to rate five qualities of the 
behaviour of the skulls (see box plot of Figure 36). The third question – “What creates 
an impression on you?” – tried to locate some of the criteria utilized in the skull 
behaviour assessment and also overall impressions of the installation (see boxplot of 
Figure 37). 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Box plot – Area V5 skull behaviour perception 
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Figure 37. Box plot – Area V5 impact on audience 
 
A majority of participants clearly found that the skulls of Area V5 felt 
mechanical rather than organic, startled, alive or conscious. Consistently with this, 
they did not consider the quasi-living dissonance as very impactful, although the 
measured intensity was significantly different across the range of impact surveyed X2 
(4) = 72.12, p<0 (Friedman’s Anova). I further looked at the impact of the number of 
skulls and their tracking capacities as opposed to just their look and feel. The number 
and the eyes’ tracking feature were reported significantly more impactful than the 
aesthetics of the skull, scoring respectively N=55, T=109, Z=5.008, p=0, and 
N=56,T=151.5, Z=3.882 and p=0.0001 in Wilcoxon tests. 
The fourth question – “Is it important that they behave like humans?” – 
concealed one of the motifs of the Uncanny Valley, i.e. is movement more important 
than form? The box plot of Figure 38 measures three characteristics of the skulls: the 
way they look, the way the eyes move (at large) and the way they follow a person. The 
measured importance was significantly different across the range of characteristics 
surveyed with X2 (2) = 8.378, p<0.015 (Friedman’s Anova). A follow-up analysis with 
Wilcoxon tests revealed that the general eye movement was significantly more 
important than the look of the skulls (N=55, T=105.0, Z=2.622, p=0.0087) while the 
specific eye pursuit failed to significantly surpass the aesthetics of skulls (N=55, 
T=201.5, Z=1.64, p=0.100). 
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Figure 38. Box plot – Area V5 human-like behaviour 
 
The fifth and last question was a hidden control question: “Would you have a 
skull installed in your house and looking at you?” By telling whether or not they 
would share a more personal social interaction with a skull, audiences were indicating 
their affinity or sense of amusement or entertainment with the behaviour and look of 
the skulls. Among the surveyed visitors, 25% of them replied that they would have a 
skull at home. 
In an attempt to correlate under what conditions individual viewers felt 
frightened, uncomfortable or unfamiliar, I looked into Pearson correlation factors. 
Even though none of these sensations were strongly measured in audience reactions, it 
was worth looking at their root, especially for the unfamiliar state, since it stood in the 
middle of the appreciation scales. The summary of the results is reported in Table 10 
and they indicate the variation of sensations from Area V5.  
When visitors feel uncomfortable, there is a strong relationship with 
considering the skulls alive (R=0.53, p=0.0001) and a moderate relationship with 
considering them conscious (R=0.36, p=0.013).  I can consider that being gazed at and 
judged by living beings makes me uncomfortable. The characteristics related to this 
uncomfortable sensation are moderately linked to the skulls’ pursuit of the spectators 
and weakly influenced by the number of skulls (R=0.32, p=0.02 and R=0.25, p=0.05).  
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When visitors feel frightened, the relation with considering the skulls alive is 
strong (R=0.59, p=0.00002) and the impact of this nervous crowd of skulls is 
moderately linked to this sensation (R=0.34, p=0.02). The characteristics shift to the 
quasi-living status of the skulls when the alive and the not-quite-living perceptions are 
moderately rated (R=0.37, p=0.007 in both cases). The frightening sensation seems to 
be rooted in psychological observations, the quasi-living, typically found in Uncanny 
Valley literature. 
Finally, the sensation of unfamiliarity could not be moderately correlated to 
any perceived behaviour of the audience. However, the number of skulls and their 
pursuit do moderately contribute to this sensation (R=0.38, p=0.005, R=0.31, p=0.02). 
Unfamiliarity seems more based on the unusual confrontation with a mass of gazing 
objects.  
 
 
Pearson’s R  
(N=47) 
p-value 
Alive vs. Uncomfortable 0.53259 0.00012 
Conscious vs. Uncomfortable 0.36134 0.01258 
Startled vs. Uncomfortable 0.19687 0.18473 
Mechanical vs. Uncomfortable 0.14904 0.31737 
Organic vs. Uncomfortable 0.06455 0.66642 
   
 
Pearson’s R 
(N=55) p-value 
Follow vs. Uncomfortable 0.32426 0.01573 
Amount vs. Uncomfortable 0.25962 0.05561 
Look & Feel vs. Uncomfortable 0.23306 0.08683 
Alive vs. Uncomfortable 0.12538 0.36172 
Not quite alive vs. Uncomfortable 0.01842 0.8938 
 
 
Pearson’s R 
(N=46) p-value 
Alive vs. Frightened 0.58829 0.00002 
Startled vs. Frightened 0.33981 0.02086 
Conscious vs. Frightened 0.19232 0.20038 
Mechanical vs. Frightened -0.15133 0.31542 
Organic vs. Frightened 0.1314 0.38404 
   
 
Pearson’s R 
(N=54) p-value 
Not quite alive vs. Frightened 0.36778 0.00622 
Alive vs. Frightened 0.36767 0.00624 
Look & feel vs. Frightened 0.23488 0.08733 
Follow vs. Frightened 0.18701 0.17571 
Amount vs. Frightened 0.14434 0.29772 
Not quite alive vs. Amount 0.06911  
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Pearson’s R 
(N=47) p-value 
Mechanical vs. Unfamiliar 0.23247 0.11584 
Conscious vs. Unfamiliar 0.22523 0.12797 
Alive vs. Unfamiliar 0.22348 0.13105 
Startled vs. Unfamiliar 0.15773 0.28965 
Organic vs. Unfamiliar -0.02508 0.8671 
   
 
Pearson’s R 
(N=54) p-value 
Amount vs. Unfamiliar 0.38064 0.00452 
Follow vs. Unfamiliar 0.31058 0.02227 
Not quite alive vs. Unfamiliar 0.21736 0.11438 
Alive vs. Unfamiliar 0.20855 0.13019 
Look & feel vs. Unfamiliar 0.01326 0.92417 
 
Table 10. Pearson's correlations for ‘uncomfortable’, ‘frightened’ and ‘unfamiliar’ 
In order to verify the correlation data I ranked answers into quartiles to create 
sub-groups among the participants. The abnormal data distribution suggested the 
existence of such sub-groups. For instance, instead of looking at the whole population, 
I could look only at the top 25% of respondents (the most frightened people per se) 
and see if this related to any other factors. The results of the correlation concur with 
this ranking. For instance, Figure 39 shows the box plots of three factors surrounding 
the unfamiliar sensation. If I compare the extreme groups, i.e. low 25% and high 25%, 
I obtain a significant difference between the two groups (p<0.05). In other words, the 
most unfamiliar persons in the surveys were also the most impressed by the pursuit, 
the number of skulls and their perceived consciousness. I did not find any 
discrepancies between the correlation and this quartile ranking method. 
 
 
Figure 39. Box plot of unfamiliar quartiles vs. tracking, number and consciousness 
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2) Demographics and general information  
The opening questions of the survey were designed to gain a picture of the 
participant’s views or conceptions of what is a robot. They were briefly confronted 
with many versions of real and fictitious robots and were asked to rank each of these 
as qualifying to be considered a robot. The box plot of Figure 40 reports the various 
representative types and their success rate. 
 
Figure 40. Area V5 – What is a robot for you? 
 
3) Discussion 
The results show that for the respondents to this survey a robot is more a 
machine-that-thinks than a machine-that-moves. This agrees with the Cartesian view 
of the old AI, but nonetheless provides hints about where they situate the roots of 
robotic behaviours and intentions. The industrial robot surprisingly surpasses the 
archetype of autonomous robots: the humanoid. This probably indicates that this 
audience was well aware of the unexciting reality of most mechanical agents. In both 
cases, it indicates that the concept of nouvelle AI has not reached a broad public. 
Although AreaV5 is a clear reference to death (of which the skull is the icon 
par excellence), the main result of the survey is that I can quantitatively demonstrate 
that visitors feel neither scared, nor uncomfortable nor unfamiliar but rather 
entertained and curious. This situates their experience, following Kang’s chart, at the 
Uncanny Sublime. 
Contributing work: Area V5 © Demers 2014 
 
132 
According to Hanson, art can modulate aesthetics and facilitate acceptance of 
the agents by participants. But perhaps the death references are too direct in this 
instance and the skulls too mechanical. The skulls are bodiless and skinless, a clear 
representation of a mechanical artefact. Nonetheless those who found them most 
disconcerting also judged them “conscious” inasmuch as they conveyed a sense of 
surveillance. The discomfiting sensation emanates from the perception of the skulls 
being alive, from their tracking pursuit of the viewer-participant, not from their looks. 
This is in accordance with Mori’s assertion of the prevalence of movement over 
anthropomorphism.    
It is clear that the audience did not find the robots of Area V5 markedly “alive” 
but this did not prevent them from being curious and entertained. After all, the object’s 
mechatronics are not concealed, which gives it a strong animated and mechanical 
flavour. Nonetheless, the skull’s capacity to follow and react to audience movements 
did radiate enough consciousness to generate some levels of discomfort. 
Hence it can justifiably be said that Area V5 modulated an uncanny situation, 
translating the anthropomorphic uncanny in the sight of animated (but manifestly 
dead) skulls into an entertaining (and sublime) experience. Forgetting the essentially 
representative nature of these moving eyes, they become articulated mirrors, and the 
audience shifts its attention to their narcissistic movements. Audiences can sidestep 
the uncanny setting and initiate a different mode of experience by transferring their 
focus from the intentionality to the functionality of the robotic skulls. Doing so, they 
will no longer consider the agent an uncomfortable presence (haunting souls looking 
at me), and their own gaze will transform into a playful challenge to the visual reflexes 
of these mechanical creatures. We may conclude, therefore, that the initial concept of 
Area V5’s scenography (an uncanny-sublime environment) is impactful but fails to 
create an overwhelming (and hence unambiguous) sensation for the viewer. However, 
the sense of the sublime engendered by the scenography evidently succeeded in 
making the audience curious and enriched their experience in the dimension of 
entertainment. 
By letting the audience navigate within these levels of representation – the 
automaton gazing as a simple, but in this instance simply disruptive, function of a 
conscious mind “accepting” my own gaze – the cognitive dissonance is lessened to a 
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level of marginality or even non-existence. The presence of the skulls implies, but at 
the same time denies, a perceived intentionality in these pursuing eyeballs. If a visitor 
considers the environment as animate, he/she will become uncomfortable. If a visitor 
considers the environment as simply animated, it will remain entertaining. In the case 
of Area V5, audience perception has oscillated between the animate (and hence 
intentional) and the animated (and hence functional). In leaning towards the animated 
it has effectively distanced itself from the aesthetic realm of the uncanny and entered 
that of the playful and entertaining. 
2.6. Conclusion 
By analysing, comparing and regrouping several discussions on the Uncanny 
Valley, I have shown that the concept is ill-formed and shallow. The focus on the 
word “uncanny” itself misguides robotic research in its discussion of the valley. And 
some promoters of androids not only misrepresent the real meaning of 
anthropomorphism, they also shift public attention from relevant agency and social 
behaviours to the verisimilitude of visual cues (hair, skin) and motion cues (details of 
eye movement, smoothness of motion). The most prominent examples of the Uncanny 
Valley in the scientific world are uncanny not because they follow or diverge from 
Mori’s law, but because they enact broader psychological dualisms and schisms: the 
evil twins (geminoids), the superficial genderising and casting of objects (actroids) 
and the utopian love of perfect partners. 
Nonetheless, the developers of androids utilize the Uncanny Valley as a 
pseudo-scientific justification for their undertakings (MacDorman and Ishiguro 2006). 
The hidden quest for verisimilitude in developing a human carbon copy is shadowed 
by the argumentation that, by building a copy of ourselves, we have a functional entity 
to test incarnate models of social behaviour and cognition, to name a few of the 
reasons given for this research. These undertakings are questioned by Kaplan: 
“Robotic experimentations sometimes give the impression of being only a 
dramatization, linking with modes of presentation found in public scientific 
demonstration dating from the 18th century; stagings of science without real 
epistemological stakes” (Kaplan and Oudeyer 2008, p. 288) 
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The current formulation of the Uncanny Valley is not about embodiment. 
Actually it conveys a tacit rejection of any other morphology than human as a gauge 
for social robotics. Seeking for the facsimile funnels the vision and diverts from the 
potential of alternative behaviours and morphologies.  
In order to expand on the issues raised by this thesis and to determine whether 
it can apply to the case of the machine performer, I needed to re-situate attention from 
morphology alone to the tandem of morphology and behaviour. Only this provides a 
complete picture. As humanoids and robots derived from engineering are built for 
understanding and not for shifting or playing with viewer perceptions, artistic 
explorations of the Uncanny Valley and their analysis are not generally allowed to 
contribute to the dilemma, where they might provide alternative views and evidence 
(see Table 11). 
By conducting a qualitative analysis of various attempts to model the Uncanny 
Valley, I have been able to establish that the phenomenon can be reformulated on the 
basis of “multi-stability perception” in the audience, a model expounded for theatre 
performances by Fischer-Lichte (Fischer-Lichte 2008; Fischer-Lichte 2008). The 
liminal divide found in the Uncanny Valley corresponds to the multi-stable perception 
of performers from an audience, constantly shifting back and forth from pretence to 
presence. This multistability is an accepted, even empowered, state in theatre. 
By playing a role between representation and embodiment, the animated and 
the animate, the automatic and the agentic, the machine performer can explore some of 
the disturbing ambiguities associated with the machine’s uncanny lack of credible 
agency. In this chapter I have argued that the Uncanny Valley – or the breach in the 
suspension of disbelief – might lie where perceptions start oscillating between the 
function (automatic) and the intention (agentic), the inert/mechanical and the quasi-life 
qualities, of the robot. Too many oscillations over time may cause confusion and 
ensuing loss of identification. Festinger’s theory that qualifies machine performers 
qualitatively with strong or weak dissonance is also applicable here.  
In my practical works, exemplified by Area V5, the Uncanny Valley does not 
manifest itself strongly at all. Although in these works the topics presented are 
sometimes distinctly uncomfortable (intimate touch, surveillance, malformed bodies), 
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audience feedback indicates a willingness to engage with the artwork. The Uncanny 
Valley of Area V5 was from its inception considered an aesthetic stand, and viewer 
response shows that it can be accepted as such, and even found entertaining, like any 
other unusual environment.    
To conclude, I will not look upon the Uncanny Valley in the following 
chapters as a measure of whether a machine performer is credible to (or accepted by) 
an audience. I will continue to apply the gauge of the animate vs. animated and I will 
argue that a salient characteristic of a positive evaluation is a “strong stage presence”. 
This strong stage presence will be developed and defined in the next two chapters, 
following the tandem morphology/behaviour mentioned above, first from within the 
machine performer via embodiment perspectives, and secondly from the outside, by 
looking at mechanisms of perception, reception and identification of mechanical 
agents. 
Science Art / Theatre 
Identification 
Familiarisation 
Repetition/Reproduction 
Alienation 
Defamiliarisation 
Ostranenie 
Engagement Entertainment 
Invariant context to isolate experimental variables Situated, contextualised and codified 
Aims to understand the human by building copies Aims to understand humans by staging situations 
Performative (functionality) Interpretive (intentionality, presence) 
Autonomous agent Exists with co-presence of the audience 
Quest for affinity Cognitive dissonance is an aesthetic experience. 
Quest for perfect replica (morphology) Metaphors, abstractions, alterations 
Quest for perfect replica (behaviour) Exaggerated behaviours - camp (Dixon) 
Table 11. Résumé of science vs. art strategies (for the Uncanny) 
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3 
Comparing Embodiments 
3.1. Outline of chapter 
The role of the body in relation to human intelligence is now at the forefront of 
research in artificial intelligence, philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. For 
example in the seminal book Phenomenology of Perception, philosopher Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the human perceives and conceptualizes everything though 
the body. Furthermore, he posits that human consciousness is embodied, eradicating 
the separation of mind from body (Merleau-Ponty 1962). This school of thought has 
been embraced by recent bottom-up approaches found in nouvelle artificial 
intelligence. By understanding their view on the role of the body in intelligence, I will 
explore and adapt their fundamental results to develop new perspectives. In fact my 
aim is to design morphologies and implement behaviours for machine performers so 
that they become embodied agents on the stage itself. In this way I will attempt to 
contextualize machine performers, inscribing them with an historical body and to 
expand the rather restrictive notion of embodiment in artificial intelligence. 
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While these nouvelle attitudes of embodiment in AI have challenged the 
Cartesian and orderly juxtaposition of the brain, the body and its interaction with the 
environment, Rolf Pfeifer still suggests in his latest book How the Body Shapes the 
Way We Think, that AI should continue to focus on non-hierarchical links between the 
brain (the computer) and the body as an eloquent distribution of muscular control 
mechanisms and cognition. For example, he suggests that walking is revealed to be a 
combination of the materials (tissues, bones, flexibility, sensors) and of distributed 
processing between the body and the brain. (Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 2007)  
In my opinion, these concepts of the physical body as analogous to a biological 
organism and the environment as analogous to a physical terrain are too narrow, and I 
would suggest that a richer multi-layered conception of embodiment would be 
appropriate in AI. From my conversations with scientists, I have concluded that many 
AI researchers sadly underestimate the concept of embodiment inside the theatre 
environment. In this chapter, I suggest that the relation between basic human 
movement and robotic movement might benefit from simultaneous comparison on a 
metaphorical level. I argue that because machine performers are situated, they can also 
provide intangible layers from the cultural context, and create a special “suspension of 
disbelief”.  This develops a more broadly embodied attribution of intention towards 
any other outside physical objects that act upon the world and affect our behaviour.  
But first I will present the definition of embodiment as seen by nouvelle AI 
scientists, because the underlying principles and methods of constructing embodied 
agents are important to this thesis. Second, I will show that there are several mini-
views of embodiment with various conceptual layers. However, nouvelle AI still tends 
to target the lower layers of embodiment, whereas I claim (as already indicated) that 
embodiment spans from the biological to the social. Third, in order to compare 
embodiments, I will present three of my machine performer projects that might 
actually expand this nouvelle AI notion of embodiment. In these works I have built 
formulated bodies that attempt to offer drama as a way to understand how a cultural 
convention can be embodied and enacted upon.  These works might share bodily 
characteristics that are physically designed to “perform” in the nouvelle AI sense, but I 
used an intangible layer of cultural conventions to place them on stage in a concrete 
theatrical setting. All these works contain a specific level of historical embodiment: 
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the Tiller Girls (female dancers), the Blind Robot (blind character) and La Cour des 
Miracles (characters in pain). 
The first work I would like to introduce is the Tiller Girls, a dance piece comprising 
an ensemble of 32 small autonomous robots with a prior history in artificial 
intelligence. First I will describe how I actually appropriated a robot design (Stumpy) 
from the University of Zurich AI lab and placed it onto the stage. Second, I will show 
how I inscribed some upper levels of embodiment from the historical context of the 
Tiller Girls in 1930, and I will ground this enactment in Judith Butler’s gender 
constitution. Third, I will examine the animate-animated equation and scrutinize this 
equation while the Tiller Girls function and perform on stage. Prompted by 
Auslander’s essay on robot performers, where he employs the Tiller Girls in his 
central discussion on technical and interpretive skills, I will finally compare the 
machine performers with the original human performers (Auslander 2006).  
 Next I will investigate the Blind Robot from the perspective of competence 
and how references to historical embodiment might shift reactions to it. In contrast 
with Tiller Girls, this robot does not have much “innate” physical competence and 
here I want to focus on social embodiment. The Blind Robot was inspired by the 
Turing test, where the influences of the perceived physical body are removed to give 
priority to the social body. Actually, this robot’s journey was the exact opposite of the 
Tiller Girls’: it was moved from the gallery back to the laboratory in order to verify 
the impact of its fictitious role on audience perceptions. Here I will discuss the results 
of two levels of quantitative analysis which aimed to verify whether changing the 
intentions of the robot – in other words its instrumental or affective state – could 
actually shift perception of its performance. In the final work, La Cour des Miracles, I 
attempted to bind behaviours to a morphology and used morphological computing 
extensively, particularly a programming technique called “subsumption” developed by 
Rodney Brooks at MIT Media Lab.  
Various aspects of these three works will be compared, including programming 
techniques, materials and body morphologies adapted for specific dynamics and 
kinematics that occur when these machine performers are re-appropriated into 
different environments. More specifically I will investigate how their behaviours and 
emotions can be implemented, even if they do not have a complete computational 
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model. Throughout this analysis I will paraphrase Rodney Brooks’ bold paper about 
intelligence without representation and look into acting or performing without 
thinking “as” machine performers.  My main aim is to derive a form of bottom-up 
“synthetic methodology” for machine performers on the stage (Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 
2007). 
Understanding embodiment has multiple implications for machine performers.  
One implication is that constructed machines might display a “psycho-physical unity”, 
a quality used in theatrical acting method. Another is that this analysis might give a 
new point of view about the perception of the machines. Embodiment is also an 
important frame of reference when attempting to analyse anthropomorphic and 
zoomorphic reflexes, because we reflect on our own bodily experiences. Finally, it 
forces us to review the idea of what constitutes “performing” for a machine. 
3.2. Embodied artificial intelligence 
I am not interested in criticising the whole discipline of AI, but in illustrating 
the current spirit of this field by concentrating on the meanings of the body and the 
environment in embodied artificial intelligence. The word “brain” has been 
purposefully left out in my previous lists of words, because I am seeking for a way to 
make a machine performer feel animated, which does not necessarily imply that it 
should feel intelligent.  When an audience can only perceive a machine performer’s 
body and its behaviour in an environment like the stage, then the body dominates.  
3.2.1. The Embodiment Turn  
In the opening chapter of his seminal book How the body shapes the way we 
think, Pfeifer defines the term embodiment in the following way: “an intelligence 
always requires a body. Or, more precisely, we ascribe intelligence only to agents that 
are embodied, i.e., real physical systems whose behaviour can be observed as they 
interact with the environment” (Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 2007, p. 18). Here the far-
reaching – and often surprising – implications of embodiment are given a literal 
meaning: that intelligence actually requires a body. Pfeifer further suggests that the 
consequences of embodiment are related to our obvious obedience to the laws of 
physics, as well as to the more complex interactions between physical processes and 
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information processing. In biological agents, embodiment lies between physical 
actions and neural processing.  In a robot, embodiment lies between its actions and its 
control program, between “body” and “brain”. Pfeifer provides various examples 
where embodiment facilitates the tasks at hand without much brain intervention, for 
example, the use of deformable materials that help to grasp objects, or the muscle-
tendon systems that perform rapid movements (running) and handle all control details. 
Equally, the morphology and anatomy of the robots built in AI can help sensors to pre-
process information. For instance sensors at the fingertips will always face the action 
of moving forward and hence provide useful, structured information to the brain: for 
example, when a hand grabs a glass or an object, the anatomical and morphological 
capacity of the forearm and hand enable it to adapt to different shapes.  
Thus the perpetual paradox of GOFAI and nouvelle AI is the highly contested 
marriage between modeling and simulation. The grasping hand demonstrates that this 
kind of intelligence resides not only in the brain, where the different memorized forms 
of drinking glass exist, nor solely on the cognitive level of the object “glass”. Grasping 
intelligence of this kind is distributed and “outsourced” between the brain, the body 
and the environment. This example is also referenced in the title of an early book by 
Rodney Brooks: Intelligence Without Representation: The World is its Best Model 
(Brooks 1998, p. 139). 
However, as another scientist Ziemke suggests, it is far from clear what kind of 
body is actually required for embodied cognition (Ziemke 2001). Although he agrees 
with Pfeifer’s view “that intelligence requires a physical body is not at all as accepted 
as one might think” (p. 1), others like Wilson consider it problematic that there is such 
an enormous variety of definitions of the term embodiment and of its relation to 
cognition (Wilson 2002). Perhaps this is why artists are attracted to the term, but I 
would imagine that the real attraction for creative artists resides in embodiment’s 
empirical formulation, its relation to phenomenology, and how it implies the process 
of learning by doing. In the course of building a robot within the methodological 
framework of nouvelle AI, one will aim to produce a behaving robot and not a model 
of behaviour with these connotations of embodiment. Artists might shy away from 
complex control systems and look instead into materials and intuitive ways of making 
things move. In my conversations with Pfeifer we have agreed on many instances 
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where the artistic process of making robotic art is similar to those found in AI 
laboratories. Some of these same methodologies from Pfeifer’s canons have been 
appropriated to make several of the works included in this thesis.  
 
3.2.2. Pfeifer’s Canons in: How the body shapes the way we think 
Pfeifer maintains an approach he calls “learning-by-doing”: a synthetic 
methodology that emphasizes the importance of building a physical artefact in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of a natural system. Within the development of this 
methodology, he presents a series of design principles for agents. These are:  
1) The Three Constituents Principle: definition of an ecological niche, definition 
of behaviours and design of the agent. An ecological niche exploits the 
environment to create a competence (such as water for fish buoyancy and 
swimming). 
2) The Complete Agent Principle: 
a. Agents are subject to the laws of physics (energy dissipation, friction, 
gravity). 
b. They generate sensory stimulation through motion and generally 
through interaction with the real world. 
c. They affect the environment through behaviour. 
d. They are complex dynamic systems which, when they interact with the 
environment, have attractor states. 
e. They perform morphological computation. 
3) Cheap Design: Design must be parsimonious and exploit the physics and 
constraints of the agent's ecological niche.  
4) Redundancy: Agent-different subsystems function on the basis of different 
physical processes, and there is partial overlap of functionality between the 
different subsystems. 
5) Sensory-motor coordination: enables an agent to interact efficiently with its 
environment and to structure its sensory input. Both the agent's morphology 
and its material properties provide physical constraints to significantly simplify 
the implementation of control architectures. 
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6) Ecological Balance: The capabilities of an agent’s morphology (shape, 
material properties) and its sensor, motor and neural systems have to be 
carefully balanced. The capabilities are all ecologically balanced vis-à-vis their 
ecological niche. Control is not limited to the neural system (or the control 
program) but rather distributed among all these components.  
7) Parallel, Loosely Coupled Processes: Intelligence emerges from a large 
number of parallel processes that are often coordinated through embodiment, 
in particular via the embodied interaction with the environment. 
8) Value: Agents are equipped with a value system, which constitutes a basic set 
of assumptions about what is good for the agent. 
3.2.3. Morphological Computing 
In traditional robotics, scientists start with particular body morphology and 
then the robot is animated and controlled to perform certain tasks. In such cases, there 
are clear separations between the brain (software) and the body (hardware). When the 
morphology and the materials take over some of the functions normally attributed to 
the control (brain), Pfeifer calls the phenomenon “morphological computation” 
(Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 2007). The main argument is that this computation cannot be 
understood simply by looking at brain mechanisms and their controls; it is the result of 
a physical interaction of the robot’s body in and with the physical world.  
The broader field of “natural computing” is also used in this context. It implies 
borrowing from nature, particularly nature’s capacity to repair itself, to evolve and to 
adapt. In a more specific way, natural computing also means to leave the digital 
symbolic representations and models found in computer machinery behind. Instead of 
calculating an equation or a model, turning the digital computer into an analogue 
computer would then be able to measure the answer. For example, a typical scheme 
might operate from a question that is later turned into a model, then the model is 
programmed and calculated, and this results in the answer to the question. A natural 
computing scheme, however, utilizes an analogy to the question by “building” it, and 
seeks its answer in terms of observing and measuring this object (Lazere and Shasha 
2010, p. 194). The fundamental issue here is that researchers build an object in the 
world that serves the purpose of measuring or modeling some part of it. For instance, 
modeling a natural phenomenon could require a differential equation, however, one 
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that measures the phenomenon sees how the differential equation behaves without 
actually developing the equation. 
The most cited and striking examples of morphological computation are found 
in walking robots. If rigid limbs are replaced and controlled with motors via a system 
of springs inspired by biological muscle-tendon tandems, control of gait becomes as 
simple as controlling a periodic movement. Pfeifer claims that with this type of control 
of the dynamics of locomotion, “[if ] properly interpreted, as an exploitation of 
constraints, “cheap design” can be applied to more complex behaviours” (Iida and 
Pfeifer 2004, p. 120). For instance, elastic components of legs can provide properties 
of self-stabilization during locomotion. Furthermore, passive elasticity in the body 
may do more than alleviate control duties: it can also achieve energy–efficient, rapid 
locomotion. In sum, exploiting intrinsic natural dynamics (in this case, natural applies 
not only to the biological but also to the artificial) means simpler control and less 
neural processing. 
This idea of empowering body dynamics emerged from research on passive 
dynamic walkers, which are purely mechanical devices. These artefacts have 
demonstrated that given proper environmental conditions (e.g. a slope, gravity, 
friction) and with very little computation or actuation, biped walking is possible. Since 
robots of this kind must be designed alongside their environment in order to function, 
their ecological niche is very narrow. Hence Pfeifer warns that: “the more the specific 
environmental conditions are exploited – and the passive dynamic walker is an 
extreme case – the more the agent’s success will be contingent upon them”   (Pfeifer 
and Gómez 2009, p. 80). 
When researcher Martijn Wisse designed a bipedal robot called Denise, he 
widened this ecological niche by generating gait impulses from motors, yet he still  
retained the use of the passive forward swing of the leg (Wisse, Feliksdal et al. 2007). 
In recent years, when presenting my doctoral research, I have usually referred to two 
bipedal robots, showing videos of Denise moving next to a Honda Asimo 
demonstration. I do not mention anything about the concepts of passive walkers. 
Because Asimo can climb stairs and simultaneously change the speed of its gait, it 
should be seen as more “competent”. Unanimously, audiences find Denise more 
“natural” and animate while Asimo feels more animated. When I reveal to the 
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audience that the blue bucket on top of Denise is not a computer with a program (or 
“brain”), audiences are stunned that such behaviour can be driven by the dynamic 
inherent in the object alone. 
 
Figure 41 Bipedal robots. Denise (2004) by Martijn Wisse and Asimo (Honda 
corporation, 2000) 
Permission to reproduce theses image has been granted by IEEE and Creative Commons. 
This type of morphological computing resonates with Kleist’s view of the 
puppet, where the dynamics rule the behaviour of the object (De Man 1984). When 
Steve Tellis discusses puppet manipulation, he considers that movements exclusive to 
their morphology can create the illusion of life. This more easily encourages the 
audience to accept the living existence of an otherwise inanimate object (Tellis 1992). 
In relation to dance theatre, when choreographer Susan Leigh Foster presents “the 
perceived, the ideal and the demonstrative body”, she is looking for a meat-and-bones 
approach to discourses and practices that instruct it (Foster 1986). This “perceived 
body” is a tangible physical body forming itself via training, attempting to reach the 
aesthetically ideal body. “The demonstrative body” mediates the acquisition of skills 
by exemplifying correct or incorrect movements. Therefore, “the perceived body” is 
natural computing in action. These influences are reflected in my own work, as I shall 
explain later. 
3.2.4. Aligning Control and Body: Performing without Thinking 
Another influence is that embodied artificial intelligence reaffirms the role of 
the body building the construction of complex behaviours. In other words, the design 
of the body and the process of “animation” have to be integrated (Kaplan and Oudeyer 
2008). Machine performers that subscribe to the principle of ecological balance can 
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behave because of their intrinsic materials and the complex dynamics of their structure 
in motion. Such a paradigm is similar to the psychophysical relation found in theatre 
acting methods, where behaviour and emotions are inherently physically grounded.  
Actually, this “outsourcing” of behavioural and emotional models into physical 
constructions is similar to the creative process of making Kinetic Art. For example, 
Arthur Ganson’s Thinking Chair reveals virtually clockwork mechanisms and 
components to the viewer. Nor does this project need a computer or any interaction 
with the outside environment: it remains in its own world. Hence, the behaviour of the 
object can be seen as a deterministic series of actions, much like the old Jacquet-Droz 
androids of the 16th century. However, there is a delicate tension between the main 
protagonist (in this case a chair) and its invented world, and hence a slight departure 
from this determinism. For the audience, the very interaction of the machine 
performer, when it rubs against an abrasive stone, creates a walking gait that feels 
“integrated” within its actual body. Regardless of the highly complex Rube Goldberg 
mechanism attached to the chair, the viewer believes that this chair is indeed strolling 
round and round like Sisyphus hefting his stone endlessly up a mountain. In this 
example, the automatic nature of the system is deliberately presented, nonetheless, a 
perceived agency from the actor is also observed. Even though, this work would fall 
into “the Uncanny Valley” category for some, its strongly metaphorical image would 
prevent this for others. Nevertheless, the audience tends to suspend disbelief and 
engage with the enchantment of this embodied world. 
 
Figure 42. Arthur Ganson’s Thinking Chair (2007) and Max Dean's Robotic Chair 
(1985-2006) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the authors. 
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Like Arthur Ganson’s chair, the “Limping Machine” of La Cour des Miracles 
expresses an endless attempt to undermine a deliberately installed poor gait. This 
behaviour can be attributed not only to the unstable equilibrium of the construction, 
but also to its staging. The introduction of a latent failure in the gait not only creates a 
poetic moment for the audience, but also gives a supplementary spark of life to the 
object, proposing it simultaneously as a social robot. Similarly, the “Beggar” that I 
presented in Chapter 1, had no experience of misery from being poor. Its shape was 
only a square box (symbol of a chest) that could rock over a hinge (an imploring body 
language). This researcher focused on a cheap design paradigm, in other words he 
exploited an ecological niche through an ecological balance in the object’s 
morphology with accompanying sensing, control and (finally) dramaturgy. 
In sum, designing the control structure to be closer to the object’s morphology 
helps the animated body to feel more animate. In machine performers the body should 
be animate instead of animated, intentional instead of functional, phenomenal instead 
of mechanical, and – as will be further discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis – it should 
have a strong as opposed to a weak presence.  
3.3. Embodiment 
 In 2008, philosopher Mark Johnson surprised many people by suggesting that 
only thirty years ago in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy “people did not have 
bodies” (Johnson 2008).  This attitude was reflected in the cybernetics view where the 
role of the body was marginalized. Here, signals and models were considered to be an 
abstract representation that existed in an abstract form independent of their biological 
carrier. In the last 30 years, Emily Martin notes that the increased interest in the body 
might also be due to the contemporary historical moment in which “we are undergoing 
fundamental changes in how our bodies are organized and experienced” (Martin 1992, 
p. 121). According to Csordas, “the kind of body we have been accustomed in 
scholarly and popular thought alike, is typically assumed to be affixed, material entity 
subject to the empirical rules of biological science, existing prior to the mutability and 
flux of cultural change and diversity and characterized by unchangeable inner 
necessities” [sic]  (Csordas 1994) . In his book Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark 
criticized the cybernetic model because it offered narrow views on our own carrier, the 
body: 
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Fortunately for us, human minds are not old-fashioned CPUs trapped in immutable 
and increasingly feeble corporeal shells. Instead they are surprisingly plastic minds of 
profoundly embodied agents: agents whose boundaries […] are forever negotiable and 
from whom body, sensing, thinking and reasoning are all woven flexibly and 
repeatably from the accommodating weave of situated, intentional action. (Clark 
2008), p. 43) 
In other words, the body changed from a simple fact of nature, to one with a 
history, an experiencing agent, and finally to one that rethinks the distinction between 
sex and gender. Csordas concluded “The contemporary cultural transformation of the 
body can be conceived not only in terms of consumer culture and biological 
essentialism but also in discerning an ambiguity in the boundaries of corporeality 
itself” (Csordas 1994).  
This transition suggests that attitudes towards phenomenology may also have 
changed since cybernetic days. For example, when Gallagher takes stock of the 
phenomenological future, he concludes that:  
Phenomenology will continue to be an important player in the ongoing debates about 
the nature of mind, agency, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity. Embodied and enactive 
accounts will continue to borrow heavily from established phenomenological concepts 
and will push forward to new phenomenological insights. (Gallagher 2012, p. 314) 
Nonetheless, he warns that:  
phenomenology will continue to struggle to define itself and its methods, 
incorporating new methods, and being incorporated into different methodological 
settings, especially in the cognitive sciences. (Gallagher 2012, p. 314)  
What this research into embodiment is about is, therefore, mainly finding a rationale 
that can situate both the emergence of meaning and the grounds for human perception 
in the movements of machine performers. 
3.3.1. Csorda’s classification 
Csordas points out three approaches that are characteristic to the anthropology 
of the body (Csordas 1994): the analytical body, the topical body and the multiple 
body.   
1. The analytical body. This suggests a discrete focus on perception, practice, 
parts, processes and products. Perception here is defined as the cultural use 
and conditioning of the five senses plus proprioception.  Practice denotes the 
classic notion of techniques of the body in motion.  Parts can regroup as 
© Demers 2014 Embodiment 
 
 149 
anatomical constituents and bodily processes (such as in breathing). Finally, 
bodily products like blood, sweat and tears can also be analysed.  
2. The topical body is about the understanding of the body with regard to specific 
domains of cultural activity. Issues such as body and gender, body and 
technology and body and trauma are among Csordas’ examples.  
3. He suggests that the body is more than the sum of its topics, so in his third 
category, multiple body, the number of bodies depends on how many of its 
aspects one cares to recognize. Accordingly, bodies can be simultaneously 
analysed as social, physical, individual, or socio-political, or on a curve from 
the commercialization of the body’s needs to the relevant social institutions – 
in other words as analogues to bodily organs. 
With respect to this classification Csordas boldly claims: “Yet of all the formal 
definitions of the [sic] culture that have been proposed by anthropologists, none have 
taken seriously the idea that culture is grounded in the human body” (p. 6). 
3.3.2. Johnson’s classification 
In another classification by theorist Mark Johnson, embodiment can be 
analysed from various perspectives. The term spans a wide spectrum of definitions and 
interpretations of the body, from the functional to the cultural. Johnson posits five 
interwoven levels of embodiment derived from other theorists that are reported here 
because I wish to describe their counterparts in robotic projects. Johnson emphasizes 
that each of the levels he suggests is irreducible and claims that they are an 
explanation for the bodily dimensions of everything human (Johnson 2008): 
1. The Body as Biological Organism. The body is a functional biological 
organism with sensing and motoric systems. It can perceive, sense, move, 
respond and finally transform the environment (Dewey 1981). 
2. The Ecological Body. The body does not exist independent of the environment. 
The organism and the environment are not two separate, nor two fully 
integrated things (Dewey 1981; Merleau-Ponty 1962). Both organism and 
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environment bring their own structure and pre-established identity into the 
interaction that is experience. 
3. The Phenomenological Body. This is our body as we live and experience it. It 
involves at least three aspects: body percept, body concept and body affect 
(Gallagher 1995). The body awareness lies in proprioception (our feeling of 
our bodily posture and orientation), kinaesthetic sensations of bodily 
movement, and internal bodily states, the felt sense of ourselves (Damasio 
1999). 
4. The Social Body. The human environment goes beyond the physical or the 
biological. It is also composed of relations and experiences of the social other. 
The body does not come fully formed, and it is shaped by social interactions. 
5. The Cultural Body. Cultural artefacts, practices, institutions, rituals, and modes 
of interaction that transcend and shape any particular body and any particular 
bodily action also constitute our bodies.  
Because these levels span many theories they seem appropriate to my own work, as I 
will demonstrate later. But first it may be necessary to take another classification into 
account. 
3.3.3.  Ziemke’s Classification. 
Cognitive Scientist Tom Ziemke also attempted to disentangle the many 
notions of embodiment (Ziemke 2003). He cited numerous concepts, emerging since 
the mid 80s from both AI and cognitive science literature covering the embodied 
mind, embodied AI, embodied intelligence and embodied cognition. Furthermore, 
Ziemke himself added many other expressions from his own publications about his 
own concerns, such as mechanistic embodiment, natural embodiment, and situated 
embodiment. However, although there is now general acceptance that any form of 
natural or artificial intelligence requires a body (Pfeifer and Scheier 1999), it is far 
from clear what kind of body is required. While Ziemke aims at redefining the body 
from the perspective of cognition, many of his examples stem from nouvelle AI, 
where embodiment is more concrete and immediate. In the following list, Ziemke 
articulates and compares six different notions of embodiment: 
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1. Structural coupling between agent and environment. This is the broadest 
notion to qualify a “system” as embodied through its mutual interaction with 
the environment Here he cites Quick who formally describes this coupling: 
A system X is embodied in an environment E if perturbatory channels exist between 
the two. That means, X is embodied in E if for every time t at which both X and E 
exist, some subset of E’s possible states with respect to X have the capacity to perturb 
X’s state, and some subset of X’s possible states with respect to E have the capacity to 
perturb E’s state. (Quick, Dautenhahn et al. 1999) 
2. Historical embodiment as the result of a history of structural coupling. This 
historical embodiment reflects the course of the construction of the body 
structurally coupled in the environment. Furthermore, according to Riegler : 
“A system is embodied if it has gained competence within the environment in 
which it has developed” (Riegler 2002). 
3. Physical embodiment.  So far, given the first two definitions, systems such as 
virtual software agents could be defined as embodied. Physical embodiment 
restricts the notions of embodied systems to the concept of a physical body. An 
even more restrictive definition of physical embodiment might come from its 
connection to the environment (perturbatory channels). Brooks refers to 
physical grounding as interactions not only from physical forces but also from 
sensors and motors. (Brooks 1990). 
Joining the above notions, living systems are a particular instance of physically 
embodied systems: they are also historically embodied, as many physical 
systems are not. Although historical embodiment and physical embodiment can 
both be considered special cases of structural coupling, neither of these two 
notions includes or excludes the other. 
4. Organismoid embodiment, i.e. organism-like bodily form (e.g., humanoid 
robots). Organismoid embodiment links organism-like cognitions to organism-
like bodies. Such bodies would have similarities with the sensorimotor 
capacities of living bodies. This notion of embodiment covers both living 
organisms and their artificial counterparts. However, an artificial organismoid 
– as opposed to the living organismoid – is the product of human design and 
not usually of an historical embodiment. 
Embodiment © Demers 2014 
 
152 
5. Organismic embodiment of autopoietic, living systems. This notion limits the 
role of embodiment for cognition not merely to physical, organism-like bodies 
but  to living bodies. Rooted in the biology of cognition from Von Uexküll 
(1928), cognition is what living systems do in interaction with their 
environment and it depends on an historically created basis for reactions. 
Machines, at least at that time, would hardly qualify for organismic 
embodiment due to their lack of growth and fixed structures. In other words, 
machines act according to plans fixed by their human designer while living 
organisms are “acting” plans.  
6. Social embodiment. This addresses the role of embodiment in social 
interactions rather than questions what kind of body is needed for a specific 
type of cognition. This discussion is somehow orthogonal to the above notions. 
For instance, in social interactions we can observe how embodiment effects 
such as bodily states in others produce bodily mimicry in the self (Barsalou, 
Niedenthal et al. 2003). 
3.3.4. Mechanistic versus phenomenal embodiment. 
In a paper about the extreme poles of robotic embodiment, roboticist Noel 
Sharkey and cognitive scientist Tom Ziemke make a point that bears on the types of 
embodiment found in theatre performances (Sharkey and Ziemke 2001). They argue 
that “many of the new roboticists drift between poles of the mechanistic and the 
phenomenal”, and continue: 
In a mechanistic embodiment, cognition is embodied in the control architecture of a 
sensing an acting machine. […] This is similar to the notion of physicalism in which 
the physical states of a machine are considered to be its mental state, i.e., there is no 
subjectivity. (p. 253) 
Of course, even the nouvelle AI robot, despite its situatedness and embodiment, does 
not actually experience the world. Some authors compare this experience of the “real 
world” with robots whose navigation is electronically controlled by digital tape (i.e. by 
the designer). They judiciously contrast examples that simulate (or model) embodied 
cognition via mechanistic embodiment with phenomenal embodiment. In other words, 
these machines neither have their own sensation nor a body to experience the world 
directly. The embodiment of a mental or subjective world is called “phenomenal” 
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embodiment. Rooted in Uexküll theoretical biology and Umwelt theory, “the 
organism’s components are forged into a coherent unit that acts as a behavioural 
entity. It is a subject that through functional embedding, forms a ‘systematic whole’ 
with its Umwelt.” (p. 255). This factor is relevant to the design of new machine 
performers because it is the observer that counts. 
Sharkey and Ziemke rightfully state that the meanings of the robot’s actions 
are in the observer’s rather than in the robot’s world. To illustrate their point they tell 
the story of Clever Hans (Pfungst 1965), a horse that could perform mental arithmetic, 
but whose answers were in reality given by means of visual cues from a bystander. As 
soon as machine performers could be as mesmerizing as Clever Hans to the audience, 
their stage value was guaranteed. This certainly recalls the mechanical lures I talked 
about in Chapter 1. While I as a designer understand the behaviours of the machine 
performers that I have created, my own mapping as an observer also counts. My aim 
here is to argue that this mapping is a kind of communality containing a potential for 
identification, and that this constitutes a supplementary reason for providing a social 
and cultural body (as part of my own definition of embodiment) for the machine 
performer. 
3.3.5. Embodiment in this thesis 
Because of its simplicity, I will mainly utilize Johnson’s five levels of 
embodiment where I will loosely cluster the first three levels, the biological, the 
ecological and the phenomenal body under the roof of either physical (for the stage 
discussion) or ecological (for the nouvelle AI discussion) embodiment. Furthermore, I 
will refer to the upper levels of social and cultural embodiment mainly as “social 
embodiment”. To collate Johnson’s levels with the embodiment levels and techniques 
found in nouvelle AI, I can freely equate the following points: 
1. The Body as Biological Organism. This is similar to the sensorimotor 
principle: the mechanical body with its mechatronic systems. There is body 
schema to enable sensorimotor coupling. I consider that the body of a machine 
performer functions at this level. 
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2. The Ecological Body. Morphological computing is due here to the close 
interaction of the robot body with the environment. Machine performers may 
need a strong ecological niche, possibly emphasized by the turning of a failure 
into normal machine behaviour. 
3. The Phenomenological Body. Not many phenomenal bodies are found in 
nouvelle AI. What might be perceived as a phenomenal body could be due to 
bias in the observer’s perception. For a designer, this is where the body image 
seems to appear inside the subject inside the foundation of the body schema. 
This can occur when a machine performer is subjectively coordinated by a 
human operator who can alter its behaviours or add to its movements by 
carefully observing its body dynamics. 
4. The Social Body. A social robotics researcher will create scenarios for his or 
her agent such as a care-taker, a toy for an infant, a coffee waiter or a 
receptionist. While social robotics at lower levels of embodiment is often 
based on bodily gestures, superimposing higher levels of intelligence will tend 
to implement higher social roles.  
5. The Cultural Body. Though some consider social robotics to be part of the 
cultural body, I would consider that robots by artists are the main 
representatives of this level, since artists are trained in poetic metaphors and 
abstraction.  
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Summarizing, the following analysis presents my four machine performers in 
relation to the three different theorists on the theme of embodiment: 
Practice Embodiment 
Csordas 
Embodiment 
Johnson 
Embodiment 
Ziemke 
La Cour des 
Miracles 
Analytical in 
morphologies, 
movements and sound. 
 
Topical in the 
production of pain. 
 
Multiple in ontological 
questioning 
Biological in sensors and 
effectors. 
Ecological in subsumption 
and morphological 
computing. 
Social and cultural in the 
mise-en-scène of a freak 
show. 
Historical embodiment in 
morphology and staging. 
 
Social embodiment in 
characters and mise-en-
scène. 
Blind Robot Analytical in the 
physicality of touch. 
 
Topical in recognizing 
the robot as blind. 
Phenomenological in the 
presence of the operator in the 
loop. 
Social and cultural in the 
acceptance of being touched 
by a blind person. 
A blind person as social 
embodiment. 
 
Historical in the 
competence of the 
operator. 
 
Organismic embodiment 
in the hidden operator. 
Area V5 Topical in the role of 
the gaze. 
 
Multiple as seen from 
the eyes of the Uncanny 
Valley. 
Biological in the capacity to 
track and follow people. 
 
Ecological in the replication 
of skulls. 
 
Cultural in the icons of death 
and clinical displays 
Physical in its gazing 
capacities. 
 
Social in the interaction 
with the gaze from the 
audience. 
Tiller Girls Analytical in dancing. 
 
Topical in performing. 
 
Multiple if we collate 
performance theory 
with machine 
performers. 
Ecological in the 
morphological computing of 
balance. 
 
Phenomenological as they are 
triggered live by an operator. 
 
Cultural in the icon of the 
Tiller Girls. 
Historical embodiment. 
 
Social embodiment with 
the Tiller Girls analogy. 
 
Historical in the 
competence of the 
operator. 
 
Devolution Analytical in dancing, 
swarming, walking. 
 
Topical if we 
contextualize these 
movements within a 
human performance. 
 
Multiple if we compare 
human and machine 
performers. 
Ecological in the diversity of 
machine species. 
 
Ecological in the use of 
swarms. 
 
Morphological computing 
with the augmented body of 
the dancer with mechanical 
extensions. 
 
Cultural in humans and 
machines sharing the stage. 
Social embodiment. 
 
Big Bot and the Swarm 
are organismoids. 
 
 
Historical embodiment in 
the prosthesis from the 
host dancer. 
 
Table 12. Contributing works and their embodiment 
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In order to explore a deeper analysis of embodiment in relation to AI and also a 
larger definition of the term, I will use two of my machine performer projects: The 
Tiller Girls and The Blind Robot. 
3.4. The Tiller Girls 
As already described in the Introduction, The Tiller Girls is a live robotic 
performance comprising a group of identical autonomous robots. Originally, the Tiller 
Girls robots were developed by scientist Fumiya Iida and refined by Raja David and 
Max Lungarella of the Artificial Intelligence Lab, Zurich. Nicknamed Stumpy, the 
resultant robot was constructed to study locomotion and gaits derived from simplified 
morphologies. These morphologies, in turn, generated a fairly rich set of movements.  
When I visited the Zurich AI Lab and went through their online video 
documentations, I was initially interested in the performative values of this 
minimalistic and rather mechanomorphic machine. I often build arrays of machines, so 
an array of Stumpies was an inspiring thought. I must state here that the idea of 
making an ensemble of dancing robots based on the Stumpies was initiated prior to 
labelling the group “The Tiller Girls”. 
While I was searching about machines on stage from the perspective of 
performance theory, I encounter theatre theorist Phillip Auslander’s essay on the 
performative values of robots (Auslander 2006). Auslander nuanced the performative 
skills of humans in a range from the technical to the interpretive. He then based his 
analysis on the Tiller Girls, which he considered mechanistic and solely technical. For 
me the Stumpies possessed a singular flare for interpretation, and I found myself 
proceeding in the opposite direction to Auslander: on the basis of a mechanical 
ensemble, typically considered by humans as purely technical performers, I wanted to 
demonstrate the interpretive potentials emerging from morphological computing. 
Furthermore, by appropriating the performance of the 1930s Tiller Girls, I 
would not only have a title with multiple associations, but also – by framing the live 
performance as a dance performance – a background canvas for a theoretical and 
theatrical analysis of the movement of machine performers. In order to make this 
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adaptation, I had to study how humans performed as dancing machines and how 
machines might be perceived as dancing (beyond operability).   
First, therefore, I will analyse the process of Stumpy’s development and how it 
was described and envisioned by its researcher-developers. What are Stumpy’s 
intended behaviours? What is the background of the Tiller Girls, and what do they 
symbolize in the machine world and in performance theory?  Finally, I will examine 
how I transformed Stumpy into my own set of machine performers.  
By transferring Stumpy onto the stage I aimed to bring a new function to the 
robot. As I claimed in Chapters 1 and 2, an animate machine is perceived differently 
from an animated machine, so I will show how the function of walking and hopping, 
from the original Stumpy was shifted to dancing. This shift is more than a mere 
reformulation of functionality; it is about the machine performing to an audience who 
read its body as a social entity relating to performance history. My main goal was to 
differentiate between a functional machine seen within the AI context and a 
performing machine seen on the theatrical stage. The embodiment for AI is limited to 
the physical context, while in performances, social and cultural levels of embodiment 
are easier to design. The resultant machine performers not only perform movements 
on the stage, they become gendered because they unfold a direct reference to history. 
3.4.1. Stumpy: an Embodied AI Experiment 
In early AI publications by its researchers, an anatomical image of Stumpy’s 
morphology is provided thus:  
Its mechanical structure consists of a rigid inverted T-shape mounted on four compliant feet. 
An upright “T” structure is connected to this by a rotary joint. The horizontal beam of the 
upright “T” is connected to the vertical beam by a second rotary joint. (Iida, Dravid et al. 2002, 
p. 2141; Paul, Dravid et al. 2002) 
The type of language used here is reminiscent of many current locomotion studies for 
one, two and four–legged hopping robots. These morphologies, along with proper 
control, would generate various gaits including stunt-like somersaults performed by 
one-legged machines. For example, a robot called Big Dog became a popular icon24 
for these hopping researches and the flagship demonstration of its stabilization 
                                                
24 One Video posted on YouTube, from the manufacturer Boston Dynamics, has more than 13 millions hits. 
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capabilities, particularly when violently kicked by a researcher onto its side. While Big 
Dog resembles a quadruped and exhibits remarkable locomotion skills, Stumpy’s 
abstract, simplistic shape enables it to achieve a surprising range of gaits with unique 
characteristics: 
 
 
Figure 43. Stumpy photograph and schematic- AI Lab 2 (Iida, Dravid et al. 2002, p. 
2142) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the authors. 
Stumpy achieves locomotion by using the inverted pendulum to induce rhythmic 
hopping and by using the traverse rotational movements to generate directional 
control: 
Using this two degrees of freedom mechanical structure, with simple reactive control, 
the robot is able to perform hopping, walking and running gaits. During walking, it is 
experimentally shown that the robot can move in a straight line, reverse direction and 
control its turning radius. The results show that such a simple but versatile robot 
displays stable locomotion and can be viable for practical applications on uneven 
terrain. (Iida, Dravid et al. 2002, p. 2141) [sic] 
The above-mentioned papers on Stumpy cover the array of potential values for 
the respective frequencies of almost any waist and shoulder actuators and their 
outcome as gaits, including forward and backward walking and turning left or right. It 
is also observed that these gaits can be modulated by speed and radius respectively. It 
is fundamental to note that this robot does not actually have legs; or, more specifically, 
it does not use legs for locomotion. The only body segment that is actuated is the 
upper body. When static, Stumpy has a rather rigid presence: a “T” shape on a stand. 
One can see it is a legless machine where only the torso and shoulders can move, or as 
a pendulum (ending with a “T”) that bounces around.  Zurich AI Lab’s video 
documentations clearly show the reaction of the experimenter, who seems to succumb 
to a certain charm emanating from the robot (see DVD 4). In 2007, in How The Body 
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Shapes The Way We Think,  Pfeifer finally included “dancing” in his description of 
Stumpy’s gaits (Iida, Dravid et al. 2002, p. 2142). Before this, Iida, Dravid and Paul 
had not mentioned dance in any paper or thesis concerned with Stumpy’s locomotion 
(Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 2007).  
The results of embodied AI often start from models of physical agent 
behaviours without a complete hypothesis. In Stumpy, the behavioural model was 
turned into a physical construct where the apparent jumping actions emerge from the 
machine’s interaction with the physical world. This is cleverly realized with minimal 
computational effort and representational models. For example, Stumpycan also 
balance sideways, regaining equilibrium due to its low centre of gravity and soft feet 
(see gait videos on DVD 4).   
 
 
Figure 44. Stumpy’s ecological balance demonstrated in comics in Pfeifer’s book 
(Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 2007, p. 133) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by MIT Press. 
The idea of empowering body dynamics was also influenced by research on 
Passive Dynamic Walkers. These constructs have demonstrated that, given proper 
environmental conditions like a slope or a surface of friction, biped walking is 
possible without computation or actuators. Since this kind of robot is designed to 
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directly relate to its environment, its ecological niche is very narrow. Because of this 
interaction between the body and the control dynamics of locomotion, Pfeifer claims 
that if “properly interpreted, as exploitation of constraints, ‘cheap design’ can be 
applied to more complex behaviours” (Pfeifer, Bongard et al. 2007, p. 133). For 
instance, elastic components for legs can provide properties of self-stabilization during 
the locomotion process. Moreover, passive elasticity in the body can achieve energy-
efficient and rapid locomotion, as well as alleviating control duties. This argument is 
geared towards Iida and Pfeifer’s main conclusion: “the functions of the system are no 
longer separable from the constraints derived from embodiment, if the behaviour of 
the robots highly depends on its body dynamics: there is no longer a clear separation 
of hardware and control” (p. 127). Stability is thus related here to simplicity of control. 
That Stumpy is statically and dynamically stable is exemplified by an exhaustive 
coverage of the control inputs of the two joints. Part of this dynamic stability is 
achieved by the springy property of its base. While exhibiting gaits, Stumpy does not 
have sensors to recognize its global states, nor, therefore, does it have any knowledge 
about the behaviour it is currently involved in, whether walking or hopping. The only 
feedback is within its motors, enabling it to perform a synchronized oscillation of its 
two joints.  
The following two figures resume various gaits obtained by varying amplitude 
and angles of Stumpy’s joints. In the lateral bounding, the shoulder joint is set at a 30 
degree angle. Among various gaits, the first distribution matrix reveals walking 
patterns, just as the second (the lateral bounding experiment) reveals turning patterns. 
It is also noteworthy that failure is coterminous here with instability or falling.  
However, Iida does not consider how the variation within each gait bears on Stumpy’s 
rationale and related argumentation. There is, I would argue, considerable potential in 
the robot’s different walking qualities: higher frequency in a joint, for example, would 
increase walking energy.  
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Figure 45. Gait distribution diagram 
Shadings indicate different gaits: “4”: Hopping, “3”: Walking, “2”: Shuffling, “1”: 
Unstable, and “0”: Fall. (Iida and Pfeifer 2004, p. 122) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the author. 
 
 
Figure 46. Gait distribution (lateral bounding) 
“6”: Hopping to Right, “5”: Hopping and Stay, “4”: Hopping to Left, “3”: Shuffling to 
Right, “2”: Shuffling and Stay, “1”: Shuffling to Left, and “0”:Fall. (Iida and Pfeifer 
2004, p. 122) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the author. 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Gait analysis 
Three typical gaits, Shuffling (Top),Walking (Middle), and Hopping (Bottom). 
Each diagram includes time series values of pressure sensors on the right foot 
(top), the left foot (middle) and the angle between the upper and lower bodies 
(bottom). (Iida 2005, p. 53) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by the author. 
 
The Tiller Girls © Demers 2014 
 
162 
3.4.2. From Stumpy to the Tiller Girls 
So what might the Tiller Girls dance group represent in the view of humanities 
scholarship and performance theory? They were famous for their precision kick line 
dance motion. These precise synchronized steps include rows of dancers with their 
arms around each other waists to maintain balance, while they kick their legs up high 
in the air. The Tiller Girls represented uniformed bodies in perfect synchronicity and 
this would erase the audience perception of the individual; so they could be perceived 
as a mass-performing object (see Figure 48). 
 
 
Figure 48. The Tiller Girls chorus line up (TheTillerGirls 1967) 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by the Tiller family. 
 
 
Figure 49. The robotic Tiller Girls chorus line up (Demers 2010) 
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Most academic writing about the Tiller Girls refers to this object as a “The 
Mass Ornament” (Kracauer 1995). As covered in the first chapter, many artistic 
movements tended to depict the human as machine, an attitude that was influenced by 
the Industrial Revolution and body culture. Thus Kracauer observed: 
In the domain of body culture, which also covers the illustrated newspapers, tastes have been 
quietly changing. The process began with the Tiller Girls. These products of American 
distraction factories are no longer individual girls, but indissoluble girl clusters whose 
movements are demonstrations of mathematics. As they condense into figures in the revues, 
performances of the same geometric precision are taking place in what is always the same 
packed stadium ... One need only glance at the screen to learn that the ornaments are composed 
of thousands of bodies, sexless bodies in bathing suits. The regularity of their patterns is 
cheered by the masses, themselves arranged by the stands in tier upon ordered tier. (Kracauer 
1995) 
 
Sigfried Kracaeur also saw an analogy between the patterns of a stage 
performance and the conditions of assembly-line production: “The hands in the factory 
correspond to the legs of the Tiller Girls”  (Kracauer 1995). He read the geometry of 
human limbs as an allegory, a staging of disenchantment in which mass ornament 
presents itself as a cult of the physical, mythological but devoid of meaning – an 
emotion that appealed to me for my own work. 
In a dissertation on the Tiller Girls, art historian Kristina Schlosser looks at the 
live components of this ornament, suggesting that these bodies no longer possess a life 
substance, but instead serve as cogs in a huge machine:  
The overall emphasis, when a large group of individuals are gathered together, is a patterned, 
geometric aesthetic in which the particular human units are subsumed and blended together. In 
agreeance, Kracaeur [sic] refers to a loss of “natural substance” creating the effect of removing 
the individual’s personality, humanness, and uniqueness in order for this seamless mass 
ornament to take priority. This then not only induces the individual into anonymity but also 
superficially presents the mass ornament as a large force of humanity. (Schlosser 2011,pp. 3-4) 
Schlosser continues with her analogy of the machine and replication: “Each Tiller Girl 
was selected for the chorus line based on similar height, weight, and stature. They 
performed standardized moves, such as the can-can, choreographed into exact 
precision with the whole group” (p. 4) – in other words, the Girls were interdependent. 
She also suggests that: “The machine aesthetic performed by the dancers was meant to 
influence the physical and emotional responses to technology from anxious, scared, 
and fearful to more positive amazement and awe of the spectacle of possibility” (p. 
16). In support, Kracauer argues that the Tiller Girls represented both, "an 
ornamentalization of function and a functionalization of ornament”.  
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 This effect has influenced a number of other artists: for example, Theo 
Jansen’s leg mechanisms have become an index (and popular icon) of the repetitive 
line-up of his beach creatures, and he has also suggested that the legs of the Tiller 
Girls are the abstract designation of their bodies (Nakaoka, Nakazawa et al. 2004; 
Ikeuchi 2009; Or 2009). Thus, some of the first robots of the 20th century are dancing 
humanoids. Recently, this interest in moving synchronous robots has been evidenced 
in the skill demonstrations of androids (Jansen 2008). These small humanoids have 
become genderless, harmless, wireless desktop-size versions of Olympic competitors 
who all kick the same way. As Kara Reilly suggests, these “glamorous Ziegfel Follies 
girls were shaped by that uncanny fetish object, Olympia” (Reilly 2011, p. 144).  For 
while the Tiller Girls may be a sleek machine, they can at the same time become a 
mechanical monster in the form of an undulating snake. She points out that “auditions 
for the Tiller Girls did not include any actual dancing but instead consisted of a 
thorough inspection of candidate’s teeth and legs” (p. 145).  The cotton factory served 
as a rehearsal studio, new candidates were placed next to experienced dancers to 
mimic them, and a head girl acted like a foreman and trained the girls with military 
marching. According to Reilly, the origins of the Tiller Girls came directly from the 
cotton mills of England, where workers performed “clog dancing” in syncopathy with 
their machines to escape the boredom of their repetitive tasks.  
3.4.3.  My Aims regarding the Tiller Girls as Machine Performers  
• To explore if the Tiller Girls could become an embodied version of the 
Heider & Simmel experiment (in Chapter 4) 
• To base the design of robots on a well-known gendered set of 
movements.  How does that change the perception of the audience? 
• To investigate the historical embodiment and competence given by 
association with the original Tiller Girls. 
• To see if gender can be constructed through specific corporeal acts 
(theatrical contexts) and therefore be culturally transformed. 
• To explore if dramatizing and reproducing an historical situation can 
become a mode of embodiment inside a current environment. 
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• To build bodies (formulation) and offer dramatics as a way to 
understand how a cultural convention is embodied and enacted by 
machine performers. 
• To differentiate between a functional machine seen from an AI context 
and a performing machine seen from a theatrical perspective. 
The biggest question was: Can the Tiller Girls as machine performers elicit 
behaviours and emotions without a complete computational model? 
3.5. Tiller Girls production and performance 
3.5.1. Adapting Stumpy for The Tiller Girls performance 
When robots are built as an AI experiment they are usually able to function for 
a limited amount of time, and their designers do not have to consider issues from the 
professional side of performing such as touring and fast deployment. Therefore, I 
commissioned these designers to construct adapted versions of Stumpy, so that it was 
1. autonomous, i.e. no umbilical cord to the control computer 
2. each could be optimized to run with at least one-hour batteries 
3. it could be produced in 12 identical copies 
4. they could be wireless networked to control the movement of each robot. 
When a new generation of Stumpies was delivered, I made further 
modifications like: 
1. programming an authoring system under Max/Msp and I ruggedizing the 
Stumpies for the stage (more demanding) 
2. fitting protective covers and fixing the batteries  
3. fixing flaws in the structural design 
4. rebuilding all the electronics so that Stumpies could make demanding 
movements such as falling on the floor 
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5. making 20 more copies to accommodate various versions of the show, i.e. 
12, 21 or 32 robots – these  numbers being derived from the limitations of 
the wireless network. 
3.5.2. Developing the Performance 
My intention was never to literally recreate the chorus line and dancing 
virtuosity of the Tiller Girls. Even if I could have envisioned this scenario, the copies 
of the Stumpy have enough minute differences that after a few minutes, some 
Stumpies did not follow the exact same gait. At best, I could evoke or pastiche short 
moments when the chorus effects of the original Tiller Girls were similar. The first 
performance with the Stumpies was an impromptu event in my laboratory (see Trailer 
on DVD Appendix). I then decide to build the performance as a structural unit where 
the sound, the lighting/visuals and the Tiller Girls’ movements were all improvised 
live.  
In their book on Robert Wilson’s work, Morey and Pardo describe how the 
freedom of the automaton can equally be applied to the spirit of the Tiller Girls’ 
performance:  
If the mechanization of the movement – of all movement, whether it be a gesture, a 
text or a melody – leads to freedom, it is because it opens up a space. While the 
muscular memory reproduces what has been learned, the rest of the body can attend to 
the punctuations of that movement; perhaps it can also think about something else. If 
the automation of the hands, of an arm, or the body that occurs to the vision, is 
liberating, it is because it activates other channels of the body itself. Other muscles – 
the muscle of the forearm or the muscle of the spirit – enter into a movement that may 
not be controlled. (Morey and Pardo 2003, p. 126) 
And, commenting on this same repetitive nature of movements found both in Wilson’s 
theatre and manifestly also in machine performances, they continue:  
The repetition leads to that freedom in which repetition itself is annulled. The freedom 
that is produced by the repetition is converted at the same time into the space in which 
the repeated gesture is successively modified, at times visually, at others as intensive 
charge.  (…) Repeating, repeating and repeating until the body becomes memory, 
muscular memory, involuntary memory. In the repetition the body becomes 
automated, moving by itself. When the body learns in the concentration, it feels, it 
becomes freer. (Morey and Pardo 2003, p. 126) 
When musical score, lighting design and choreographies converge, all the improvisers 
(in this case machine performers) have parcels of phrases for their media that can be 
assembled and manipulated live. The core of the communication between robots, 
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music and visual environment lies in sharing the control signals sent to the Tiller Girls. 
In this sense, music and lights follow the Tiller Girls, not the other way round. In this 
sense the music and visuals are renderings of the Tiller Girls’ internal state.  This is 
similar to the non-narrative, abstract aspects of Wilson’s theatre:  
There are choreographies in which the bodies do not follow a story that has to be 
interpreted, but more instead in terms of a conception of time and space that, for 
Wilson, has its basis in architecture. In these choreographies, too, it is the body in its 
relationship with itself that is modified, as in Cunningham’s compositions, for 
example, where the dancers do not follow an external score but attend instead to their 
own internal music, listening to their own bodies. (Morey and Pardo 2003, p. 126) 
My performance script consisted of the following tableaux for a duration of 
around 30 minutes (depicted in Table 13): turning on the machines and making them 
stand up, a duet followed by group accompaniment, an ensemble, a quartet making a 
drumming session, a duet that deconstructed the Tiller Girls, a reset where I 
repositioned all the robots in a line-up as ornamental figures, followed by chaos and 
extinction. The development of the performance was operated over a series of 
experimental and informal rehearsals. After lab tests, the second phase of 
improvisation was during the CyberLab workshop in St. Polten (Austria) and finally 
two weeks of development and rehearsal in a theatre studio. Each time it was 
performed, the script and results changed because of improvisation sessions during the 
set-up of the work. The performance has been presented at ten venues for more than 
thirty representations and seen by a combined audience of 6000 persons. The 
following table illustrates some stages of these performances. 
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Machine performers - 
Atmospheric / Kinetic Stage  
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First Duet. 
Second Duet. 
Ensemble. 
First duet throws on floor. 
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Ensemble twist sideways. 
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Group of four improvising together 
on drumming sounds. 
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The first duet constantly throws 
itself back on the floor. 
 
Another performer joins the duet. 
 
Ends when the trio is all entangled 
or cant move anymore. 
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V
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Archetype of the Tiller Girls 
formation. 
 
The geometric patterns break. 
 
End when most of the robots have 
collapsed on the floor. 
Table 13. The Tiller Girls Performance Tableaux 
3.6. Stumpy and the Tiller Girls 
In this section, I qualitatively compare, under nine headings, Stumpy as seen by 
nouvelle AI to the Tiller Girls as seen in the contexts of art and theatrical 
performance. Of course I use the word “theatre” liberally: machine performers are 
certainly not dramatic characters in the sense of a theatre play – they are objects that 
move on stage. 
1. Body Morphology and Historical Embodiment. As I have suggested earlier in 
this chapter, morphological computing is about how the shape and function of 
the body changes according to its history and environment. When Ziemke 
discusses how a robot is built, he sees its competence as derived from the 
history of coupling with the environment. In theatre, the performer is 
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constructed historically by the given cultural as well as social connotations of 
the character and by the live audience that perceives and interprets the 
movements and apparent behaviours. Likewise, with the mechanical 
performance of the Tiller Girls the audience has a phenomenological response 
to the performance because of the bodily associations they make with their 
human counterparts.  As Judith Butler argues, gender is often an historical 
situation rather than a natural fact, so the audience assumes the machines are 
women (more literally girls from the ensemble name). This situation intersects 
with the physiological and ecological levels of embodiment found in nouvelle 
AI in such a way as to give the social/cultural embodiment of the machine 
performer a gender. What makes Butler’s remark relevant for our analysis of 
Tiller Girls is that she sees acts that constitute gender as bearing similarities 
with performative acts. She further suggests that to decipher the starting point 
of these bodily identifications might be an interesting exercise: “In both 
contexts, the existence and facticity of the material or natural dimensions of the 
body are not denied, but reconceived as distinct from the process by which the 
body comes to bear cultural meanings” (Butler 1988,pp. 519-520). Butler 
argues that “acts by which gender is constituted bear similarities to 
performative acts within theatrical contexts”, and introduces the notion of 
‘‘doing gender, of gender as a performance rather than a fixed, given state” 
(Butler 2004). 
2. In articulating the tableaux of the performance, I build upon Butler’s task: “to 
examine in what ways gender is constructed through specific corporeal acts, 
and what possibilities exist for the cultural transformation of gender through 
such acts” (Butler 1988,pp. 519-520). In the Tiller Girls, gender is obviously 
constructed by the connotation of the dance group; and – to extend past gender 
– the performing acts of the Stumpies define their bodies beyond their clever 
pendulum as operating in an original ecological niche. Butler writes that 
“gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be 
understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and 
enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self” 
(p. 519). With Tiller Girls this illusion takes a double-vision turn: their gender 
is obviously not physiological, nor directly linked to actual movements 
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(however stylized). The interpretation of their enactments, read as female 
gestures, is tainted by the connotative social values carried by the ensemble’s 
name. There is a mechanical facticity in the Stumpies in that there is no 
physiological sex and gender is a signification not of that facticity (it can’t be) 
but a signification of a cultural interpretation. In this sense, sexless machines 
might be better stylized into a third gender – a machine gender – especially if 
they have non-anthropomorphic bodies. Under the conditioning of the label 
“Tiller Girls”, the audience perception of the historical body supersedes the 
functional body. 
3. Constructed bodies. Because the Stumpies are actually balancing metronomes 
in a mechanical sense, AI researchers aim to discover the influence of 
dynamics of materials and structures on balancing behaviours. In my theatre 
performance, I attempt to create a phenomenological body for the audience by 
expanding simple gaits into dance and by introducing improvised elements 
(dynamism of the live event). The constructed body of the Stumpy matches the 
biological and ecological body of Johnson’s classification while Tiller Girls 
also constitutes a phenomenological body (audience perception, human 
operator to orchestrate the gaits) and as well a constructed cultural body. 
4. Gaits. In nouvelle AI, gaits are intrinsically related to the shape of the object 
and the main focus is to understand the potentialities of cheap design and of an 
ecological niche for locomotion. On the stage, gaits are orchestrated to 
resemble dance movements that also include failures of locomotion (or 
behaviours). Apparent intentions surface when machine performer movements 
do not follow Newtonian causality (or folk physics). For instance, after falling 
down, a Tiller Girls is able to stand up even if its body scheme does not 
suggest this ability. 
5. Stage and Lab. In nouvelle AI, robots are not often staged because the aim is to 
test the functionalities of the embodiment. Experimental scientific protocol 
usually targets controlling variables, aiming at reproducibility of the 
experimental conditions. The notion of environment is limited to the 
physiological level and so it tends to exclude theatricality as a variable. In 
theatre, the body of the machine performer augments or transforms behaviours 
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that are derived from similar morphologies (cast of actors).  What is interesting 
for my research is how the liminal situation of the physical body and its 
representation borders on quite unpredictable situations (Fischer-Lichte 2008). 
6. Autonomy. One of the aims of nouvelle AI is the construction of autonomous 
agents capable of operating in their environment. In theatre, as exemplified by 
Tiller Girls and Devolution, autonomy is not a central issue but more of a 
practicality.   AI autonomy has the potential to distract from the dramaturgical 
effect if not properly framed, a factor I will develop later in Chapter 4. Finally, 
autonomy should not be confused with the animate qualities of machine 
performers. Autonomy can enhance the animate sensation but it is not essential 
as soon as the movement feels like it is coming directly from the mechanical 
object. For example when a leg is not animated to move, but moves by itself. 
7. Environment and co-presence of the audience. In a lab environment, the 
audience (observers) deconstruct and analyse the behaviours more than on a 
stage. When audiences are tasked to assess the functionality of the robots, their 
emotional reactions are triggered, but they may be pushed aside by the task in 
hand. (See Stumpy AI Lab movies and staff comments on DVD). In theatre, 
the audience shares the same time and space as the machine performers, and 
this creates a co-presence. As explained by Fischer-Lichte:  
By transforming its participants, performance achieves the re-enchantment of the 
world. The nature of performance as event – articulated and brought forth in the 
bodily co-presence of actors and spectators, the performative generation of 
materiality, and the emergence of meaning – enables such transformation. (Fischer-
Lichte 2008, p. 181) 
8. Presence and representation. In nouvelle AI, the presence of an observer is 
seen as a value for authenticity, while in theatre, value belongs to how the 
authoritative controlling mechanisms are represented. This is because  
In aesthetic theories, presence and representation were long considered oppositional 
concepts, wherein presence was equated with immediacy and seen as the experience 
of opulence and completeness, as authenticity. Representation, in turn, belonged to the 
grand narratives, exerting an authoritative controlling mechanism. (Fischer-Lichte 
2008, p. 147) 
While nouvelle AI researchers strive to define how functional robots are 
grounded in the physical reality connected to the robotic agent, theatre brings 
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together the real and the unreal: fact and fiction. This is what Jean Cocteau 
called “the realism of the unreal”, a way of blending magical motifs with 
everyday realism he suggests is something “not be admired, but to be 
believed”. 
9. Psychophysical and physiological movements. In nouvelle AI, witnesses of 
experiments push aside the combination of morphological computing and 
connotations of movement because they prioritize measurement. After all, they 
are engineers and they strive to compare the understanding of the robot body-
schema with the actual outcome of its behaviours. In Tiller Girls, the 
combination of morphological computing and the associative characteristics of 
choreography stimulates psycho-physiological interpretations in the audience. 
As a phenomenological reaction, audiences both identify with the body-
schema of the robot and with how they interact (or in this case dance) together. 
10. Cultural and Social. In the lab, audiences are observers. In the cultural domain, 
they are the curious witnesses of the construction of fiction. Cultural functions 
make social relations broader. In AI, researchers strive to make social robots 
learn to be social over time through exposure to the manmade environment 
around them. In theatre, learning is already embedded, not only in the 
experience of the past, but also because illusion is a priority that can be used to 
create social metaphors. Therefore, while both social robots and machine 
performers are designed to socially engage with people or other robots, 
nouvelle AI scientists see social interactions as a specific functional attribute, 
while theatre designers see these interactions with robots as having potential 
for bodily metaphors and interesting associations. 
In conclusion, by taking the same machine, Stumpy, and by appropriating it in 
a different context, broader definitions of embodiment emerge.  This is because in 
theatre, mimicry is based on social, historical and cultural factors and these factors 
become an integral part of Stumpy. 
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3.7. Performers and Tiller Girls 
In this section, I move from the comparison of Stumpies vis-à-vis Tiller Girls 
to the comparison of human performers vis-à-vis machine performers (while focusing 
on the Stumpies). Since dancers and instrumentalists rely more on patterns and 
mathematics than a theatre actor (text), the comparison is targeted at the former.  
In Humanoid Boogie, Auslander tackles the human and mechanical opposition 
of performing. Yuji Sone sees this as exposing the indeterminacies in the binary 
thinking found in the traditional performing arts (Sone 2008). Auslander states: “I 
want to make clear that although I clearly do wish to make a case for seeing machines 
as performers, I am not proposing that machines can perform in all of the ways that a 
human being can” (Auslander 2006, p. 90). His main stance is that definitions of 
performance typically put an emphasis on the agency of an artist who expresses 
something through interpretation. Hence, Auslander’s main argument is that 
“Although I insist that robots can possess technical performance skills, I will not claim 
that robots possess interpretive skills” (p.91). Though I agree that machine performers 
do not perform in all the ways of human beings, I will try to demonstrate that 
unrecorded and unmodelled machine performers based on morphological computing 
have some starting ingredients that could lead to interpretive skills in the machine 
performer. 
Auslander develops his argument by confronting performance scenarios whose 
execution is based on either technical or interpretive skills, and where the latter are 
regarded as specifically human. Auslander highlights the ‘grey’ area between these 
skills with the practised routines of orchestral musicians, and the Tiller Girls’ 
synchronized chorus-line dance, in which human performers are “called upon to 
exercise their technical skills but not their interpretive skills” (Auslander 2006). In 
such a context it should be a small step to conclude that a Stumpy-as-Tiller-Girl is 
solely based on technical skill. After all, its operative element is a simple pendulum. In 
this context I can regard the interpretive skills of the Tiller Girls in two ways: first 
through the agency of the chorus and second, through a discussion of apparent agency. 
Theatre historian and theorist Tobin Nellhaus disputes Auslander’s views on 
the blurring distinction between human beings and machines in conventional genres 
© Demers 2014 Performers and Tiller Girls 
 
 175 
that involve repetitive routines. According to Nellhaus, Auslander considers that the 
performers cede a substantial part of their agency to someone else such as a conductor 
or choreographer (Auslander 2006; Nellhaus 2010, p. 185). Nellhaus’ reading of 
Auslander is that one either possesses individual agency or cedes agency and becomes 
machine-like. Introducing the notion of organized group agency25, Nellhaus disagrees 
with the view that the demand on a performer’s technical skills leads to a loss of 
agency. He even goes further by stating that the chief alternative to individual agency 
is to participate in larger forms of agency where the artistry lies in ensemble 
performance. The concluding section of my Tiller Girls performance exemplifies this 
situation. It operates as a deconstruction of the chorus line, constantly showing the 
minute (and imperfect) differences in the ensemble that not only act as a counter-
intuitive representation of the stereotypical repetitive capabilities of a machine but 
lead to structured chaotic “improvisation” of the ensemble. The programmed motions 
of this section of Tiller Girls are based on a set of individually fixed movement 
phrases that can be modulated live (via speed and energy for instance). Delivered as an 
ensemble, night after night, the patterns, clusters, and falls are always different and 
always tainted by various apparent individual machine performer’s interpretations (for 
similar movements, some machines end up on their flanks, some standing in a duet, 
some in the audience). This situation could not be claimed as the result of pure 
randomness; it is the result of an organized improvisation. I will cover other instances 
of this corporate agency in Chapter 4. I will present an aesthetic reading of this 
corporate agency that shows how a flock of machine performers can produce 
atmosphere. 
At the beginning of his paper Auslander outlines when a machine can perform 
or not. Based on Tellis (Tellis 1992; Nellhaus 2010, p. 185), he discards the automaton 
as a simple animated kinetic sculpture, nuancing this notion on the basis of playback 
devices26 such as a programmed automaton, and he sees some mechanical works as 
technologies of production not reproduction (Tellis 1992; Auslander 2006). Auslander 
would consider machines as part of performance when they go beyond the re-creation 
of a prior performance.  Auslander then brings examples of robots and activities that 
potentially demonstrate a certain sense of agency but not interpretation. Starting from 
                                                
25 Nellhaus calls this “corporate agency”. 
26 Auslander’s body of work deconstructs the concept of “live perfomance”. 
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performance theorist Michael Kirby’s concept of nonmatrixed27 performing , he 
demonstrates that some stage actions are based solely on execution (Auslander 2006; 
Kirby 2011). Auslander then brings a solid example with The Table by Max Dean 
(1984-2001). The Table is a machine shaped like a table that chooses to follow certain 
persons of the audience in the room within which it is set. Auslander rightly claims 
that this machine goes beyond the playback device to the level of performance, but he 
still situates the decision making of The Table as a technical performance, like the 
nonmatrixed performing of Kirby. He uses this example to contrast apparent agency 
with real agency, while showing that in such cases there is no difference in overall 
artistic intention whether a human or robot performs the task.  
Here I would simply follow up on the discussion about the mechanistic and 
phenomenal embodiments found in robotics (see Section 3.3.4). Walter’s Tortoises 
were not hungry, they simply executed a nonmatrixed set of rules. However, machines 
that begin to make incursions into the phenomenal body, such as those guided by 
morphological computing, depart from nonmatrixed performance. It is difficult to root 
interpretive skills in the physiological/ecological embodiment unless we consider 
machine interpretation as the unpredictable movements issued from the coupling of 
the robot and its environment. The interpretive capacities of the Tiller Girls are based 
on two elements: their enactments through morphological computing and my 
operations and modulations of their movement phrases. Even though Stumpy’s body 
does not sense itself, its construction does: this is morphological computing. It has a 
tendency to stay upright and self-stabilize. Even if such construction sounds like a 
pure mechanical production of movement, the object-in-the-world really departs from 
the level of simple “closed” automaton. This specific machine performer does not 
fully claim equivalence to human interpretation. However, the staging brings 
intentionality (this will be demonstrated in Chapter 4), just as the live operator injects 
interpretive skills into the Tiller Girls. As seen from the audience – and as with 
puppets – the manipulator is part of the image, but the puppet is the location of the 
interpretation. 
                                                
27 These, like happenings, are task-based, non-representational events, where a performer does not feign or present 
any role, but is simply being himself or herself, carrying out tasks. 
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Fischer-Lichte attributes an aura to objects on stage but denies them the quality 
of presence. She proposes a range of presence: weak, strong and radical. The weak 
refers to the mere presence of the body onstage, the strong refers to the performative 
value of the body and the radical intertwines the semiotic and phenomenal body 
Fischer-Lichte 2012).  When she applies her scale to objects, she argues:  
While aura is frequently applied to objects, only the first two concepts of presence 
allow for such an application. Objects can command space and attention and qualify 
for the strong concept of presence as long as these qualities are detached from the 
embodiment processes. The radical concept, however, cannot be attributed to objects. 
Objects are frequently perceived as present, especially in theatre performances and 
performance events. The radical concept of presence requires the idea of an embodied 
mind at its centre and therefore has to be limited to human beings. (Fischer-Lichte 
2008, p. 100; Fischer-Lichte 2012) 
And she continues that “presence brings forth humans as that which they always 
already are: embodied minds. Ecstasy, in turn, makes things appear as what they 
already are but which usually remains unnoticed in everyday life because of their 
instrumentalization.”  
Giving an historical body to the machine performer can also alleviate this very 
instrumentalization.  Such action makes the machine performer depart from the simple 
object status of a prop. I would, then, attribute radical presence to machine performers, 
seeing them as an embodied mind, the result of a staged construction given to the 
machine performer. In this chapter’s section on the Blind Robot, I will show how I 
give this machine performer a mind (intentionality) and an expertise (touch) by the 
mere ascription of character to a pair of embodied arms. This aura will be discussed 
more extensively in Chapter 4. 
Fischer-Lichte’s presence scale also tries to nuance the grey area between 
having a body and being a body. Here I would return to the previous chapters and refer 
to the animate and animated qualities of machine performers. The animated body is 
simply an articulated structure, while the animate body has some perceptible essence 
of inner motivation. I would claim that morphological computing helps the machine 
performer to “be a body” since enactments are not issued by a model (having a body) 
but emerge from the ongoing actualisation of the body in the environment (being a 
body). 
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Machine Performers:  
Stumpies as Tiller Girls 
Human Performers:  
Dancers and Instrumentalists. 
Movements are the result of an effector 
articulating a given body schema, potentially 
sensing its environment. 
Movements are both the results of body schema, 
body image and cultural and historical bodies. 
Inanimate object becoming animate. Machine 
performers can become more than just “things” 
by borrowing techniques of presencing. 
Performers have the tacit capacity of presencing.  
Randomness from natural computing, 
incorporating failures and other “unaccounted 
for” parameters. 
Performers’ historical bodies can contribute to 
randomness of movements via improvisation and 
interpretation. 
Machine performing – aliveness. Live Performance – liveness. 
Technical Skills from mechanical construction 
and design.  
Technical skills from training. 
Performing from its own construction, its own 
body. Potentially enhanced by an operator 
(similar to a puppeteer). Stumpy is similar to a 
puppet, they are linked by virtual strings to the 
computer/operator/puppeteer that makes them 
move. 
Interpretive skills. 
Even with carbon copies, a machine performer 
body becomes unique through minute variations 
in its construction that impact on its movement. 
Individualities are also created by contrasting 
one robot to a mass of robots. 
Biological individualities. 
Historical individualities. 
Initially mechanomorphic but becomes 
anthropomorphic through staging. 
Initially anthropomorphic but becomes 
mechanomorphic by repetitive movements.  
Constructed, synthetized, and historical 
embodiment vested by mise-en-scene. 
Biological body grows and is constantly shaping 
and reshaping itself. Historical body is 
developed only through time and experience. 
Limited to a “niche” but yet its impact can be 
optimized. For instance, Stumpy as a dancer of 
“Mass Ornament”; the singular body 
movements of water puppets. 
Multi-tasking. 
Multi-stability in the order of presence and 
representation. Fischer-Lichte (see Chapter 2.) 
Stumpies as Tiller Girls humanize the 
mechanical performers. 
Mechanomorphic turns into anthropomorphic. 
Multi-stability in the order of presence and 
representation. Fischer-Lichte (see Chapter 2.) 
Tiller Girls turns human performers into 
mechanical performers. 
Anthropomorphic turns into mechanomorphic. 
Transfer from functioning to performing opens 
audience interpretation of stage acts. 
Expression and development of vocabularies of 
movements. Cultural codes of dance. 
Table 14. Comparison of Machine Performers and Human Performers 
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3.8. Contributing work: La Cour des Miracles 
In another work, La Cour des Miracles, I also borrowed, two elements from 
nouvelle AI: morphological computing and Rodney Brook’s subsumption control 
architecture. Following the ecological balance, my design and programming aim was 
to align the body and its animation as far as possible. Through their intuitive way of 
modelling behaviours, both methods help to generate behaviours that are less scripted 
and that appear more rooted in what “happens now” to the robot. My goal was to 
achieve life-like behaviours out of minimalist constructions, an amalgam of basic 
tasks issued from empirical models (see the images of La Cour des Miracles in 
Chapter 1). 
The main idea behind subsumption is to loosely couple tasks together without 
the need for a centralized controller or a global representation of the exterior world. A 
complex task is broken down into many simpler tasks that are organized into layers. 
The layers form a hierarchical structure where higher-level tasks can subsume other 
lower-level tasks, taking over their control. Layers correspond to particular goals of 
the agent, where higher layers are increasingly abstract. The lowest layers can work 
like fast-adapting mechanisms such as reflexes, while the higher layers work to 
achieve overall behaviour. In the absence of this control, lower levels carry out their 
actions without being planned from the layers above them. The key is to consider 
these layers as semi-autonomous, with their own view of the world, and only 
adjudicate conflicts when layers interfere with each other. In other words, this 
architecture helps to coordinate disparate functional components without requiring a 
globally unified scheme. Most examples of subsumption deal with small autonomous 
robots navigating in the environment. In this case, a low level task can become an 
obstacle avoidance gambit that feeds information to upper levels, such as going 
forward or urgently looking for a power source in order to recharge its own batteries. 
This subsumption architecture typically uses what is called in AI “a bottom-up 
approach” to information flow. 
Though Rod Brooks did achieve robust and simple control of small 
autonomous robots with this architecture, the wider AI community claimed that results 
were mostly at the insectile level. Designing high levels of competence is difficult, as 
these would depend on the design and implementation of lower levels of competence, 
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and on how the subsumption network and adjudication decisions were made. Thus the 
architecture seems to work better when it deals with reactions to its environment than 
when it has a task like reasoning. However, Brooks pointed out that the socially 
competent robot Cog seemed to his audiences more than competent. Cog has various 
eye movements that mimic saccade – the way in which muscles use the visual field to 
fixate an object – all organized by subsumption architecture. So Cog appeared to be 
taking turns when interacting with a human, but actually these movements were a 
simple result of organized “reflexes” that obscured the causation to bystanders, who 
were unaware of the control in action (Brooks 2002, p. 91). 
For my machine performers in La Cour des Miracles, I borrowed the ideas of 
subsumption from Brooks’ programming in order to bring about an interaction with 
visitors. I found this programming architecture interesting, because it not only 
subsumed control of the motors but presented me with a loosely coupled authoring 
system where I could throw in various behaviours that were then assembled and 
synthesized according to the flow of sensor information and the compound state of the 
machine. By compound I mean that the condition of the machine performers is 
represented not by a single state but by an ensemble of states. What I obtained from 
this was, therefore, not an actual model of behaviours but the unfolding of events 
within the programmed architecture that showed me how the object behaved. For 
instance, I could implement a set of primitive (reflex) actions, but the interconnection 
scheme often caused a more complex (compound) behaviour to emerge.  Thus in a 
convulsive machine, the movements will not follow a single “choreography” but are 
the cumulatively subsumed result of several smaller primitive choreographies 
happening at the same time. 
In La Cour des Miracles the levels of “sensor excitation” can be layered to 
control the layers in the machines. The robot is retrofitted with four motion detectors 
covering its perimeter, each of them facing outward and aligned with its corresponding 
limb. If the machine does not sense any presence in its vicinity, it simply performs a 
normal routine and waits for a change in the environment. When a sensor detects a 
movement, the corresponding limb reacts as if in reflex to the intrusion. When two 
sensors detect the presence of onlookers, the machine develops a more frantic 
behaviour (defensive parade per se) aimed in the direction of these sensors. When 
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three sensors are active, it means that visitors are close to the machine’s upper and 
lower parts, and this triggers to-and-fro motions of the whole machine. When all 
sensors are active, it means that people are surrounding the robot and the machine 
either reaches a very high level of excitation or shuts down and plays dead. The 
sensing information also incorporates attributes such as the duration of the presence 
detected. For instance, this duration can modulate a reflex-based behaviour, making a 
contraction larger or a spasm faster.   
The subsumption approach inside the control scheme then decides whether the 
motion of a limb is the result of a reflex process or from a higher layer (full 
excitation). This decision either suppresses the reflex and lets the excitation prevail, or 
lets the reflex “emerge” and overrides the excitation, or randomly selects one of the 
two, or merges the motion in some form of chaos. The following is my max MSP 
software diagram for these reactions: 
 
 
  Figure 50. Subsumption for La Cour des Miracles 
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Figure 51. Subsumption for La Cour des Miracles 
 
In Figure 51, I have programmed a subsumption scheme with the graphic 
object-oriented system Max/Msp/Jitter. In this data flow, there are boxes labelled 
merger and suppressor that correspond to the subsumption functionality. One can read 
the flow of actions of the machine: two simpler behaviours (idle, spasms) are 
potentially suppressed by a higher behaviour (excited) to form the resultant behaviour 
while the sensor data is fed everywhere in the data flow network. Manifestly, this 
scheme is tailor-made for this machine and matches its morphology and the niche of 
the robots (on the floor, balance is always assumed). Although it is an incomplete 
map, the model of the machine in La Cour des Miracles creates a network of potential 
actions, as actions are assembled in real time. 
 In Chapter 1 I wrote about the lures of automation and also the credible 
embodiment of pain found in La Cour des Miracles. In the following quote, Sharkey 
and Ziemke summarize how the perception of such staged characters (machine 
performers) might work:   
Behavior-based robots are all designed by humans so that their movement in 
interaction with ‘cues’ in the environment, e.g. lights of a particular intensity, looks, 
to human observers, like the behaviour of an organism.  Even if artificial neural 
adaptation or evolutionary methods are used to develop the physical structure and 
control systems of a robot, the goals or purpose of the system  are designed by the 
researcher to make the work  comprehensible to other human observers. These goals 
implicitly direct the themes of research and give the devices their credibility as 
autonomous agents.  Essentially the experimenter (who is also an observer) can search 
through ‘cue’ space to find appropriate cues that lead to the satisfaction of their goals. 
These goals are not the robot’s but merely an instantiation of the experimenter / 
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observer’s goals. Thus the robot’s interactions with the world carry meaning only for 
the observer. (Sharkey and Ziemke 2001, p. 260)(Sharkey and Ziemke 2001) 
In the end, the perception of pain may be real, and this was in fact suggested 
through the historical embodiment of these machines. What is assumed is the internal 
state of the machines, the causal sensorimotor effect of the pretence of pain. What 
makes this machine performer animate is its morphological computing, which creates 
a mechanical embodiment of pain, an analogue state that I cannot even fully 
demarcate, even though I am the maker of this object. 
3.9. Contributing work: The Blind Robot 
 Blind Robot was built as an experimental instrument to assess the impact of 
giving a character a morphological structure. Since there were antecedents in social 
robotics surrounding the subjective response to robots that could initiate touch, an 
experiment along these lines would, I conjectured, give me grounds for comparison. 
Moreover, the scientific results I was inspired by came from Georgia Tech’s team, 
who were interested is creating a relationship between a nurse (robot) and a patient 
(human), with touch used instrumentally rather than affectively (Chen, King et al. 
2011). They suggested that discomfort is based on the potential misinterpretation of a 
nurse’s intention during the touching of a patient. Consisting of a blend of 
instrumental software that could affect the type of its touch, the Blind Robot was built 
to discover the participant’s body.  It was a psychological experiment in which 
participants were presented with two body roles : first with the robot as a device that 
examines the body to gather medical data and secondly, as a specifically blind robot 
that needs to touch in order to discover. The results show that the blind character’s 
intentionality was clearly grasped by the visitor, and consequently people became less 
afraid of being touched by the character than they would have been by the robot as 
mere instrument. 
3.9.1. The Blind Robot as a Turing Test 
This preference system was inspired by the Turing Test, which – like Claude 
Draude, professor of socio-technical system design and gender – I also wanted to 
reconsider. For Draude, Turing’s experimental setting was of far-reaching importance 
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for the relationship between machine and human. Looking more closely at an earlier 
formulation of the tests she noted that  
The Turing test, proposed in 1950, challenges the ability of a computer to engage in 
human-like conversation. While various critics analyse the notion of machine and 
intelligence Turing had developed, others have stated that the gender relevance of this 
‘‘founding narrative of artificial intelligence and cybernetics’’ at most times gets 
neglected when the test is mentioned today. (Draude 2011, p. 322) 
When Turing developed this scenario, he invented a gender imitation game where 
different roles were attributed to each gender. The imitation game was  
played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may 
be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object 
of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and 
which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game, 
he says either ‘X is A and Y is B’ or ‘X is B and Y is A’. (Draude 2011, p. 322) 
According to Draude, in the process of splitting (or hiding) the human body and the 
sign in his experiment, Turing typecasts the woman role and by doing so, his test 
produces a gender-based performance asking the man or the woman to assume the 
gender (Butler 2004). Turing suggests that a man may transgress his gender while a 
woman can be of assistance to the operator. However, for his third test, Turing 
eliminated any reference to the human body, voice or even handwriting, for the 
interrogation is actually replaced by a typewriter.  This typewritten language is then 
considered free of connotations that the embodied human actually induces. A correct 
answer to the test reunites the enacted and the represented body. A mistake 
demonstrates that the enactment and the representation is no longer an inevitable 
certainty but a contingent production of identity. This gender/machine performance 
had a major impact on Draude because,  “It is this decoupling of the sign and the 
human body which makes it possible to attribute a rather radical, subversive potential 
to the 1950s Turing test” (Draude 2011, p. 322). 
In my experiment, the Blind Robot becomes an embodied typewriter, a 
manifestation of the suggested character. The Blind Robot is rendered genderless in 
the process of substitution of the characters but in turn, the gender issue inevitably 
reappears in each visitor’s experience. Turing’s interrogator becomes the visitor but 
he/she is not directly asked to reunite the touch and the motions of the robot with its 
role. The enactment and the representation of the Blind Robot are, as far as possible, 
invariants in my test. But the suggested role becomes the experimental “variable”. 
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What I intended to show is that in the process Turing actually decoupled an 
anthropomorphic machine from its behaviour. Here the embodiment is mainly social 
and does not really connect to the physicality of the robot. 
3.9.2. Building the experiment by contrasting with a social robotics experiment 
Georgia Tech’s team staged an experimental scenario where a robot touches a 
participant (Chen, King et al. 2011).  They proposed two sentences that are spoken by 
the robot, to the participants in the course of the experiment. The instrumental 
sentence is: “I am going to rub your arm. I am going to clean you. The doctor will be 
with you shortly." and the affective sentence is “everything will be all right, you are 
doing well. The doctor will be with you shortly" (p. 260). 
Their hypothesis was that “Participants will find robot-initiated touch more 
favourable when it is perceived to be instrumental versus affective” (p. 259). This 
hypothesis is aligned to clinical hospital research where: “Touches from nurses on the 
face, leg, and shoulders were perceived as uncomfortable by patients. Only 
instrumental touches on the shoulder and arm by a nurse were viewed as comfortable 
(p. 258). As the robot touch is invariant in their experiment, their experimental results 
are that “Significant variation in responses resulted not from differences in the 
physical interaction, but from the participants' perception of the robot's intent” (p. 
262). The team then concludes: “We believe an important general result from our 
study is that perceived intent can significantly influence a person's subjective response 
to robot-initiated touch” (p. 264). Although I consider that the patient-nurse situation 
calls for professionalism and a fair amount of instrumental touch, the empirical results 
from interacting with Blind Robot seemed to go in the other direction. Equally, my 
original hypothesis was that this agent might be more accepted because it is perceived 
as blind and that the empathic touch of a blind robot could be more acceptable than a 
cold neutral instrument. Given a perceived intent that is rooted in an empathic 
character, the touch of a robot seems to be more accepted from the blind character 
than from their device character, i.e. from the affective (empathic) touch rather than 
the instrumental touch. Therefore, instead of eradicating the intent, I decided to 
investigate what happens if the situation is constructed to cause another direction. 
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In order to compare my results with those of the Georgia Tech team, I decided 
to administer a survey that would include questions from their own experiment. From 
their questionnaires I included the standard Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) and the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), both made to assess the 
participant’s state of reaction. I also included a subset of the questions that are targeted 
in their hypothesis.  And I included a method called a Godspeed questionnaire for the 
sake of comparison with other experiments in the social robotics field.28 This 
questionnaire dealt with anthropomorphism and also with perceived competence and 
safety. The full questionnaire can be found in the Appendix of this dissertation. 
3.9.3. Procedure and data gathering 
The laboratory setup is presented in Figure 52 and Figure 53. The ambience 
during the test was not intended to be a clinical trial; instead it uses an artistic gallery 
setting. The Blind Robot protrudes from a wall that separates the control equipment 
and the human-robot area. Away from this area, there is a table where the participants 
sit to fill in the survey after their experiences. At the end of the wall stands another 
control table where video and motion capture equipment are located. In each session I 
gathered a survey, a video recording (side view) and a motion capture of the 
movements of the arms, hands and one finger. This motion capture also grabbed a 
video from the frontal position. The motion capture data was collected to further 
analyse the movements of the robot to detect potential discrepancies or differences 
between each session. Although this data will be analysed outside the framework of 
this thesis, some interesting results are worth reporting. 
 
Figure 52. The Blind Robot experimental setup (atmosphere) 
                                                
28 See my remarks about this questionnaire with Area V5 in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 53. The Blind Robot - Experimental setup (work lights) 
 
The participants were all students and faculty from the School of Art, Design 
and Media at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore where I teach. The 
experiment accepted only one visitor at a time to limit the influence of bystanders. The 
participants were invited to sit on a chair in the front of the blind robot while they 
were briefed about the upcoming interaction. After asking about their conditions, such 
as vision impairment or if they had any prior knowledge of the experiment, the 
students were invited to approach the robot, where they could read one of the two 
statements that describe it as either a device or a character. In order not to influence 
the participant, the name of the work – Blind Robot – was never mentioned. When the 
participants filled out the survey, a copy of the statement was left on the desk. When 
they completed the survey, they were asked not to communicate any of their 
impressions to fellow participants in order to limit prior exposure that might bias the 
data. The two texts were as follows:  
• “This is the Blind Robot.  This robot has no eyes and in order to ’see’ 
you, it creates a mental representation of what its fingertips have seen. 
The robot will need to explore you, to touch you, your face, your upper 
body and sometimes even your legs.” 
• “This robot is being studied as an instrument to measure biometrical 
information of the body.  Doctors and psychologist will be able to 
interpret various kinds of reactions from your bodies towards their 
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diagnoses.  The robot will now sense you and touch your face, your 
upper body, and perhaps even your legs.” 
3.9.4. Analysis and discussion 
Since the period of tests was a whole week and the concentration required by 
the operator to manipulate the robot is high, I had to factor in changes of operators 
during the experiment, but the response of operator 2 was quite different from that of 
operator 1. The valence in the self-assessment questionnaire had a mean of 5.85 for 
operator 1 as opposed to 7.08 for operator 2, and the two way ANOVA reported a 
significance of F(1.72)=13.32, p<0.0005. The positive valence was more pronounced 
for operator 2 if it was the blind character with significance of F(1.72)=13.93, 
p<0.0004. I will therefore report values independently for each operator.  
In the PANAS questions, I looked more closely at the emotional states related 
to the situation such as being afraid or distressed, both indications of a negative 
assessment of the intention of the robot. I soon observed that this data gave conflicting 
results between the operators. It seemed that the quality of manipulation shifted the 
whole perception of the proposed characters. The emotions that indicate the 
preferential shift from the instrument to the blind robot were: distressed, enthusiastic, 
alert, inspired, attentive, jittery and afraid. I performed a two way ANOVA on some of 
these categories and for both distressed and afraid, the exposed character was almost 
significant with both operators (p=0.065 and p=0.09 respectively). When considering 
only operator two in a post hoc tests, people were much more distressed and afraid of 
the instrument, with p=0.055 and p=0.06 as significant levels. 
 
 
Figure 54. PANAS results 
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Figure 4 reports the participants’ experience. When asked if they were 
confused about the touch, the instrument made them more confused than the blind 
robot with significant levels obtained in the ANOVA of F(1,72)=3.62, p=0.06. Again 
for operator two, the significance increased with p=0.04. 
 
 
Figure 55. Participant experience results 
 
The results show that the intention behind the robot’s touch seemed to be better 
understood than that from the instrument. This does not mean that it was more 
enjoyable but that it was more comfortable. Our social rules and codes dictate to us 
that a touch from a blind person will be positive and needed for his/her perception. In 
this experiment, a blind touch has more potential to be affective than the instrumental 
touch of the device. Therefore, I do claim that I had opposite results from those of the 
Georgia Tech group, as I had indications that people preferred the touch that was more 
personal (affective). In this case, the intention was socially accepted for a blind person 
touching a stranger. The problem might not lie in the affective or instrumental touch 
but more in the elucidation of the intention behind the touch. Finally, an empathic 
character did manage to create the impression of a positive intention in the vulnerable 
and intimate touch of a person’s face with a robot. 
3.10. Conclusion 
In embodied AI, the notion of environment is limited to the physiological 
level. It excludes theatricality as a variable because fiction is not considered a 
scientific method. By taking an AI robot away from its lab and using it in a different 
context, I illustrated that a broader definition of embodiment enables a richer palette of 
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perceived behaviours. I demonstrated that methodologies from morphological 
computing could be transported and applied to machine performers. This creates a 
tighter coupling of the animation process to the given morphology of the robot.  These 
techniques can enhance the stage presence of the machine performers, causing more 
fully embodied behaviours to occur with apparent energy and inner motivation. This 
presence makes the audience see the machine performers’ actions as agentic as 
opposed to strictly functional. Thus, on a performative level, I claim that the audience 
identifies more with an agentic object than a functional object. Morphological 
computing also helps a machine performer to have both performative and interpretive 
skills. Moreover, morphological computing enables the machine performer to reach 
the radical concept of presence put forward by Fischer-Lichte. With Tiller Girls, I 
challenged her claim that the radical concept of “presence” can only be applied to 
human performers and not to objects. 
As opposed to science, failures and mistakes can be fully exploited by 
designers of machine performers. From the AI standpoint, a Stumpy with an ill-
formed gait is seen as a negative result, but in Tiller Girls such a gait can create a 
sense of suspense (like falling) or a sense of spontaneity (like jumping for no reason). 
In nouvelle AI, mimicry in the physical embodiment is one the main focuses for 
researchers. By adding new variables, such as the vocabulary of the mise-en-scene, 
Tiller Girls is designed to shift locomotion gaits into dance vocabulary. While the 
physical embodiment of the machine performer is essential, the social embodiment of 
the robot is the main focus to create perceptible and empathic behaviours for machine 
performers. 
Behaviours that are attributed to agents do not necessarily embody subjectivity 
in the final perceived intention. Walter’s tortoises are regarded as hungry and the 
machine performers in La Cour des Miracles as sadly suffering. Even the largest 
geometric figures of Heider and Simmel’s animation are regarded as aggressive 
characters.  
The designer of a machine performer aims to create a competent body that will 
radiate with intention. Whether simulated, modelled or computed naturally, the fact of 
its being given a set of perceived behaviours means that the machine performer has to 
first align its animation with its body in order to become a credible agent. Its 
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animation (behaviours) has then also to be aligned with its given social embodiment. 
These behaviours will make the fictitious historical embodiment credible. The 
charisma of the machine performer, the presence of the machine body on stage is 
supported by this alignment. When the body feels animated, mechanical, or arbitrarily 
assembled, this presence vanishes and is gradually replaced by its sole representation, 
the object. Therefore, if a lack of presence leads to a perception of behaviours that are 
solely based on automation, the machine performer will feel animated rather than 
embodied.  
Table 15 shows in summary form how synthetic methodology can benefit from 
the transformations that occur when we look at multiple levels of embodiment. It must 
be noted that for a machine designer, the starting point is this Nouvelle AI 
methodology and it is during the development of the performer that these 
transformations operate. They are rendered possible because machine performers do 
not need to implement (in an engineering sense) agency, they only need the presencing 
of intentions or interpretation. Nonetheless, even if the machine performer does not 
provide a model or an understanding of an agent, this altered synthetic methodology 
can open up channels of exploration for eventually deriving a more optimal ecological 
niche for the agent. 
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Synthetic Methodology – Nouvelle AI Designing Machine Performers based on 
Nouvelle AI 
 
The Three Constituents Principle: definition of an 
ecological niche, definition of behaviours and 
design of the agent. An ecological niche exploits 
the environment to create a competence (such as 
water for fish buoyancy and swimming). 
 
The Two Levels of Embodiment principle: the 
machine performer shall include at least two 
levels of embodiment; one from the ecological 
embodiment and one from the social embodiment. 
Social embodiment is not necessarily seen as a set 
of supplementary capacities to implement. It can 
actually short-circuit implementation through 
fictional or apparent behaviours. 
Examples: The pain in La Cour des Miracles. The 
dance vocabulary of Tiller Girls. 
The Complete Agent Principle: 
1. Agents are subject to the laws of physics 
(energy dissipation, friction, gravity). 
2. They generate sensory stimulation through 
motion and generally through interaction 
with the real world. 
3. They affect the environment through 
behaviour. 
4. They are complex dynamic systems which, 
when they interact with the environment, 
have attractor states. 
5. They perform morphological computation. 
 
The Complete Agent Principle: 
1. At least two levels of embodiment (see 
above) 
2. Co-presence of an audience 
3. Spatio-temporal context 
4. A role, representation or character 
5. Presencing 
Examples: Blind Robot is a simple piece of 
mechatronics. However, given the mise-en-scène 
of the character, the perceived agency and 
intentionality can be modulated. 
Cheap Design: Design must be parsimonious and 
exploit the physics and constraints of the agent's 
ecological niche.  
 
Cheap Design: The niche can be extended to the 
social levels, where apparent behaviours emerge 
in the audience’s perception of the machine 
performer. 
Example: Blind Robot is foreseen as an expert in 
touch. In reality, his touch is far from being as 
subtle as a human’s. However, it suffices for the 
audience to engage in interaction with the 
machine. 
Redundancy: agent-different subsystems function 
on the basis of different physical processes, there 
is partial overlap of functionality between the 
different subsystems. 
 
Redundancy: machine performer behaviours must 
align as much as possible the ecological body 
with the historical/cultural body. 
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Sensory-motor coordination: enables an agent to 
interact efficiently with its environment and to 
structure its sensory input. Both the agent's 
morphology and its material properties provide 
physical constraints to significantly simplify the 
implementation of control architectures. 
 
Sensory-motor coordination. Empowering an 
operator as a sensor-feedback loop element can 
greatly enhanced the SMC. 
Example: While developing a machine performer, 
an operator can trigger activities in the quest of 
the dynamics of movements or spontaneity of the 
behaviours. 
Example: Tiller Girls is an improvised 
performance. Devolution’s Spine has better 
dynamics if triggered by an operator. 
 Devolution’s prostheses have a greater richness 
of movement on the back of a human performer; 
their actual control is a simple static loop. 
Ecological Balance: The capabilities of an 
agent’s morphology (shape, material properties) 
and its sensor, motor and neural systems have to 
be carefully balanced. The capabilities are all 
ecologically balanced vis-à-vis their ecological 
niche. Control is not limited to the neural system 
(or the control program) but rather distributed 
among all these components.  
 
Ecological Balance: Control is indeed not limited 
to the neural system (or the control program) but 
rather distributed among all these components: 
the layers of embodiment, the morphologies and 
the characters. 
 
Example: The Chess Player was perceived as 
autonomous and vested with intelligence. Control 
was borrowed from a human but hidden to the 
audience. 
Table 15. Synthetic methodology and machine performer design
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4  
Perception and Reception 
4.1. Outline of chapter 
As the movement of a machine is one of the most prominent factors for the 
perception of its agency, this chapter will focus on our intrinsic human mechanisms of 
perception of motion. I will look more precisely at this perception as a phenomenal 
experience from the audience’s point of view. I will also investigate prominent 
theories and techniques that deal with human perception at the intellectual and 
phenomenal levels, in order to contextualize my research. 
As I have mentioned earlier in this thesis, when an audience perceives an 
object in motion, principles of animacy, causality and attribution offer a body of 
theory and corresponding experimental verification concerned with the attribution of 
intention to this object (Heider and Simmel 1944; Michotte 1963). The psychological 
experiments found in this field are based exclusively on the motion of abstract objects 
and are not designed to suggest any direct anthropomorphic associations. In the course 
of investigating attribution theory, I recreated the Heider and Simmel experiment with 
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the Tiller Girls. The results proved that viewers actually shift their perception of the 
behaviour of a machine like Stumpy from that of a walker into that of a Tiller Girl 
dancer. On this level, direct anthropomorphic suggestions do not necessarily imply a 
positive reaction from the audience, nor a sense of autonomy or agency. In Chapter 2, 
I argued that the Uncanny Valley is ill-formed mainly due to a misconception of 
anthropomorphism. Here, I will look at the intangible causes of anthropomorphization 
found in primal, cognitive and social discourses.   
Just to recapitulate, when a machine performer is placed on the stage, the level 
of its agency is shifted. Extending the vision of nouvelle AI beyond physical 
embodiment, I investigated how alternative morphologies can engender a phenomenal 
(visceral) reaction in the audience, and how the biological mechanisms of the 
perception of human motion can provide grounds of empathy towards inert 
mechanical bodies. In this process, I looked at the “share manifold” hypothesis, a 
neurobiological explanation of empathy and embodiment (Gallese 2001). I also looked 
at point light displays as a technique used to analyse the perception of human and 
biological motion. I created an experimental scenario combining the two fields in 
order to evaluate a) whether the shared manifold could be applied to machine 
performers, and b) whether mechanical motion can transform in principle into 
biological motion.  
For this more specifically psychological section of my research, I have based 
my observations on practical work staging humans alongside machines. Devolution 
(2006) was a major commission by the Australian Dance Theatre under the direction 
of choreographer Garry Stewart. Through Devolution, I will look at all the machine 
performers of the company’s cast and reflect on these aspects in relation to theories of 
human perception. I will examine group movements such as flocking, and situate them 
within this perceptual realm, and consider the machine performer in the stage space 
and its contribution to the construction of atmosphere (Böhme 2008). 
4.2.  Animacy, causality and attribution 
The perception of animacy, causality and motion was an important field of 
research opened up by psychology and neurobiology in the early 20th century. As 
Albert Michotte suggested, scientific evidence was being accumulated about very 
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simple displays (visual cues) and how they give rise to surprisingly high-level percepts 
(Michotte 1963). The simplest way to describe perceptual causality and perceptual 
animacy is to use Michotte’s description of the “launching effect” (Scholl and 
Tremoulet 2000, p. 299): 
(1) Two small squares are sitting in a line, separated by several inches. The first 
square (A) moves in a straight line until it reaches the second square (B), at which 
point A stops moving and B starts moving along the same trajectory.  
(2) Two small squares are sitting in a line, separated by several inches. The first 
square (A) begins moving in a straight line towards the second square (B). As soon as 
A gets close to B, B begins moving quickly away from A in a random direction, until 
it is again several inches from A, at which point it stops. A continues all the while to 
move straight towards B’s position, wherever that is at any given moment. This 
pattern repeats several times. (Michotte 1963; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000) 
This seems like an objective description based on simple physics and 
kinematic movement. However, an analysis of subjective perception indicates that it 
distinguishes two salient situations: in the first situation, A causes the motion of B 
(causality) while in the second, A and B are seen as alive (animacy), with a certain 
intention attributed to their motions, such as B trying to flee from A. In Michotte’s 
concept of “functional relations”, in which properties are perceived from visual cues 
(objective environment), he posits that these interpretations cannot be located in either 
the actual events or their retinal reception.  
4.2.1. Heider and Simmel’s apparent behaviour experiment 
Heider and Simmel expanded the awareness of those fields through the method 
of testing and collecting animated perceptual responses with different audiences 
(Heider 1944; Heider and Simmel 1944). They showed that functional relations are 
primarily perceptual but that their interpretation is highly personalized and individual. 
They did not set out to investigate facial expressions out of context, or to interpret 
intention or emotion, but rather to test if situations and activities could be measured by 
“describe what you see” methodologies. Within this position, they were not looking 
for correctness of response but for dependence on a variety of stimulus-configurations. 
The Heider and Simmel experiment protocol was as follows: a candidate was 
presented with a short animated movie followed by a series of questions. I cite the 
description of the movie from their publication to exemplify the way they constructed 
Animacy, causality and attribution © Demers 2014 
 
198 
the story. The portrayal uses anthropomorphic words for the purpose of efficiency, 
since purely geometrical terms would be too cumbersome: 
The large triangle is referred to by T, the small triangle by t, the disc by c (circle) and 
the rectangle by 'house.' 1. T moves toward the house, opens door, moves into the 
house and closes door. 2. t and c appear and move around near the door 3. T moves 
out of the house toward t 4. T and t fight, T wins: during the fight, c moves into the 
house 5. T moves into the house and shuts door 6. T chases c within the house: t 
moves along the outside of the house toward the door 7. t opens the door and c moves 
out of the house and t and c close the door 8. T seems to try to get out of the house but 
does not succeed in opening the door: t and c move in circles around the outside of the 
house and touch each other several times 9. T opens the door and comes out of the 
house 10. T chases t and c twice around the house 11. t and c leave the field 12. T hits 
the walls of the house several times: the walls break. (Heider 1944, p. 245) 
 
 
Figure 56. Frames from Heider and Simmel's experiment 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by RightsLink. 
Heider and Simmel built three sets of experiments where the first group was 
simply asked to "write down what happened in the picture." The second group was 
asked to interpret the movements of the figures as actions of people, for instance, 
“What kind of a person is the big triangle? What did the circle do when it was in the 
house with the big triangle? Why? The last group was shown the picture in reverse 
with a subset of questions from the second group. Results show that all but a few (less 
than 5%) interpreted the picture in terms of actions of animated beings, chiefly human. 
The researchers interpreted the movement combinations as comprising four 
categories: 1) successive movements with momentary contact, seen as energetic 
movements, 2) simultaneous movements with prolonged contact where origin and 
recipient of a movement induces perception, 3) simultaneous movements without 
contact where the origin will anchor interpretation such as in leading versus following, 
and finally 4) successive movements without contact such as chasing or aggressing. 
They further analysed the perceived origins of movements as causal and need. In 
causal origins, the movements are organized in terms of acts of persons. In contrast, in 
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cases of need as origin, when a movement is ascribed to a figural unit, this unit is 
perceived as animated, hence a perception of motive or need arises. However, 
motivation cannot be read from movement alone, but only with the surrounding field 
and connected sequences. A figure entering the house can hide, pursue or be pursued, 
depending on the unfolding of movements. In sum, attribution of origin influences 
interpretation of movements and the way these figures are judged. The Heider and 
Simmel experiments have been reproduced recently, and some variation in the 
description of the characters has been noted, perhaps, as the authors argue, due to 
growing exposure to animated characters (Lück 2006).   
Clearly animacy cannot be separated from concepts of embodiment or of the 
bodies of primal mechanisms. In their seminal survey, psychologists Tremoulet and 
School presented current topics about animacy and causality (Scholl and Tremoulet 
2000). The results tend to show that the perception of animacy and causality are 
innately connected in human beings. They introduce a great deal of evidence showing 
that humans might have several perceptual pathways, hardwired for certain stages of 
visual perception, while other stages are the result of higher-level cognitive 
interpretation. For instance, they report a neuroscience study that links perceptual 
animacy to brain structures in the context of this psychological research experiment. A 
patient with amygdala damage, however, did not describe a specific movie in 
anthropomorphic terms, suggesting the important role of the amygdala in social 
perception (Heberlein and Adolphs 2004). 
4.2.2. Reconstructing Heider and Simmel with the Tiller Girls 
I devised a small experiment reproducing similar conditions and goals as Heider and 
Simmel’s 1944 apparent behaviour tests. The aim of this experiment was to verify 
whether an audience would indeed, as for abstract figures, build narrative structures 
and endow the Tiller Girls with intentions and attitudes. I was particularly interested to 
see if gaits would be perceived as dance, i.e. if the machine performer would shift, in 
audience perceptions, from a functional behaviour (walking) to an intentional 
behaviour (dancing a specific choreography).  
The experiment included some variations on the original procedure. The 
candidates were first presented with a series of 15 short (ten seconds) clips. Each 
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segment was presented only once and each showed one Tiller Girl robot performing 
one gait (e.g. turn left, walk forward, crawl). For each clip, the participants were asked 
to briefly describe the action they saw and attribute an internal state to the robot. The 
audience was instructed to answer nil if they did not discern any state. Two longer 
sequences (35 seconds and 1.45 minutes respectively) followed these short gaits. 
These sequences showed a series of gaits successively linked together with two robots. 
The machines performed the exact same moves with their respective position 
constantly altered as a result of their respective movements. After the presentation of 
the first sequence, people were asked to state “What they saw”. After the presentation 
of the second sequence, people were again invited to state their perception but they 
were also asked to describe the two different characters they had just seen in the 
sequence. I administered the test on three small groups for a total of N=19 subjects, 
where the gaits and sequences were projected in a single frontal screen before the 
whole group. All the videos were played silently. 
 
Figure 57. Gaits - Stumping, falling, turn left, dervish 
 
 
Figure 58. Duets.  Embracing (left). Throwing partner on the floor (right) 
Among all the observed gaits (15 gaits shown x 19 respondents = 285), only 
six were described using the word dance (or variation of), which appeared three times 
for one specific sequence (walking forward and away from the camera). The most 
striking result was with the narrative sequences, where the word dance appeared 13 
times for the first sequence (approx. 68%) and 6 times for the second sequence (32%). 
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Not only did the presence of a second character induce the perception of 
animacy and causality in the subjects, but it also transformed a series of successive 
gaits into dance gestures. Unfortunately the tests did not include a sequence where 
successive gaits of a single robot were linked back to back, in order to isolate the 
experimental variables: solo versus duet and single gait versus a series of gaits. 
Regardless of either variable as responsible for the actual contributing factor in 
perceiving the Tiller Girls as dancing, both cases would be the result of an act of mise-
en-scène. The only case that represents a neutral viewing condition of the Tiller Girls 
“function” (lab scenario) is the one of single gait where subjects read a negligible 
amount of movement as dance. 
In the two sequences, both Tiller Girls’ motors were simultaneously controlled 
by the same commands. Obviously, the lack of variation in each robot structure, as 
well as in the floor and in their original starting positions, were among contributing 
factors that made the robots’ behaviour in principle comparable and in fact perceptibly 
different. This mirroring state was respectively noticed for sequence one and two by 
42% and 21% of the subjects. Therefore, in both sequences, the staging makes the 
characters appear to behave differently (under the same actuation), especially after the 
breaking points: one protagonist falls off the stage while in the second sequence one 
protagonist throws the other on the floor. These observations corroborate the results of 
Chapter 3 where it was seen that the environment cannot be solely ecological but must 
also include the cultural or social staging of tensions in order to attribute 
intentionality. 
Philosopher Pierre Le Morvan’s distinction between three types of 
intentionality, "transparent", "translucent", and "opaque" (Le Morvan 2005) is useful 
for an analysis of the apparent behaviour(s) of the Tiller Girls in this experiment. 
Morvan calls the “intendum” what an intentional state is about, and the “intender” the 
subject who is in the intentional state. Le Morvan builds the three categories on two 
criteria: existentially transparent or opaque (condition I) and referentially transparent 
or opaque (condition II). Condition I grounds the intention: object sighting (seeing 
objects or events) and factual seeing (seeing facts about objects or events), which are 
genuinely relational if they entail the existence of not just the intender (the subject) but 
the “intendum” as well. Condition II enables substitution of identical relations for the 
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same “intendum”: if the intentional state is about a, and a = b, then the intentional state 
is about b as well.  Equally, a state is referentially transparent if subject S sees a, and a 
= b, then S sees b, whether or not S realizes that she is seeing b or realizes that a = b.  
An intentional state is transparent if it satisfies two criteria. An intentional state is 
translucent if it satisfies (I) but not (II). An intentional state is opaque if it satisfies 
neither (I) nor (II). 
In the sequences, the internal “motoric intentions” are obviously the same but 
the environment makes them emerge externally as quite different. According to Le 
Morvan, and as an intuitive reading, all the actions in the sequences should be 
transparent. After all, the Tiller Girls can be substituted for each other (Condition II).  
The perceived intention of a sequence of motoric actions is bound and grounded to the 
physical object directly by means of morphological computing (Condition I). 
However, according to the results of the experiment there is breach in condition II, as 
exactly the same movements in two robots are ascribed different intentions in both 
sequences (even if they are identical). There is also a potential breach in condition I, as 
the same movements are seen equally as functional (gaits) or performative (dance) 
depending on where they are presented in solos or duets. This depends on the 
strictness with which condition I is applied. Intentionality in these mechanical agents 
is neither translucent nor transparent, but becomes opaque in terms of their social 
interactions  (at higher levels of embodiment, see Chapter 3.3). Meanwhile, at the 
motoric level and at the ecological level (interaction with the environment, e.g. at 
lower levels of embodiment), it should be transparent or at least, translucent.  
In sum what seemed an obvious situation of replaceable and substitutable 
behaviours among a cast of identical objects is not so direct. The emergence of 
perceived intentions signifies the potential of similar ensembles of robots to generate 
patterns that would encompass and express the mechanical nature of the origins of the 
movements. Along these lines, I will explore in Chapter 4.6 how behaviours from non-
intentional systems such as swarms can contribute to the creation of “atmospheres” on 
stage. 
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4.3. Anthropomorphism 
Anthropomorphism within the history of machines, design of objects and 
theatre semiotics includes a broad array of abstract and representative mimicries of 
human behaviour. From the beginnings of Greek automata to biomechanics, 
enhancement via anthropomorphism has played a major perceptual role. 
Anthropomorphism is an important factor in the arts context. 
Anthropomorphism entails attributing humanlike emotional states, behavioural 
characteristics, or humanlike forms to nonhuman agents.  In the 6th century BCE, 
Xenophanes was the first to use “anthropomorphism” when describing the similarities 
between religious agents and their believers (Lesher 1992). As Dennett also confirms, 
the audience often attributed intention to mechanical characters or agents in relation to 
their predominant belief systems (Dennett 1987). 
The close association between the performing machine’s visual impact and that 
of a human agent raises difficult questions not only for artistic practice but also for 
scientific disciplines. According to Cary Wolfe, both anthropocentrism and specieism 
reflect the priority of visual reception in the human sensorium (Wolfe 2002). 
Today, this attribution raises questions about the level of anthropomorphism 
needed in robots (Duffy 2003). It also raises discussion in relation to the act of 
projecting intentions onto performing machines, and questions whether this is an 
inevitable reflex or not (Duffy and Joue 2005). When comparing attributions to the 
machine performer in the field of AI, the fictional potentials of the stage have always 
and always will allow the audience to have associative attributes rather than literal 
ones.  Normally a literal interpretation by the audience is related to the goal-oriented 
approach of nouvelle AI. However, complex behaviour could emerge from robot 
morphologies that bear no direct resemblance to zoomorphic entities. This allows for 
greater freedom in the audience’s associations. 
I would suggest that behavioural scientist Nicholas Epley’s definition of 
anthropomorphism is more suitable for performing machines. He defines it as a 
process of inference about unobservable characteristics of a nonhuman agent, rather 
than a descriptive report of a nonhuman agent’s observable or imagined behaviour 
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(Epley, Waytz et al. 2007; Epley, Waytz et al. 2008). Anthropomorphism is far from 
being based solely on visual cues, nor does it include behavioural description of 
observable actions. Describing an observable action, for instance ‘this agent is 
aggressive’, does not entail anthropomorphism. It is only when this level is 
transcended and judgment and attribution are involved (‘this agent is vindictive’) that 
anthropomorphism comes in. Hence anthropomorphism does not merely entail 
animism. Treating an agent as living, animate life is not uniquely a human 
characteristic. Like any belief, anthropomorphism does not require the reflective 
endorsement of an inference: for instance, when one curses a computer, because not 
all will consider that a computer truly possesses humanlike characteristics. A strong 
form of anthropomorphism arises when one thinks that the agent actually possesses 
human traits, where weak anthropomorphism (as in the example of the computer) 
follows a weaker as-if component. Anthropomorphism is not necessarily the result of a 
mistaken representation of a nonhuman agent, nor does it need to be accurate. 
It follows from the above-mentioned characteristics (which are based on 
Epley’s views of anthropomorphism) that when social robotics seeks a “visual 
anthropomorphism” it is perhaps on the wrong path. Research on the Uncanny Valley 
and the study of the psychological impact of robots usually formulates questions about 
the minimal set of visual human features that supplements or augments the 
functionality of a robot.  Formulating the problematic in such terms imply an optimal 
solution. Anthropologist Denis Vidal investigated anthropomorphism in robotics and 
in the rituals used to mediate between gods and humans. His findings show that 
anthropomorphism is far from being optimal in rituals. Objects found in rituals rarely 
bear any truly anthropomorphic resemblance, nor do they follow the anthropocentric 
reflex of roboticists that requires any entity that deals with human contexts to act in 
the same way as humans act with each other (Vidal 2007). 
Designer Carl DiSalvo studied the attributes of anthropomorphism when 
objects are intended and/or perceived as trying to imitate humans. DiSalvo proposes 
four kinds of anthropomorphic feature that can all be present in a single artefact: 
The Structural anthropomorphic form imitates the construction and operation of the 
human body with a focus on its materiality. The presence of shapes, volumes, 
mechanisms, or arrangements that mimic the appearance or functioning of the human 
body is evidence of structural anthropomorphic form. […] Gestural anthropomorphic 
form imitates the ways people communicate with and through the human body with a 
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focus on human behaviour. It draws from knowledge of human non-verbal 
communication and reflects the expressiveness of the human body. […] The 
anthropomorphic form of character imitates the traits, roles or functions of people. It 
also emphasizes the purpose of individual action. […] Aware anthropomorphic form 
imitates the human capacity for thought, intentionality, or inquiry. It also recognizes 
the social qualities of being human. However, unlike the anthropomorphic form of 
character, which privileges the individual in the society, aware anthropomorphic form 
emphasizes a common nature of being human. (DiSalvo, Gemperle et al. 2005) 
 
Mechanomorphism would be the pendant of anthropomorphism when we 
attribute mechanical qualities to humans (or objects). Felicia McCarren in her Dancing 
Machines discusses dancers as machines: “Dancers have represented both the 
capabilities of highly mechanized body and the pre-technological body whose 
powerful naturalness is imitated by machinery” (McCarren 2003, p. 4). She considers 
dance performance as labour: “Arguably important to a cultural reconception of 
gesture and rhythm in labour, dance offers ways of thinking both about the movement 
possible with machines and about machines moving themselves” (McCarren 2003, p. 
4). The dancing machines of her book are a hybrid between anthropomorphism and 
mechanomorphism: dancers imagining themselves as machines and machines being 
imagined as dancers. 
In relation to these shifting definitions of anthropomorphism, machine 
performers and puppets share the essential characteristics of being inert entities that 
are “animated” and “brought to life” in front of an audience. When Steve Tellis writes 
about puppet anthropomorphism, he suggests that the verisimilitude in mimicking 
human behaviour often creates a superficial sense of realism (Tellis 1992). He further 
suggests that the illusion of life is better supported from movements exclusive to the 
puppets’ morphology. A comparable argument can be raised in relation to sculptural 
movement. In his Morphology of Movement, kinetic artist George Rickey traces the 
history of verisimilitude in art and argues that when artists attempt to abstract and 
stylize form from reality they are often more successful (Rickey 1963). He further 
suggests that awkwardness and failure to achieve verisimilitude permitted objects to 
evolve into an artwork. In his terms, kinetic art cannot be served by a direct imitation 
of nature but by recognition of it laws, awareness of its analogies and response to the 
vast repertory of its movement through the environment. For instance Jean Tinguely’s 
1959 Métamatics series of drawing machines imitates the painting gestures of abstract 
expressionism in an ironic way. 
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Therefore, the interpretation of robots as performers, or staged robots, involves 
an act of suspension of disbelief as a first and constitutive condition of theatrical 
reality. The puppet as the machine performer takes on its metaphorical connotations 
because it inherently provokes the process of double vision, creating doubt as to its 
ontological status: What is the nature of its being? By sharing these ontological29 
questions raised by puppet theorists, and by exploring the paradox of the quasi-living, 
machine performers force one to define a set of new ontological states that could 
become future guidelines, in artistic and scientific domains, for both researchers and 
educationalists (Gruber 1993; Emmeche 1994). 
I would suggest that part of the major appeal of machine performers to their 
viewers is the sense that they are conspecific with them. Like mirror neurons30, 
machines are often built to mimic human behaviour, as though the viewers were 
performing the actions themselves. But appearing conspecific does not entail being 
structurally anthropomorphic, but rather being metaphorically anthropomorphic in 
gestures and traits. In their analysis of the coming 21st century theatre, Sermon and 
Ryngaert cite the many transformations of the human body on the stage since the early 
1900s, including disfigured bodies, mechanized bodies, artificial bodies and 
dehumanized bodies as various attempts to become “anthroponoclast” (Ryngaert and 
Sermon 2012). 
The movement (or perceptible change of state) of an object can be seen as 
indicating its objective nature, of which the act of perception is the subjective 
counterpart. Consequently, a rather abstract inert shape can become fluid, organic and 
eventually anthropomorphic by the sole means of contextualization and movement. In 
La Cour des Miracles, all the robotic performers play the role of miserable machines 
(begging, convulsing, limping and harassing) using gestural anthropomorphism (see 
Chapter 1 for figures and descriptions). These deviant machines are shaped to support 
their hypothetical gestures. The perceived behaviours manifested by these robotic 
agents are, then, neither real (as no evidence of robot pain has been proved) nor 
strictly faked, but they are still undoubtedly material and visible. As Epley argues, this 
                                                
29 In the context of artificial life, an ontology defines how the world in which the agent lives is 
constructed, how this world is perceived by the agent and how the agent may act upon its world. 
30 Psychologist Susan Blackmore attempts to constitute mimetics as a science by discussing its 
empirical and analytic potential. 
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anthropomorphism does not need to be ‘correct’, but credibility is greatly enhanced 
when the audience’s response goes beyond mere animacy towards empathy and 
anthropopathy. 
The convulsive machine is helplessly shivering with spasms. The structure of 
this robot is derived in such way that the actual mechanisms are under a supreme 
physical stress and tension. This tension percolates into a perceived psychological 
stress, enhancing the psychophysical unity of the machine. In fact the apparently 
afflicted bodies are carefully “designed” and “animated” to promote the actuality of 
their pain which, in turn, foregrounds behaviours over morphologies. 
Staging the begging machine anthropomorphizes its perception. Viewers of La 
Cour des Miracles perceive it as a miserable, afflicted creature. With scarcely any 
computer input, the behaviour is carried out by a juxtaposition of this social mise-en-
scène and the gestural anthropomorphism of the character. Starting from a weak 
anthropomorphism (a box should have no affliction), the anthropopathy towards this 
machine and its consequent degree of credibility increases in strength. The begging 
machine’s body is not anthropomorphic, but elements of its anatomy recall parts of the 
human body, for instance the arm that grabs the money. Actually it is the gestures that 
provide the anthropomorphism here. The body’s trunk is a structure inspired by a 
(treasure) chest but its rocking movement mimics that of a beggar. The robot starts 
with a weak anthropomorphism in its structure, the gestures make the 
anthropomorphism stronger, and finally the contextualization raises the level to an 
actual anthropomorphization of this machine performer as a beggar. 
 
4.4. Perception of human movement 
There has been rising interest recently in the perception of dance – human 
movement – and its potential relations with the mirror neuron systems (MNS) of the 
brain (Hagendoorn 2005; Reason and Reynolds 2010; Jola, Ehrenberg et al. 2011). 
Dance analysis is focused not so much on the imitative powers of MNS as on the 
potentials of empathy bound to what Vittorio Gallese has called the shared manifold 
hypothesis (Gallese 2001). Lying at the root of phenomenal identification with the 
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dancing body on stage, this hypothesis resides in the human ability to perform an 
embodied simulation (Gallese 2005). 
In this section, my aim is to construct a similar hypothesis for the perception of 
the machine performer. As studies in MNS have mixed results about the systems’ 
activation when watching a non-human (or non-biological) agent, I will have to 
investigate possible correspondences between machine and human performers. 
Regardless of whether the shared manifold hypothesis can be solidly proven or not, 
the establishment of pathways between the perception of the human and the 
mechanical body might provide a rationale for our visceral reactions to machine 
performers (as in La Cour des Miracles or with Tiller Girls). As I have demonstrated 
with regard to the powers of anthropomorphic suggestion, the perceptions concerned 
are intellectual. Studying the perception of the machine performer’s movements 
addresses a complementary process. 
4.4.1. Embodied simulation, body schema and correspondence. 
For Gallese, the same neural structures are involved in our conscious 
modelling of our body acting in space as in our awareness of living bodies and objects 
in the world. Gallese also argues that other neural circuits guide the sensations and 
emotions in and through which we experience and interpret actions performed by 
others, and understand the emotions and sensations they experience. Basically this is 
the neural route of empathy based on a mutual understanding of social and cultural 
codes found in human gestures. This hypothesis proposes, therefore, that we 
understand actions by a process of simulation, against a personal background of 
emotions, within our own bodies. 
To create this awareness, neuroscientists refer to the concept of “body schema” 
and “body image” (Gallese 2005). The body schema is an unconscious body map that 
is used to move and monitor the actions of our body parts. In contrast, the body image 
is a conscious perception of our own body. The body schema operates at the 
physiological level while the body image corresponds to a phenomenological level. 
Relating this to Chapter 3, robots of nouvelle AI have a body schema, and in my 
works I suggest that machine performers have (i.e. create) a body image. 
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Gallese states that our social competence is based on the meaning of the 
actions we witness. These fall into two categories: transitive, object-related actions 
(grasping a mug) and intransitive, expressive or deictic action (sending kisses). 
Gallese points out:  
What makes our perception of both types of actions different from our perception of 
the inanimate world is the fact that there is something shared between the first and 
third person perspective of the former events; the observer and the observed are both 
human beings endowed with a similar brain-body system making them act alike. 
(Gallese 2005, p. 32) 
Meaningful conceptual structures arise from the structured nature of bodily and social 
experience. They also arise from our innate capacity to imaginatively project from 
certain well-structured aspects of bodily and interactional experience to abstract 
conceptual structures (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Given the observations made in this 
section, we may conclude that a robot with wheels, as opposed to legs, would lead to 
very different bodily reactions in the audience. Hence the role of the designer is to 
endow both structures and movements of the machine performer with some level of 
shared mutual bodily understanding with the audience.  
4.4.2. Correspondence 
The correspondence problem is an important issue in imitation by agents. 
Dautenhahn and Nehaniv posit this problem as being like a “given animator (a 
biological or artificial system) trying to imitate a model (the biological or artificial 
system to be imitated)”, and ask: “how can the imitator identify, generate, and 
evaluate appropriate mappings (perceptual, behavioural, cognitive) between its own 
behaviour and the behaviour of the model?” (Dautenhahn and Nehaniv 2002) For 
instance, structural homologies among tetrapod animals and artefacts could link the 
head, the feet and the hands. In a similar fashion to the body-map, the imitator has to 
identify structural correspondences. 
However, even systems with very dissimilar bodies (and body-maps) can 
achieve the same behaviour. In this case, the authors give the example of hovering as 
common to a hummingbird, a helicopter and a hoverfly (syrphid fly). Mimicking or 
copying presupposes a notion of correspondence between agents. Dautenhahn and 
Nehaniv tend to focus on the formalization and algorithmic implementation of the 
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problem for artificial agents. Nonetheless, the way in which the mirror neuron system 
mediates relations between actions of agents on their environment may well also be 
relevant to the investigation of this correspondence. 
4.4.3. Point light displays 
We rarely have to rely on animate motion alone to generate shared bodily 
understanding or correspondence, as multiple cues are usually present at the same 
time. In order to isolate the visual perception of biological motion, Gunnar Johansson 
introduced point light displays (PLDs) into experimental psychology some 40 years 
ago (Johansson, 1973). Replacing the normal visual cues of a human body by a small 
number of dots matching the major structural points of the body, these create a vivid 
percept of the human body (Johansson, 1976). With such point-light walkers, 
experiments found that participants can attribute gender to a walker and identify 
individual persons. Although this effortless organization of a small number of moving 
dots into the coherent percept is well documented, the underlying mechanisms are still 
poorly understood (Troje, Westhoff et al. 2005). Point light displays (PLD) also offer 
a technique to investigate the isolation of movement from anthropomorphic visual 
cues, rendering the body as an abstract structure or morphology.  
 
 
Figure 59. Point light displays for human movement (Shiffrar 2011) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by RightsLink. 
On the analogy of biological motion, point light techniques can also be used to 
study non-biological motion. Pyles and Grossman’s experiments are based on 
synthetic creatures derived from evolutionary algorithms. The study examines 
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behavioural and neural responses to novel, articulated, non-human ”biological 
motion”. The researchers found that artificially evolved creatures can effectively 
portray animate events, even when depicted only as point-lights (Pyles, Garcia et al. 
2007; Pyles and Grossman 2009). 
As each creature in these experiments represents a different model, observers 
must build the body representation anew each time from implied cues. Pyles and 
Grossman point out that 
[…] body structure is much more informative for human point-light animations in 
which the same body configuration can be anticipated regardless of the action 
depicted. Prior assumptions regarding body structure will be less informative for the 
Creature trials as compared to the human trials. (Pyles, Garcia et al. 2007, p. 2795) 
Finally, their results on neuroimaging are not congruent with each other with respect 
to the way the brain regions are triggered when watching the PLDs of humans and of 
what Pyles and Grossman call “creatures”. They suggest that there is evidence for 
neural mechanisms of perception that processes novel dynamic objects such as non-
human creatures.  
With colleague Chouchourelou, Margie Shiffrar, an authority on the perception 
of motion, compared stimuli from biological (human and animal) and non-biological 
sources in order to expand on previous observations that percepts of biological and 
non-biological objects are neurologically dissociable. The PLD technique has been 
mainly used for human gait and it is far from clear how this can be generalized to 
nonhuman movements. Chouchourelou and Shiffrar report that 
The visual percepts of human motion and object motion typically differ from one 
another dichotomously while the percepts of human motion and non-human, animal 
motion vary smoothly along some continuum. That continuum appears to be graded in 
a manner that reflects the degree of similarity between an observed event and the 
observer’s ability to produce that event with his or her own body. (Chouchourelou, 
Golden et al. 2013) 
It is suggested that this gradient may be defined by the degree of bodily similarity 
between the observer’s own body and observed bodies: 
Indeed, observers in the simple studies described here consistently demonstrated 
greater visual sensitivity to some non-biological entities, such as cars, than to some 
biological entities, such as the apedal bodies of fish and snakes. Interestingly, when 
non-biological objects, such as wooden blocks, are positioned so as to mimic the 
structure of the human body, observers tend to interpret the movements of those non-
biological objects as if they were actually human movement. (Ibid.) 
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Despite the observation of these specific cases,  
[t]he results [of their experiment] are consistent with the existence of a perceptual 
category that might be called “biological motion” that includes at least people and 
animals but not human made objects. Within this proposed category of “biological 
motion”, human movement appears to constitute the best or prototypical stimulus that 
yields the greatest neural activity within the action perception system as well as 
relatively elevated perceptual sensitivity. (Ibid.) 
4.4.4. The Tiller Girls’ body schema. 
In order to investigate if there are phenomenological levels where a human 
audience could identify with the Tiller Girls, I sought to establish whether or not there 
was any form of correspondence between the Tiller Girls’ body schema and that of 
humans.   
In this experiment, I am trying to see if the “shared manifold” hypothesis can 
be verified by the audience’s biological perception of the movement of the machine 
performers on stage. I can also test the possibility of modulating the perception of 
mechanical motion and shifting it into the realm of animal motion. The experimental 
results demonstrate that participants recognize alternative locomotion patterns in some 
special cases of the Tiller Girls’ PLDs, and also that any structural correspondence 
suggested between humans and Tiller Girls disturbs the classification of some Tiller 
Girl gaits. 
 
 
Figure 60. Motion capture of Tiller Girls 
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The generation of the PLDs of the Tiller Girls was done in a dance studio using 
motion capture recording systems. Only one robot was recorded at a time. I made 
three sets of recordings with a different number and location of light points on the 
robots. The recordings with nine points are the fullest and most literal representation 
of the Tiller Girls’ morphology, virtually mapping the points where their four feet 
touch the ground. Two other in-between scenarios utilize six points, the first with the 
shoulders and feet points aligned (two opposed T’s), and the second with only the 
extremities aligned (two opposed V’s). 
 
 
Figure 61. Tiller Girls’ PLDs. Four legged vs. two legged bodies 
In the spirit of the previous Shiffrar experiment, the test consisted of 15 
different PLD sequences with each lasting around three to four seconds. The clips 
were played three times in a row. There was one clip for training the subjects. The clip 
was a human walking normally. The subjects were asked to determine if the 
movements they saw were mechanical, animal or human in nature. Subjects were 
instructed to assign “other” if they could not categorize what they perceived and, if 
they wanted to be more specific (e.g. insect as opposed to animal), to write their 
alternative perception. The subjects were also asked to label the action and give the 
direction of the perceived movement. I administered the test to three small groups for 
a total of N=19 subjects where the PLDs were projected in a single frontal screen 
before the whole group. All videos were played silently. 
The 15 clips comprised five human, four animal and six mechanical 
movements. The human actions ranged from the simple (jogging, cartwheel and 
sidekick) to the complex (performing push-ups and crawling on four legs). Among the 
five animals, none were bipedal (dog walking and seal crawling) and two were apedal 
(owl and bat flying). All the clips except the mechanical ones were taken from an 
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existing database made by Tomas Shipley’s Spatial Cognition, Action, and Perception 
Lab at Temple University31. All the mechanical PLDs were extracted from the Tiller 
Girls’ motion capture. Two out of the six sequences utilized the “four legged” Tiller 
Girls and the others, the double V configuration. 
For a sub-group, prior to the training video, I presented the image of Figure 62. 
This image suggests a potential mapping that is transferable from the human figure to 
the Tiller Girls: it aims at establishing a correspondence between human shoulders and 
arms and the upper T structure of the Tiller Girls and also between the human waist 
and legs and the waist and feet of the robot. I selected the double V point light 
displays as opposed to the nine points, so the suggestion does not refer to an obvious 
mechanical artefact. 
 
Figure 62. Suggestion for mapping – experimental variable 
Figure 63 and Figure 64 report the success rate of identification of the object in 
motions. These results are comparable with the results from Shiffrar depicted in Figure 
65. Complex human movements are confused with mechanical ones in the Shiffrar 
study and with animal movements in my case. There is a remarkable difference for 
apedal animals. In my experiment, the wing flapping of flying animals was rather easy 
to detect, while Shifrar’s tests included swimming motions, which are more intricate 
and difficult.  Mechanical objects seemed to be identified by the majority of 
participants in both studies.  
 
                                                
31 http://astro.temple.edu/%7Etshipley/mocap.html 
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Observer 
categorization 
response 
Human 
(simple) 
Human 
(complex) 
Animal 
(walking) 
Animal 
(flying) 
TillerGirls 
(four legs) 
TillerGirls 
(two legs) 
Human 0.96 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.11 
Animal  0.39 0.61 0.61 0.08 0.20 
Mechanical 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.82 0.54 
Other  0.29 0.11 0.34 0.08 0.16 
 
Figure 63. Success rate by category and stimulus type 
 
 
Figure 64. Success rate for each clip, by category of stimulus 
 
 
Figure 65. Success rate by stimulus (Chouchourelou, Golden et al. 2011, p. 5) 
Permission to reproduce this figure has been granted by the authors. 
 
The main results are that the two-legged Tiller Girls are perceived as less 
mechanical than the four-legged ones, and that the suggestion for equivalences 
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between the human body and the two-legged Tiller Girls had some influence on their 
categorization as non-mechanical. Among the four sequences including the two-
legged robot, three had their most frequent responses miscategorised. In the upright 
walking position, the robot perceived as walking is more frequent in the group 
exposed to the transfer suggestion indicated above. In its crawling position, the 
exposed group perceives the motion more as animal than the non-exposed group. In its 
rotating dervish motion, most members of the exposed group see the robot as an 
animal, while the non-exposed group clearly stick to a perceived mechanical gesture. 
Tiller Girls two-legged  
Observed as 
G1 - non-exposed 
G2 - exposed Walking Crawling Dervish Walking 
Human G1  0.11  0.11 
Human G2 (*) 0.40   0.30 
Animal G1 0.11 0.44   
Animal G2 0.2 (*) 0.70 (*) 0.56  
Mechanical G1 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.78 
Mechanical G2 0.30 0.10 0.44 0.70 
Other G1 0.22 0.11 0.20 0.11 
Other G2  0.20   
 
Table 16. Correspondence impact on two-legged Tiller PLDs 
 
This experiment still needs to investigate the scrambling and noise factors that 
are a norm in the PLD studies of human motion. As building a fully-fledged PLD test 
would be a large enterprise involving programming and motion capture of many 
subjects and objects, I did not want to exclusively devote the perception chapter to this 
topic. The tests presented here were made in the spirit of verifying whether the 
correspondence problem can be in part analysed with the help of point light displays. 
The outcome is modest though promising, whereas to fully investigate this avenue 
would require further analysis of the repercussions of the number of points on a 
moving body. The motion capture of both human and machine bodies should be made 
in concert with equivalences already established prior to the recordings. Finally, the 
distribution of the points on the body must be carefully assessed – for instance, in the 
example of the Tiller Girls a nine point cloud screams mechanical construction, while 
a six point structure brings some freedom in the interpretation of the moving dots. 
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4.5. Atmosphere 
This tension between authenticity and representation, a classical principle in 
visual aesthetics that informs any mechanical simulation of the animate, can readily 
shift towards the creation of atmosphere. The concept of atmosphere holds a series of 
opposites – presence and absence, materiality and idealism, the definite and the 
indefinite, singularity and generality – in a relation of tension (Anderson 2009). 
When Boehme introduces atmosphere as a new form of aesthetics, he situates 
its origins:  
The conception of atmospheres as a phenomenon has its origin in reception aesthetics. 
Atmospheres are apprehended as powers, which affect the subject; they have the 
tendency to induce in the subject a characteristic mood. They come upon us from we 
know not where, as something nebulous, which in the 18th century might have been 
called a je ne sais quoi, they are experienced as something numinous – and therefore 
irrational. (Böhme 2013, p. 1) 
He formalizes this je ne sais quoi under a phenomenological perspective:  
Atmosphere is the common reality of the perceiver and the perceived. It is the reality 
of the perceived as the sphere of its presence and the reality of the perceiver, insofar 
as in sensing the atmosphere s/he is bodily present in a certain way.(Böhme 1993, p. 
122) 
Atmospheres synthesise and at the same time legitimize the particular forms of speech 
in which an evening is called melancholy or a garden serene (Böhme 1993). Boehme 
claims that classical aesthetics dealt practically with only three or four atmospheres, 
for example, the beautiful, the sublime and the characterless or “atmosphere as aura”. 
Under Boehme’s definition there is an endless variety of atmospheres: serene, serious, 
terrifying, oppressive to name a few. The multitude of linguistic expressions indicates 
that a more complex knowledge of atmospheres exists than is suggested in aesthetic 
theory. 
When approached from the side of production aesthetics, which makes it 
possible to gain rational access to this “intangible” entity. Boehme claims that  
It is the art of the stage set which rids atmospheres of the odour of the irrational: here, 
it is a question of producing atmospheres. This whole undertaking would be 
meaningless if atmospheres were something purely subjective. […]  It is, after all, the 
purpose of the stage set to provide the atmospheric background to the action, to attune 
the spectators to the theatrical performance and to provide the actors with a sounding 
board for what they present. The art of the stage set therefore demonstrates from the 
side of praxis that atmospheres are something quasi-objective. (Böhme 2013, p. 2) 
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Atmospheres are not things and they are always perceived by subjective experience. 
However, the quasi-objectivity of atmospheres is demonstrated by the fact that we can 
communicate about them in language and that the stage set is a practical proof.  
A further pertinent insight about environments created for (or by) machine 
performers is Svoboda's conception of theatrical and scenic mosaics, which transform 
spatial perceptions, and his notion of what he termed psychoplastic space:  
My essential point in using projections is the creating of new stage space, not as a 
substitute for decor or establishing a locale. […] we want to attempt composing 
individual, separate, and distinctive visual perceptions into a new total-image 
according to a given theme: to convey a given intention by a composition of images, 
their inter-relationship, their temporal and spatial rhythm. […] The result is real 
psycho-plastic space created by transforming the dimensions of space in response to 
the nature of the scene. (Burian 1971,pp. 93-95)32 
Applying atmosphere to (and with) machine performers is recurrent in the late 
20th century. Science-fiction movies are permeated with utopian or dystopian 
sensations rooted in apocalyptic scenarios. Icons of the creation of machine mayhem, 
the performances of Survival Research Laboratory (SRL) are staged in warehouses; 
the sound level is unbearable and the performance usually ends with the entire 
environment being destroyed. What people communicate about SRL is the atmosphere 
they create. 
In my own works, the scenography is an integral part of the machine 
performer, just as it is one of the constituents of its environment. Conversely, I use the 
machine performer as a stage element to create atmosphere. For instance machines can 
become lighting instruments (with intentionality) or dynamic décor. Their labour and 
energy are then part of the atmosphere created. In the practical works found in this 
thesis, La Cour des Miracles is in itself an atmosphere. The scale of Area V5’s array 
of skulls augments the atmosphere of surveillance, and the Tiller Girl theme sets the 
tone of the whole performance. 
                                                
32 Burian actually quotes Svoboda in the presentation of these spaces. 
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4.6. Case Study: Sayonara and Pessoa 
 
Figure 66. Pessoa (Ubu Theatre, 1997) and Sayonara (Hirata, 2011). 
Permission to reproduce Pessoa image has been granted by the Ubu Theatre. Permission to reproduce 
Sayonara image has been granted by the Ars Electronica. 
 
Recently, there has been interest in a theatre play that involves a female 
geminoid (produced by Ishiguro’s laboratory). In the following brief analysis I will 
contrast my concept of the machine performer with, and distance it from, that of 
Sayonara’s humanoid performing on stage.  
The two theatre performances, Les Trois Derniers Jours de Pessoa by theatre 
group Ubu, and Sayonara by director Oriza Hirata, share quite a few aspects. First 
they each stage two characters, one human and the other his/her artificial counterpart. 
Second, the artificial characters are not mobile and their movements are “off-line”, i.e. 
pre-recorded for Ubu’s piece and tele-operated for Sayonara. Third, the robotic artist 
Zaven Paré, currently working with Ishiguro, participated in the production of both 
performances (Paré 2011; Paré 2012; Paré 2013). I interviewed Paré about both these 
experiences. 
I had the opportunity to see both performances live, and while the adaptation 
of Pessoa constantly engaged me, my interest in Ishiguro’s work was almost non-
existent. I had neither a sense of the uncanny in Ishiguro’s work nor any sense of co-
presence. However, I had a pleasant sensation of eeriness from the ghostly presence of 
the video puppet in the Pessoa performance. 
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At the ICRA 201233 workshop, I participated with Ishiguro as an invited 
lecturer discussing the potential of robots for the arts, and specifically for 
performance. Ishiguro himself portrayed the geminoids as “big speakers with a human 
shell”. Indeed, in both performances, the artificial creatures are nothing more than a 
speaker with a human shell. What made me attracted to Ubu’s work and not 
Ishiguro’s? A starting point for the difference lies in the characters. Pessoa is the ghost 
of a human; in fact, the main protagonist has a conversation with himself on his 
deathbed. The actroid is a robot playing the role of social robot character, 
accompanying the main protagonist through her terminal disease. In Sayonara I felt 
stuck between an experimental laboratory34 and a demonstration of the capabilities of 
the actroid. 
From the point of view of the orders of presence and representation, this 
actroid plays the role of an android, which means that the order of representation is 
cancelled and the object represents itself. When it comes to presence, the android is 
too functional, reducing to a dressed-up radio capable of a few facial and bodily 
expressions. Although the android recites the text (poetry) with hints of credible 
emotion (like embodying indifference in an emotionless character), it is not present. 
By anthropomorphizing and instrumentalizing indifference and sentimentality in the 
recitation of poetry, the android fails where it wants to succeed. 
 Hibino’s analysis of Sayonara sees the central character as multistable, 
oscillating between authenticity and fakery (Hibino 2011). However, my perception of 
the situation is radically opposed to this claim. There is only one suggested reading of 
the embodied emotions or behaviours of an android, and this offers barely any of the 
perceptual richness of Fischer-Lichte’s multistability: it is a robot playing a robot in 
the sentimental story of the relationship between a robot and a dying human. Here the 
orders of both representation and embodiment are fixed. These are human 
representations (and stereotypes) rendered in a functional way by a mechanical 
speaker. And although the audience realized that it was a matter of a mechanical 
device trying to achieve a fake sentimentality, they chose to pick up the monotone 
dissonance of a humanoid playing a humanoid. 
                                                
33 International Conference on Robotics Automation 
34 Ishiguro is collecting survey data about the performance. 
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Oscillating between fakery and authenticity, in the context of Orizo’s and 
Ishiguro’s play would lead an audience to consider that the android has a presence on 
stage, incarnating a character that transcends the android’s sole perceived function 
(mainly a speaking human body with minimal facial reactions). As opposed to what 
Ishiguro claimed at ICRA, I would argue that audiences are not duped by the 
geminoid. The geminoid is a machine and is perceived as a machine throughout the 
play. I would argue, in opposition to Hibino’s analysis, that a machine that can recite 
poems does not manifest the fakery of a performer. As Ishiguro himself wrote, an 
automaton saying “thank you” is more aligned to the behaviour of a stage performer 
than to that of a robot playing the character of a robot.  
One can certainly claim that the video playback device (the machine performer 
of Ubu’s play) would fall under the analogy provided by Ishiguro’s incarnated 
speakers. Theatre theorist Liviu Dospinescu discusses the effect of presence and non-
representation in Ubu’s work and claims that contemporary theatre is looking at 
experimental ways of generating presence (Dospinescu 2008). Ubu’s work displaces 
the concept of the actor, replacing it with a video projection (Jacques 2005). The 
actors brought back on stage by this technological means have a different presence, 
but they effectively inhabit the dramatic space: the liminal divide between life and 
death. As Dospincescu argues, the absence of real actors paradoxically heightens the 
sensation of their presence.  
Actual Body (below) vs. Staged 
Representation (right) 
Human Humanoid 
Human  Acting Stereotypical indifference. 
Incongruence in emotions. 
Stereotypical gestures. 
 
Humanoid Breach of believability. 
 
Substitution bound to fail to the 
competence of an agent “out of 
its niche”. 
 
Typical science-fiction 
character. 
Surreal sense of authenticity. 
Potential implosion of the 
representation and presence. 
Table 17. Humans and humanoids playing each others’ roles 
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4.7. Contributing work: Devolution 
The Australian Dance Theatre – via their artistic director Garry Stewart – 
commissioned my first contributing work during this thesis: Devolution (2006). The 
work is a dance performance for metallic and organic performers, in which thirty 
robots share the stage with ten dancers. The atmospheres produced by my previous 
works compelled Stewart, and in Devolution a singular metaphorical universe is 
amplified by a compelling sense of ritual that drives the form and aesthetics of the 
work. The structured repetition of the robotics suggests a rite of passage, evoking 
communality and the metaphysical. The work is richly embedded with symbols of 
transformation. 
4.7.1. Description of work 
The nature of consciousness, the perception of emotion and intelligence, of 
what is living and dying, and how empathy is evoked are the starting points for 
Devolution and its choreographer Garry Stewart. In an early proposal for the work, 
Stewart presented his position: “The work operates through an overt sense of ritual 
with the suggestion that for all of our technology we are still primitive, and of the 
flesh. We continue to engage in religious ritual and we remain biological entities” 
(Stewart 2004). 
As performing entities, Stewart continues, the robots are given equal status to 
the human bodies in the work, albeit with some major operational differences. 
Devolution does not try to conceptually separate robots and humans as different 
species, but it is interested in the collision and confluence of the two. When they 
collide, Devolution becomes an experiment in morphology and function: we 
acknowledge the robots as machines and in doing so we explore the machine-like 
function of the human body and the zoomorphic potential of bodies. By distorting the 
body away from an upright bipedal orientation and challenging the Cartesian view of 
the body, Devolution posits humans as animals, which of course we are. It then 
explores the anthropomorphic potentialities of robotic machines, the nature of human 
consciousness and thought, and the emotional potential elicited by machines in 
relationship with human performers.  The work is a fantasia set in its own universe 
populated with human and machine-made symbols suggesting, as Stewart puts it, 
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deities, angels, creatures and totems. Furthermore, it evokes the image and function of 
a closed ecosystem embodying processes of mutualism, symbiosis, hierarchy, 
sickness, birth and death.  
The work situates humans in communion with both large and small-scale 
robots, and forces us to create a relationship between the two. Through Devolution, 
Stewart and I looked at human bodies and the role of consciousness and human 
emotions, as they co-exist next to machines that are devoid of feeling. Simultaneously, 
the machines were designed and operated so that they purposefully aimed to evoke 
“feelings” and “emotions” and gave the appearance of being motivated by thought. 
This is in conflict with our concept of machines as spiritless and “dead”.  
In the lineage of my works, Devolution explored different facets of the 
anthropomorphic, zoomorphic and mechanomorphic characteristics of the machine 
performer, so that the audience felt empathy and identity with them. Audiences 
seemed to elicit emotional and psychological content, which was in reality produced 
by viewing the machine performers subjectively through the paradigm of our own 
experience as emotion-and-thought-oriented beings (dancers and machine performers). 
In Devolution’s proposal, Stewart concludes:  
What is this saying about consciousness and perception? What is this stating about the 
rationale for movement and gesture? The machines don’t actually care what we think 
about them, they have no conception of our existence or their own. Yet at the same 
time, human beings are also machines, with cables, a central pump, electrical wiring 
etc. Present in every machine is the metaphor of the human body. (Stewart 2004) 
Devolution is a surreal and rich parallel universe that evokes images and functions of a 
closed ecosystem embodying processes of mutualism, hierarchy, territoriality, 
parasitism, predation, symbiosis, senescence, sickness, birth, death and growth. 
Devolution explores the anthropomorphic potentialities of robotic machines and the 
nature of human consciousness and thought. It also explores the emotional potential 
elicited by machines in relationship with human performers.  
Looking at the dancer-machines of Devolution, we see a world in which we 
may no longer be human, if being human means being masters at a distance, different 
and disconnected from all that we survey.  Looking at Devolution, we learn instead to 
live our lives embedded in and enmeshed with the beings of our world. Devolution 
creates a ritualistic drama that disrupts the centrality of humans, inasmuch as they 
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share time and place with their mechanical creations. It triggers the sense of 
pleasurable disruption and irrationality at seeing an object move with what seems like 
decisive purpose and conviction. As humans we find a pathos in the actions of these 
machines that allows us to feel for the struggle they appear to be enduring in enacting 
their simple function. Their struggle is read and understood through our own struggle. 
Empathy is immediately evoked. There is a symbiosis between metal and flesh, as the 
robots are an attempt to express the profoundly human nature of the mechanical realm 
and the profoundly mechanical nature of humankind. As the performance programme 
puts it, to dance with machines is to dance the ecology of our world.  
4.7.2. Aims 
Devolution aims: 
1. To create a relationship between performers and large-scale robotic machines; 
2. to force the audience to create a relationship with large robotic machines; 
3. to explore various morphologies of the machine performers and their 
underlying characteristics so that the audience would feel empathy for them; 
4. to construct an interplay of bodies: human, mechanical and part human, part 
machine with the goal of eliciting emotional and psychological content which 
is, in reality, produced by viewing them subjectively through the paradigm of 
our own experience as emotion-and-thought-oriented beings; 
5. to create a sense of the unreal through ritualistic drama, because this genre 
disrupts the centrality of humans in live performance, as they share time and 
place with their mechanical creations; 
6. to investigate and compare the quality of presence from machine and human 
performers sharing the same stage; 
7. to investigate how organized groups of machine performers can create 
atmospheres and a genre of psychoplastic stage35 – the redefinition of 
scenography in the 20th century.  
Before embarking on the analysis, I will provide some insights into the process of 
designing, producing and rehearsing with machine performers. 
4.7.3. Design and development of Devolution’s machine performers 
                                                
35 Scenographer Josef Svoboda coined this genre (see section on Atmosphere) 
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1) Choreographer’s framework 
In this section, I will trace the process of developing the robots for Devolution. 
The piece works with the dancers exploring choreographic relationships that respond 
to ecosystem processes. The choreographer and director started with this framework of 
ecosystems that became pivotal for the whole design process. Furthermore, to explore 
the relationships of beings within the ecosystem, Stewart and I investigated the 
processes of mutualism, parasitism, symbiosis, mutation, hierarchy, territoriality, 
predation, swarming, herding, carnality, sickness, birth and death (Zimmer 2003). By 
engaging in a closed invented ecosystem embodying these processes, we attempted to 
create a ritualistic drama that disrupts the centrality of humans as they share time and 
place with their mechanical creations. Looking at Devolution, spectators may learn 
instead to live their lives embedded and enmeshed amongst the beings of a world in 
which machines are now an integral element. 
In the design brief, Stewart was equally attracted to the monumental scale of 
my previous works, where he wanted to incarnate large scale machines that would act 
as metaphors for deities, angels and totems. He was also interested in small to 
medium-sized robots that would interact directly with the dancers and can enact 
contact duets and trios with them. Finally, Stewart was looking at a ”kinetic stage” – a 
stage-wide robotic environment that would act as an overarching context for the work.  
2) Interpreting the director’s framework 
In an interview with Stewart, I revisited the development of the robots and we 
discussed their fulfilment of the original concepts of the work. Stewart reflected on the 
ongoing discussion we had had about the strategy of developing simpler and more 
varied machines versus concentrating on fewer but more articulate mechanical bodies, 
closer to human dancer capacities. I reminded Stewart that ecologies rely on diversity 
and the failure of one species should not compromise the whole ecosystem, as might 
be the case with a single complex machine performer. The choreographer had to adapt 
the rich movement vocabulary that he employs with human dancers and to “distribute” 
it among the machine performers. I had to persuade him that the intrinsic qualities of 
the machine performers that I could technically achieve were not situated in virtuosity 
but in its limitations. The challenge is not to create a situation where the machine, as a 
Contributing work: Devolution © Demers 2014 
 
226 
manifestation of a lowest common denominator, impedes its capacity for stage 
presence. 
Staging for dance is a mixed blessing, as an open and empty stage is a flexible 
canvas. However, for Stewart this stage had to remain clear, as his dancers needed a 
minimal volume (extending to a few metres high for their jumps) to execute acrobatic 
drastic, precise and extreme movements. Therefore, most robots have to enter and exit 
the stage for their stage appearance, either from the ceiling (flying), from the wings or 
from an upstage position away from the dancing area. What sounds like a simple 
requirement is already a challenge for robots as, on top of being able to “dance”, they 
would need to be mobile and able to navigate on stage. 
I proposed more than thirty machine possibilities during the early stages of the 
development of Devolution. During that period, Stewart and I had occasion to 
experience each other’s work. Stewart visited my atelier and experienced the co-
presence of some of my previous machines, and I attended several ADT European 
performances during that period. We finally agreed on the development of eight 
different groups of robots that would respectively target the initial concepts of 
Devolution with the provision to drop groups due to unforeseen events at the 
production stage. Among the six species listed below that were finally part of the 
premiere, the first three species were targeted at the kinetic stage and the creation of 
atmosphere while the last three were designed to interact with the dancers: 
1. The Cube. A metaphor of Greek theatre’s deus ex machina, a god-like entity 
morphing into an organic network. The Cube is based on a rigid discrete 
manipulator. Once animated, a strong cognitive dissonance emerges from a 
massive abstract structure that morphs into an organism that softly floats above the 
stage. 
2. The Chorus is the most anthropomorphic robotic entity, though it is sketched down 
to its elementary form. The Chorus manages to interact with minimal human 
gestures mainly derived from its neck and head. 
3. The Swarm is a colony of insect-like robots. Based on a flexible symmetrical 
structure, they can navigate in all directions (Chen and Yeo 2003). 
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4. The Spine is a complex structure based on the assembly of several parallel 
manipulators. The structure and movements recall the morphology of a 
disembodied spine.  
5. The Big Bots are two large hexapods, spanning over four meters, gliding slowly 
across the stage. Despite their large bodies, these robots interact softly with 
dancers. 
6. The mutations or malformations, incorrectly labelled prostheses, are seen as the 
initial phase of a hybrid metallic and organic evolution. They can also incarnate a 
host-parasite relation, distorting, disturbing and convoluting the human body in 
action. Articulations of the mutations are based on a parallel manipulator, enabling 
full revolution around the joint. These “prostheses” are worn by the dancers and 
alter their proprioception, creating a symbiotic-antagonistic relationship between 
dancers and technology.   
Borrowing items such as variable geometry trusses, discrete manipulators and 
parallel manipulators from the mechanomorphic realm, each of the robot species 
reformulates these inert shapes into life-like bodies (Hughes, Sincarsin et al. 1991; 
Merlet 1993 ; Suthakorn and Chirikjian 2001). The design process of the robots is to 
replicate non-organic robot geometries that were originally made to serve a purpose (a 
functional tool) and reappropriate them into one of the machine performers to endow it 
with some degree of intentionally and agency. I also decided to replicate body parts 
across the robot species, to suggest on the one hand common building blocks inside 
this fictitious evolution process, and on the other a process of synthesis, yet with some 
degree of diversity. For instance, articulations (neck, shoulders, elbows) are all based 
on the same mechanical architecture (Chirikjian 1994). 
3)  Production challenges 
Devolution is the result of a large team effort. If I look only at the development 
of the robots, the effort was around 44 man-months distributed over four full-time 
positions (circa May 2005 – March 2006): one production manager and three product 
designers skilled in mechanics and able to build the robots. There were also part-
timers for a period of around 20 man-months.  This does not count my own time, 
which needs to be calculated during pre-production, production and rehearsals. I 
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evaluate my overall time as 15 man-months for this project. The first seven months of 
production were done in Germany where the facilities of my atelier were needed 
(welding, cutting, etc.). Afterwards, the production moved to Australia (where ADT is 
based), where the focus shifted to the final preparation of the robots and rehearsals.  
One of the major constraints of such a large project involving significant 
human and financial resources is that once the production process starts, it is very 
difficult to make any major design changes. There were many moments in the 
rehearsal process when we discovered the potential for alternative forms and functions 
of the robots. Unfortunately, the time and budget forced us to discard these ideas. We 
could only perform minor changes or robot fixes that had no significant impact on 
robot behaviour but more on operability within the performance, although for the 
development of the prostheses I opted to develop mechanical building blocks that 
would only be assembled during actual rehearsals with the dancers. In this way I 
aimed to limit design issues, to customize the host body, and finally to optimize the 
exploration process with the dancers.  
In parallel to the realization of Devolution’s machines in Germany, ADT had 
to develop major sections of choreography independently, without their participation. 
It would only be during the last two months prior to the premiere that the dancers 
could share the stage with the mechanical cast. During the realization phase, my atelier 
was constantly producing video documentation of our interim results. Stewart would 
then show the potentials of these different machines and he would develop a dance 
vocabulary that responded to that of the machine performers 
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Table 18. Devolution’s machine performers (Demers 2006) 
Permission to reproduce these images has been granted by Chris Herzfeld 
4.7.4. Rehearsing with machines in Devolution 
There are two major limitations that alter the immediacy of the usual rehearsal 
process. First there is an important safety/security protocol to respect, since the robots 
can potentially harm the dancers if they are wrongly manipulated. This necessary 
protocol imposes a rhythm that slows down the process. Second, the programming of 
the robots requires an amount of time that makes it impractical to execute within a 
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rehearsal block. In sum, the rigidity of the operational framework of the robot prevents 
spontaneous changes, sudden explorations and improvised adaptation to errors. This 
situation is one of the major concerns raised by the theatre theorists Sermon and 
Ryngaert when they write about robots on stage (Ryngaert and Sermon 2012, p. 116). 
Indeed, choreographing the movements of the robots needs exhaustive 
programming, which in turn generates the actuation sequences of a machine 
performer’s muscles. This is a very time-consuming task compared with directing 
human performers, where you can try out variations at once. On average, I would need 
a few hours simply to test out a new phrase of choreographic movement. While I 
could save time and effort by hiring a skilled programmer, the intricate timing of 
actuation and proper understanding of the robot’s morphological qualities made this 
role very difficult to delegate. Following Kaplan’s observations on the animate 
qualities of successful embodiment, my task as a programmer was to align the control, 
animation and dynamic properties of the robot’s morphology as far as possible. 
Fortunately, building on my experience from staging numerous robot 
performances, I have developed working methods that alleviate some of the above 
concerns. First, I program a palette of nominal movements and build on these. Any 
programmed movement must have operational parameters such as speed and 
amplitude of motion that I can control live to bring variation in rehearsal. Second, I 
never try to program extensively during rehearsals. I simply move to another part of 
the performance and do the needed changes off-stage, ready for the next day. Third, to 
endow further variations on pre-programmed sequences (such as complex gaits), I rely 
on a human operator to provide additional dynamism. For instance, the Spine can 
build up momentum if the triggering of the actuator matches its pendulum motion. 
When a robot has no embodied feedback, the operator becomes an integral part of this 
control loop, acting as a very high level sensor (fusing predictability and 
understanding the end-effect of the motion). I recall Stewart noticing a less energetic 
Spine and asking me if I had changed anything in the program. I simply replied, there 
is a new operator at the desk. This architecture recalls some of the topics visited in 
Chapter 3 where the “intelligence” of the robot is outsourced in the operator. Another 
example of shared tasks between robot and operator is found with the Big Bots. They 
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are remotely controlled by stage crews who can easily steer these huge structures on 
stage without dealing with the complex gait of a hexapod. 
4.7.5. Public presentations and awards 
Devolution was premiered at the International Adelaide Festival in 2006. In 
2007, it was presented at the Sydney Festival, at the newly refurbished Carriage 
Works. Later on that year, Devolution was mounted again in Adelaide, followed by a 
small French tour that brought the work to world dance mecca Theatre de la Ville 
(Paris) and into the national stage network in Annecy. In 2008, I presented Devolution 
in the form of video screenings for the media arts festival “Mutamorphosis” (Prague, 
Czech Republic) and at “Art in Post-Biological Age” curated by Dimitry Bulatov 
(Kaliningrad, Russia). I would estimate the combined number of viewers (open 
rehearsals, advance-premieres and shows) of a live representation of Devolution is 
easily more than 15,000 people. Devolution’s YouTube trailer has a little more than 
35,000 views, mostly during the piece’s stage life, between 2006 and 2008. Kostas 
Metaxas also features Devolution in the art and science documentary series “A kiss of 
art” (S1, EP2). 
The performing arts community awarded Devolution several prizes after its 
premiere, including the “Best new Australian work” and the “Best Lighting Design” at 
the Helpmann Awards 2006 (Australian National Performing Arts Awards and the 
“Outstanding Performance by a Company” at the Australian Dance Award 2006. 
Devolution also received the Ruby Award 2006 for innovation in South Australia and 
also several cinematographic awards for its trailers and commercials. 
These awards indicate a definite level of acceptance and recognition of the 
value of machine performers on stage. The awards also indicate a potential to diminish 
Ryngaert and Sermon’s concerns about the rigidity of robots both on stage and during 
the production process (Ryngaert and Sermon 2012, p. 116). It is important to note 
that this applies in the context of a full-blown production and not just in a small cameo 
appearance of a robot. A full-blown production implies that the machine performer has 
to be integrated – with all the underlying implications – at every level (pre-production, 
rehearsals, publicity and performances) into performance structures that usually 
feature only humans. With regard to McCarren’s comment about the alienation and 
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dehumanization found in early 20th century dance (McCarren 2003), I would regard 
the presence of Devolution’s machine performers on stage as a signifier of the 
mechanization of labour: the labour involved in getting this complex stage machinery 
in motion.  
4.7.6. Analysis of Devolution’s machines (perception) 
This section will analyse representative robots with respect to the issues of 
perception and reception presented in this chapter and to the main issues raised by the 
thesis: i.e. the animate qualities of machine performers, the Uncanny Valley and 
embodiment (seen from nouvelle AI and from a broader perspective). The stage 
presence of each machine performer will be assessed with regard to the audience’s 
perception of its animate qualities.  
On the Uncanny Valley, the work presented human robotic extensions that 
mirror Mori’s original statement about prostheses.  The various embodiments found in 
Devolution stimulate discussion of their ecological and cultural bodies. So far as 
anthropomorphism is concerned, robotic species range from the mechanomorphic to 
the insect-like and finally to the human-like. The animacy analysis will look at 
perception of machine performers’ solos, duets with the dancers, and choreographic 
vocabularies generated between dancers and machines. In Devolution, swarms, 
machine choruses, lighting and soundtrack, conspire to produce atmosphere. 
1) Animacy/intentionality and anthropomorphism 
In Devolution, morphologies span a spectrum from the mechanical to the 
organic. Initially all the machine performers are mechanomorphic, as they share the 
same materials and structural building blocks (joints). When the parts are assembled, 
the visual cues derived from their form determine how the audience will classify the 
static bodies. In static form the Cube is mechanomorphic, the Swarm, the Spine, the 
Big Bots and the Extensions (on the dancer’s bodies) are zoomorphic, and finally the 
Chorus is anthropomorphic. 
Bollen describes the movements of both dancers and machines: 
The envisioning of nature in these works trades Duncan’s cosmic vision for the 
minute and microscopic. The strange ways insects move—with their crisp and 
crunchy biomechanics, their swiftness, swarm and buzz—are traced across the 
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choreography of both works. At times in Devolution, Stewart’s choreography recalls 
the movements, stranger still, of plants and protozoa. (Bollen 2006) 
However, these forms have a new reading when the machines are in action. The Cube 
shifts to zoomorphic. The extensions become either anthropomorphic (mutualism) or 
mechanomorphic (extension as parasite). As the audience is progressively exposed to 
the machines in movement, the Chorus becomes mechanomorphic, while 
intentionality appears in the Swarm, the Spine and the Big Bots. The apparent seeking 
of motion by these machines in relation to the human performers creates these 
intentions. The Big Bots walk towards duets to inspect them, the Swarm circles a solo 
and the Spine looks at the dancing bodies from above. Bollen describes this situation:  
Unlike the dancers, these mechanical monsters have searching eyes—spotlights that 
transfix the dancers in their gaze. They intrude upon them and impinge upon their 
space. The dancers cower and sink beneath the awesome rudeness of the robots’ 
presence. (Bollen 2006) 
On the other hand, the indeterminacy of some robot behaviours is hard to classify, 
leaving the audience with a sensation of limbo. Bollen describes a scene with the Big 
Bots in its functionality, reminding me of the Heider and Simmel experimentation: “A 
robot drags a dancer across the stage and drops him” (Bollen 2006). 
2) Embodied simulation 
In Devolution, the mechanical extensions of the human dancer create a 
morphological variation on the human body (or the machine performer). Does this 
variation make a new body or is it still a type of human dancer? In this context 
Gallagher discusses issues of body-schema and perceived structure:  
The process will allow things to appear as instances of the same phenomenon until 
one generates a variation that turns the phenomenon into something else. To see in an 
essential insight, a Wesensschau, the structural invariants is to see the essence of the 
phenomenon and this happens when one comes to establish a horizon within which 
the object can vary without losing its identity as a thing of that type. (Gallagher 2012, 
p. 308) 
By attaching a minimalistic articulated joint, the machine extension becomes a 
variation of the object “human dancer”. Being integrated and real, it becomes a factual 
variation of the body. However, when the dancer is on the floor, subdued by the 
violent articulations of the mechanical arm, the variation is mechanical. Finally, when 
the dancer wears a forceful frontal extension, we are back to a variation of the human 
dancer. In the framework of Devolution and the mutualism of species, the variation is 
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modulated on the perception of how harmful the parasite is to the host body, or how 
far it is in control of that body. 
In turn, this variation helps to extend the body schema (the imaginative 
invention from our original model) and to generate the potential for triggering 
empathic bodily reactions. In informal discussion with performance-goers, the Tail 
was certainly the most favourite of all the extensions. Questions mainly revolved 
around the bodily perception of having this appendix in motion on your body: 
• It must hurt/ Does it hurt the dancer? 
• How can you dance with this on top of you? 
• How does the tail interact with the body ? 
4) Reality and fiction 
Gallagher presents new forms of life as variations: “In addition, in probing 
philosophical issues that pertain to problem solving or more holistic forms of life, or 
‘life as it could be’ (Langton 1989), the use of simulations and evolutionary robotics, 
rather than imaginative variation alone, facilitates the study of complex systems” 
(Gallagher 2012, p. 309). Devolution suggests how evolutionary robotics and new 
forms of body slightly alter the perceptive process described by Fischer-Lichte. 
First, a new category of object is required, as Fischer-Lichte does not attribute 
the concept of strong presence to objects (Fischer-Lichte 2008, p. 100). I see quite a 
different phenomenal perception and reaction with a machine performer than with a 
prop on stage Likewise, where do we situate the human body – acting as a machine or 
subdued by the group? As Bollen observes:  
Their heads are often down, their faces turned away. Their arms curl out, a leg folds 
up. Sometimes they are rooted, fixed like tripods on the spot, supported on 2 knees 
and an elbow, 2 feet and a hand, 2 hands and a head. At other times, the dancers travel 
in a pack, with arms and legs entwined and overlapping. Three pairs dance a sequence 
mouth-to-mouth. (Bollen 2006) 
Perhaps a new category of objects might be one that encompasses the 
mechanical robot as becoming present (and animate) and the animate human mass of 
bodies as becoming mechanical (or ecological), where the group remains as the 
present performing body. The objects in question are, in this process, transformed into 
vehicles of enhanced, enacted signification. 
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5) Atmospheres 
When the Swarm approaches the solo dancer, and when the Cube performs its 
own solo, the intentionality of these machine performers shifts to the atmospheric. 
These machines produce an experience and a sensation to both the performer and the 
audience, an effect without a tangible cause. 
Bollen describes the Swarm, in action with the solo dancer, in the following 
terms: “A man is left to dance a solo, angular and naked, but not alone […]. Waiting 
in the wings and suspended from the rig are Louis-Philip Demers’ robots which 
stumble, trundle, scatter in to survey the scene” (Bollen 2006). In this case, Bollen 
perceived the stumbling of this swarm as an act of observation – even surveillance – 
from the group. This is a bodily sensation that the audience can recall as an experience 
surfacing from the production of a “surveillance” atmosphere. 
4.7.7. Interview with Garry Stewart 
1) Data gathering 
In late 2007 I developed an analytic survey of the perception of each different 
species in Devolution. I tried to distribute the surveys after the performance in Paris 
but most of the public were simply too anxious to leave the venue (Risner 2000; Glass 
and Stevens 2005). The few people that stayed were gathering with friends and 
declined to fill in a form that would have taken 10 to 15 minutes of their time. I did 
not want to administer the test to people who gathered in the green room after the 
performance as this would be a highly biased segment of the audience (dance experts). 
In retrospect, I should have done so, since I found years later dance perception studies 
that distinguish between novice and expert viewers. Moreover, the Australian Dance 
Theatre, despite numerous invitations, decided not to tour Devolution after 2007. So I 
had no further opportunity to administer the survey to a live performance audience. 
2) Interview with Garry Stewart 
To analyse the work from the perspective of the choreographer, I planned my 
interview with Garry Stewart around a critical review of Devolution. Theatre theorist 
Jonathan Bollen had published a paper on Devolution in which he investigated the 
translation actions and effects operating between humans and machines (Bollen 2009). 
Bollen also analysed the media coverage of the work. 
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Five years after the opening, Stewart still wished for a more elaborate 
vocabulary of the machines. He reflected on the effort of making all these species as 
opposed to concentrating on a few more sophisticated machine types. Similarly, after 
five years of robot development I still provided the same rationale: if we wish to offer 
an ecology, it has to be diversified. At the same time, this redundancy is also an 
analogy of nature, where species come and go and diversification blends failure and 
success. My other rationale is based on my experience of staging robots: as I find it 
difficult to maintain presence for a long period of time, robots can take turns to draw 
the attention of the audience.  
Stewart sees one of the main successes of Devolution in its atmosphere: the 
sheer scale of the work, the various hierarchies of scale in the relations between 
human and machine performers and the energy that radiates from the stage. Bollen 
comments on the atmosphere:  
The robots’ moves are cumbersome, and sometimes cute. When it’s quiet, we can hear 
them creak and breathe. But when composer Darrin Verhagen’s clunking, churning 
industrial score lends aural power to Demers’ machines, we are witness to the 
mechanical choreography of terror. We hear bones crushing and flesh tearing. The 
dancers shrink in fear. (Bollen 2006) 
Stewart recalls the danger of the Cube and how it felt for us to see this mass 
swing past dancers. Bollen describes the end of the piece, a frantic moment of activity 
by the Cube: as the end approaches, the stage is electrified with action, robots agitated, 
lights flashing, bodies pulsing. And then a screen descends. The final video is of a 
clustering of human flesh, shrinking, fading, and disappearing. In the curtain call for 
Devolution, as if to reassure us, only the human performers lined up for the applause 
(Bollen 2006). 
Stewart also sees the extensions as a positive experience of altering dancers’ 
bodies. However, he felt we did not have enough time to experiment with the 
integration of the artificial and mechanical into the human body. Bollen describes the 
extensions in the following terms: “Machines attach themselves to dancers, as 
parasitical appendages that pulse upon the dancers’ bodies with their piston push and 
shove” (Bollen 2006). 
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4.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have suggested that any morphology can lead to different 
perceptions of causality and intention, but that movement is the most highly prioritized 
factor in the perception of an agent’s behaviour. It seems that while 
anthropomorphism is often an inevitable reflex for the viewer, it is very important to 
reconsider the pre-objectified and objectified relationship with the external agent. This 
is why in Tiller Girls I adapted a live performance from the Heider-Simmel 
psychological experiment on animacy, causality and attribution. However, I tried to 
design the Tiller Girls’ movements with morphological computing methods, and 
attribution theory was then applied afterwards. Consequently, a wider variety of 
audience reactions then occurred and they invented narratives, became empathetic and 
shared their associations. But when agents have dissimilar bodies on stage it was more 
challenging to transmit social behaviours to the audience (Devolution). From this I 
would assume that the duplication of machine performers’ behaviours causes a deeper 
level of identification.  
 Furthermore, when the correspondence problem is combined with the “shared 
manifold” hypothesis, the embodied simulation verifies our visceral reaction to the 
machine performers. My experimental results not only demonstrated that we can 
recognize locomotion patterns, like the Tiller Girls’ point light displays, but also that 
we can correspond or match some of our human body schema with the original Tiller 
Girls’ body schema. It seems that different visceral reactions have been underexplored 
in the performance milieu, and machine performers certainly can be used to trigger 
strong anthropocentric reflexes. Therefore, when the co-presence of audience and 
human performers is bonded, the machine performers also become more embodied. 
However, the atmosphere surrounding the performer enhances all of this. 
Atmospheres produce an intangible yet very real presence – one that is almost 
palpable. Atmospheres can be effectively produced by the robotic presence on the 
stage and they can be designed to have an impact on the human performer and 
similarly on the audience’s reception. Machine performers, especially when used in 
choruses or organized groups, create a genre like a psycho-plastic stage. This concept 
comes from 20th century scenography, and has greatly contributed to the production 
of atmospheres on the theatrical stage. As I have shown, my own aim was to design 
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atmospheres for my own machine performers so as to create an experiential (visceral) 
situation rather than an intellectual reaction in the audience. 
 240 
 
Conclusion 
Chapters 
In this thesis I have divided my research into four chapters, drawing from a 
wide range of transdiciplinary historical, scientific and theoretical analysis. In Chapter 
1 I concluded that many similarities could be found between the experience of human 
bodies and machine performers. I suggested that the human potentials of adaptation 
and learning should be considered when building machines for performance. I also 
claimed that the actual morphology of the agent is not the central issue when it comes 
to making a machine performer credible. Perception of the machine as animate is often 
more a matter of the way the context and the fictitious character impact the audience – 
and thus a matter of the condition of the audience and the potentials of their 
perception. Only then can the machine performer’s body in action be congruent with 
its fictional role. 
In Chapter 2 I concluded that the discourse of the Uncanny Valley is extremely 
relevant for designers of machine performers. This is because, as a process, the artist 
often relies on unstable scenarios for inspiration, and the uncanny can be embraced as 
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an aesthetic stance. For these designers, it is more relevant to look at the potentials of 
a machine’s “presence”. I would claim that the audience accepts the agent because it 
feels animate, rather than because of its constituent mechanics. In the Uncanny Valley, 
the scientific mistake is to be anthropocentric; it seems to prevent any alternative 
formulation of this psychological issue. 
In Chapter 3, I concluded that by being machine-centric, the robots of nouvelle 
AI are bound to remain mechanistic objects operating in a terrain that bears no 
resemblance to the social terrains of human beings. Expanding the concept of robot 
embodiment beyond the physical environment, designers can imbue machine 
performers with new capabilities that the mechanistic machine does not possess. 
Furthering the nouvelle AI morphological computing where it distributes locomotion 
onto the robot’s environment, the machine performers’ behaviours are intangibly 
distributed between the audience and the machine, yet physically shared by the co-
presence of both bodies. 
In Chapter 4 I concluded that many mechanisms found in the various levels of 
human perception of movements on the stage are transferable to machine performers. 
Equipped with this result, when machine performers present hints of these human 
behaviours, audiences are better equipped to trigger these mechanisms. Those hints are 
the basis for sharing a phenomenal appreciation (empathy for instance) with any 
machine performer. Anthropomorphism and atmosphere often start with intangible 
perceptions rather than literal signs. What makes anthropomorphism a powerful tool 
for the machine performer is not a facsimile of the human body at all, but all the 
imagined and suggested human components around the machine performer. These 
suggestions are also crystallized in atmospheres; by labeling an atmosphere with a 
word, I suggest that the intangible becomes real. 
To put it succinctly, in this dissertation I posited that my research into the 
“Uncanny Valley”, anthropomorphism, causality and animacy can shift human 
perception of the relationship between modalities and the abilities of machine 
performers on the stage and in other cultural environments.  I hope that by focusing 
with my machine performer experiments on these four areas of shifting human 
perception – the Uncanny Valley, anthropomorphism, causality and animacy – I will 
The Uncanny Valley and shifts in human perception © Demers 2014 
 
242 
have succeeded in expanding these concepts. I will now summarize some of these 
expansions in relation to human perception under these same headings. 
The Uncanny Valley and shifts in human perception 
My original aim was to find common ground about the rejection or acceptance 
of machine performers compared to humanoids. My conclusion was that when 
machine performers are built with an aesthetic based on standard emotional levels of 
audience identification, then they become more popular. This result can definitely be 
enhanced by the use of theatrical aesthetics like lighting, dramaturgy and sound. For 
example, in Devolution the body extensions worn by the dancers produce a strong 
sense of audience identification with the afflicted performer. However, these 
extensions also play a scenographic role in transforming the human performers into a 
chorus of lighting devices. Unlike the shallow concept of the Uncanny Valley often 
used in computer scientific research, I focused on the strong and weak dissonance that 
comes from some representations of what I call “the quasi-living”. This proved 
interesting for many audiences. With La Cour des Miracles, for instance, the 
dissonance signals that come from a machine performer that might be experiencing 
pain do not trigger an uncanny reaction, but rather an empathic response in an 
audience. As opposed to scientific views of the Uncanny Valley, the quasi-living 
status of the machine performers in La Cour des Miracles was not the focal point of 
the audience-visitors’ engagement in the experience.  
However, these shifts in human perception will not work without a very strong 
stage “presence” surrounding machine performers.  Elaborate stage presence causes 
new reactions once posited by Fischer Lichte as “multi-stability perception” (Fischer-
Lichte 2008). Furthermore by carefully orchestrating the (mis)alignment of 
morphology and behaviour in machine performers,  multi-stability can be managed 
and even empowered. Integrating alternate morphologies into their animate behaviour 
can also minimize them. In this sense the machine performers of La Cour des Miracles 
and the Tiller Girls, as well as the body extensions of Devolution, are all alternative 
variations of morphologies from known biological structures. The combination of 
morphological computing and their singular bodies gives these machine performers a 
strong sense of presence: their representation is not specifically designed to be 
anthropomorphic, but their bodies can be seen as extremely animate. 
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Anthropomorphism and shifts in human perception 
I included this topic in the thesis because it seemed essential to examine the 
behaviour of machine performers and compare them to other scientific experiments. 
Although I found a lot of discussion about morphological representation, this 
trajectory was not so popular. I concluded that a shift was needed away from the literal 
and scientific definitions of anthropomorphism towards an abstraction of separate 
parts of human behaviour that the audience can more easily identify with.  Thus with 
Blind Robot, I navigate away from the complex technical task of making an 
anthropomorphic robot touch a visitor by relocating the experience, and thereby 
transforming it into an empathic relation with a blind agent. This process of 
abstraction seems to generate greater affinity between the machine performer and the 
audience. Certainly it tends to engender the machine performer’s relationship with a 
human when an inverted pendulum on a few springs, can make a Tiller Girl walk. The 
gait is decidedly abstract, but the competence of this machine performer to balance 
itself often mesmerizes the crowd. For this reason, in designing my performers I 
focused on metaphors that stage social contexts alongside these machines. For 
example, designing morphology does not provide Tiller Girls with high level 
anthropomorphism; instead, it is the historical context that gives the machine 
performers the connotation of a chorus line of dancers. The anthropomorphism arises 
from the body in action with new intentions attributed to their gestures: namely the 
intention to dance. Furthermore, when theatre directors combine machines with 
dancers from contemporary or historical perspectives this tends to attribute another 
role to machine performers. The point is that “a body” does not have to be 
anthropomorphic to behave anthropomorphically. 
Causality and shifts in human perception 
I realized through the practical research for my thesis that I needed to include 
“attribution” as part of causality, but in a different way from that taken by scientific 
researchers. This is because I am very interested in how the audiences judge the 
machine performer’s intentions. With the Blind Robot experiment, I demonstrated that 
given the same movement, people perceive intentions differently according to the 
manipulation of the machine performer’s suggested character. Functionalism is also 
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related to causality, but in this thesis I have suggested that designers take a major shift 
away from it and instead focus on characterization, personality and emotion. When 
machine performers display the loss of particular functions for the audience, then 
personality and characterization can be triggered. In the Tiller Girls, I deliberately 
open the performance with a series of well-behaved motions that end with a disruption 
caused by a “failure”. So in the end the Girls plunge to the floor. This suddenly shifts 
these machine performers from functioning to dancing. I could sense the audience’s 
perplexity and the triggering of dissonance. This very “failure of function” can cause a 
higher level of empathy in an audience. For example, when machine performers are 
built to elicit standard emotional responses from the viewer, they also reinforce this 
empathy. Thus the Blind Robot’s touch shifted from an instrumental (mechanical and 
functional) to an affective approach. That each viewer asks for the machine to touch 
him or her, in a singular and empathic sensation, means that the audience fully trusts 
the care and gentleness that a blind agent should possess. When machine performers 
are designed to mimic prior known affinities to motion from the historical past, like 
coordinated dance steps, then another type of causality takes place in the mind of the 
audience when they automatically make connections to traditional dance.  
Animacy and shifts in human perception (related to 
causality)  
Here my intentions were closer to theatre.  The aim was to explore the 
potential of machine performers who move without apparent reason and in doing so 
affect causality. For example, if one machine performer is placed on the stage by 
itself, it is perceived as moving, but if two or more join in, then it becomes “dance 
theatre”. This shift in perception seems different when viewing “real life” animation 
than it is when encountering abstract movements that reveal a machine performer with 
unusual intentions. Artificial intelligence researchers often seem to animate in order to 
understand biological behaviour, but perhaps machine performers are more inspiring if 
their behaviour is excitable or unpredictable.  The dance-theatre director of 
Devolution, Gary Stewart, also recommended this as a theatre tactic.  The point is that 
members of the audience always build their own individual narratives or have 
emotional reactions in response, because of   the cultural backgrounds and experience 
they individually bring to the event. As Heider & Simmel demonstrated in the 
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replication of the animacy and attribution experiment; when Tiller Girls move, their 
movement is perceived as walking, but when two Tiller Girls move together, it is then 
perceived as dancing. But group reactions also happen on the basis of shared 
knowledge of cultural events, so that movements from analog machines often foster 
historical stereotypical connotations that are very relevant for a larger part of the 
audience. When agency is embedded into the machine performers, they can also be 
seen to have causality. They could react to human movement or be extensions of 
human movement (Devolution), or react to human movement (V5) or simply move 
because they are built to play with balance (Tiller Girls). All of these are interesting 
potentials to explore when designing machine performers.   
As I have concluded above machine performers are interesting new “actors” to 
include on the stage for a variety of perceptual reasons, however they are often made 
to do one thing and not be multi-functional. In this respect they differ from live actors. 
They do however solicit alternative reactions and dynamics, and even nostalgic 
longings for our own analogue past.  
In this dissertation I have also compared various discussions in the realm of 
performance theory about the concepts of “presence” and “phenomenology”. For 
example, the machine performer corporeality and the character portrayed “in tandem”, 
what Fischer-Lichte once identified as a multistable level of perception (Fischer-
Lichte 2008). So a machine performer can present both authenticity and immediacy to 
provide a richness of multistable states. 
In these theories strong stage presence is mostly attributed to humans and not 
to objects, so I imagine that a new category could be added to this discourse about 
machine performers.  I have claimed that machine performers can trigger primal and 
visceral reactions in viewers, particularly if the machines are deconstructions of the 
human body abstracted by the designer, in other words if they are not human but are a 
part of a human. Certainly, if these abstractions are dramatized for the stage, it tends to 
create an embodied and contextual experience for the viewer. To express this 
conclusion I have made a table that provides a summary outline of these concepts of 
presence, animacy, embodiment and atmosphere as they have been developed in 
successive chapters.    
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Practice Presence Agency 
Animate vs. 
Animated 
Embodied 
Simulation 
Atmospheres 
La Cour des 
Miracles 
Morphological 
computing. 
 
Subsumption. 
 
Embodying pain. T-Ing on 
zoomorphic 
machines. 
Scenography of 
La Cour. 
 
Saturation of 
peripheral vision. 
 
Saturation of 
sound. 
The Blind Robot Tele-presence Embodying a 
blind person vs. 
an instrument 
Upper-Body, i.e. 
shoulders and 
waist. 
Being probe. 
 
Area V5 Gaze back at 
viewer.  
Skulls are more 
automatons than 
bodies. 
Look-gaze. Surveillance. 
 
Sublime with 
scale. 
 
The Tiller Girls Morphological 
computing. 
 
Act of balance 
and richness of 
gaits given the 
rigid shape. 
Dancing and 
performing 
bodies. 
Mapping shoulder 
and torsos. 
 
Upward position. 
Cabaret 
Devolution Extensions. 
 
Presence of 
swarms and 
chorus of 
machines. 
Destabilization of 
body. 
Body extensions. 
 
Spine. 
 
Cube torsions. 
 
Walkers. 
Post- apocalyptic. 
 
Sublime when the 
Cube performs a 
solo. 
 
 
Table 19. Overview of practice vs. chapters 
This table summarizes some of the important mechanisms of perception 
presented in this thesis and the way each practical work subscribes to them. I hope that 
other researchers who are interested to explore these trajectories will analyse their own 
machine performers in a similar way. Therefore I will conclude this dissertation with a 
set of recommendations that other builders of machine performers might like to 
contemplate. 
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Recommendations for the design of machine performers 
in the future 
 
1. Take an experimental approach to the human body 
• Think about fragments of human behaviour instead of whole complex 
androids.  
• Think about the body as an experimental variable meaning, and try to alter the 
morphology. 
• Read about the evidence in psychology of perception to understand or 
appropriate how people identify with “the other”. 
• Be inspired by quantitative analysis of the psychology of perception. 
• Don’t simply build to understand the human body, but think about the body in 
terms of its similarities, complementarities and differences. 
 
2. Consider the power of the stage 
• Think of machines as characters, then apply the same rules for actors.  
• Explore different ways to represent the environment other than the standard 
theatrical procedures. 
• Relate body morphologies to the qualities that already work well on the 
theatrical stage.  
• Consider the concept of atmosphere for machine performers.  
• Compare and utilize scale, because the human reaction to scale creates a 
“sublime” emotion.  
• Rather than think of a machine as being demonstrated, think about it being 
embodied in the installation, theatre or environment 
- Can singular or multiple characters create more dissonance through 
their movements, their intentions or their agency? 
- Atmosphere – use theatrical lighting, sound, etc. These are proven 
techniques that integrate analog machines as if they were performers’ 
bodies. 
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3.  Redefine Embodiment in a different way from that used by science 
• Instead of thinking about how the machine interacts with the environment, 
think about how layers of social and cultural influences can affect the 
behaviour of the body. 
• Try to expand the notion of body to include the imperfect, the naughty, or the 
surprising behaviour that adds to the identification of the body in its 
environment. 
• Even if the machine performer can only do a few things, utilize the 
surrounding environment to make it look more embodied. 
 
4. Look at Embodiment from the nouvelle AI perspective 
• Approach morphological computing not as a computing problem but as a 
kinetic sculpture problem, nouvelle AI is imbued by this learning-by-doing. 
• Empower materials. 
• Ecological Balance. Concurrently design machines that have a niche in both 
the ecological and the cultural. 
• Understand the consequence of morphologies and their intricate links with 
sensor-motor-control. 
 
Perhaps other researchers and designers who are interested in building machine 
performers for the stage can extend this research in future. 
 
END 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
List of support materials (by DVDs) 
 
DVD 1 – Devolution  
• Video documentation 
• Full performance documentation 
• Pictures 
• Documentary 
• Promotional clips 
 
DVD 2 – The Tiller Girls 
 
• Video documentation 
• Full performance in Belgrade 
• Full performance in Paris 
• Pictures 
• Stumpy documentation 
 
DVD 3 – La Cour des Miracles / Area V5 / The Blind Robot 
 
• Video documentation of all works 
• Images of all works 
• Area V5 tests in laboratory 
• Blind Robot video excerpts of subjects interacting with the robot 
 
 
DVD 4 – Support Materials. 
 
• PDF copy of this document 
• Source code 
• Interviews with Garry Stewart and Zaven Paré 
• Publications related to the thesis 
• Surveys 
- Questionnaires 
- Experimental Results 
• Video clips 
- Tiller Girls video for Heider & Simmel experiment 
- Point light displays used in perception of motion 
 
 
 
